Bluetooth Authentication and Personal Identification Number Estimation by Attacker

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Abstract: This research deals with the mechanisms used in Bluetooth Link-level security Mode. In this mode, a Bluetooth device will initiate security measures before a channel is established. This is a built-in mechanism that is used regardless of the application layer security that may also be used. In this study we have discussed about the estimation of personal identification number by the attacker and demonstration of how the security of the Bluetooth devices is disturbed.

Key words: Pairing, personal identification number, initialization key, link key

INTRODUCTION

Bluetooth, a short-ranged wireless technology, was originally designed to be a cable replacement. Due to its energy efficient nature and its low cost of production, Bluetooth has become a popular way for small mobile devices to connect to each other wirelessly. Today, most of mobile phone models support Bluetooth and most of the palm pilots provide Bluetooth connection. As more and more personal information is stored within these gadgets, Bluetooth will become an increasingly important gateway that mobile phones and palm pilots manufacturers need to guard. Although Bluetooth technology has been around for more than 10 years, its design may not be secured enough for some potential applications. Most mobile phones have their Bluetooth features turned off by default so that only knowledgeable users will turn them on. Mobile phone manufacturers also recommend users not to turn on the Bluetooth connections on their mobiles when they are not in use in order to minimize the risk of being attack by hackers. Bluetooth designers also recommend people not to bond Bluetooth devices in public places. All these facts are reinforcing the fact that the Bluetooth security (SIG, Part B, 2001) design is insufficient for many applications.

THE BLUETOOTH PAIRING AND AUTHENTICATION PROCESS

The Bluetooth pairing procedures consist of 3 or 4 steps:

- Creation of an initialization key (Kinit).
- Creation of a link key (K_{AB}).
- Authentication.
- After the 3 pairing steps are completed, the devices can derive an encryption key to hide all future communication in an optional 4th step.

Creation of Kinit: The K_{init} key is created using the E_{22} algorithm, whose inputs are:

- A BD_ADDR.
- The PIN code and its length.
- A 128 bit random number IN RAND.

This algorithm outputs a 128-bit word, which is referred to as the initialization key (K_{init}).

Figure 1 describes how K_{init} is generated using E_{22}.

The PIN code is available at both Bluetooth devices. One hundred and twenty eight bit IN RAND is transmitted in plain text.

This initialization key (K_{init}) is used only during the pairing process. Upon the creation of the link key (K_{AB}), the K_{init} key is discarded.

Creation of K_{AB}: After creating the initialization key, the devices create the link key K_{AB}. The devices use the initialization key to exchange two new 128 bit random words, known as RND_1 and RND_2 (SIG, Part B, 2001). Each device selects a random 128 bit word and sends it to the other device after bitwise xoring it with K_{init}. Since both devices know K_{init} each device now holds both random numbers RND_1 and RND_2. Using the E_{21} algorithm, both devices create the link key K_{AB}. The inputs of E_{21} algorithm are:

- A BD_ADDR.
- The 128 bit random number RND.

E_{21} is used twice in each device, with two sets of inputs. Figure 2 describes how the link key K_{AB} is created.

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Fig. 1: Generation of $K_{aa}$ using $E_{21}$

Fig. 2: Generation of $K_{ab}$ using $E_{21}$

Fig. 3: Mutual authentication
MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION

Upon creation of the link key $K_{AB}$, mutual authentication is performed. This process is based on a challenge-response scheme (SIG, Part H, 2001). One of the devices, the verifier, randomizes and sends (in plain text) a 128 bit word called AU_RAND. The other device, the claimant, calculates a 32 bit word called SRES using an algorithm $E_i$. The claimant sends the 32 bit SRES word as a reply to the verifier, who verifies (by performing the same calculations) the response word. If the response word is successful, the verifier and the claimant change roles and repeat the entire process. Figure 3 describes the process of mutual authentication. The inputs to $E_i$ are:

- The random word AU_RAND$_A$.
- The link key $K_{AB}$.
- Its own Bluetooth device address (BD_ADDR$_a$).

**BLUETOOTH CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES**

**Bluetooth PIN Guessing:** The basic attack assumes that the attacker eavesdropped on an entire pairing and authentication process and saved all the messages (Table 1) the attacker can now use a brute force algorithm to find the PIN used. The attacker enumerates all possible values of the PIN. Knowing IN_RAND and the BD_ADDR, the attacker runs $E_{i2}$ with these inputs and the guessed PIN and finds a hypothesis for $K_{an}$. The attacker can now use this hypothesis of the initialization key, to decode messages 2 and 3.

Table 1: List of messages sent during the pairing and authentication process. "A" and "B" denote the two Bluetooth devices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Message No.</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Message signal</th>
<th>Length of message in bits</th>
<th>Message format</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>IN_RAND</td>
<td>128 bit</td>
<td>Plain text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>LK_RAND</td>
<td>128 bit</td>
<td>XORed with $K_{an}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>LK_RAND</td>
<td>128 bit</td>
<td>XORed with $K_{an}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>AU_RAND$_A$</td>
<td>128 bit</td>
<td>Plain text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>SRES</td>
<td>32 bit</td>
<td>Plain text</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Messages 2 and 3 contain enough information to perform the calculation of the link key $K_{AB}$, giving the attacker a hypothesis of $K_{AB}$. The attacker now uses the data in the last 4 messages to test the hypothesis: Using $K_{AB}$ and the transmitted AU_RAND$_A$ (message 4), the attacker calculates SRES and compares it to the data of message 5. Figure 4 describes the entire process of PIN estimating.

Note that the attack, as described, is only fully successful against PIN values of under 64 bits. If the PIN is longer, then with high probability there will be multiple PIN candidates, since the two SRES values only provide 64 bits of data to test against.

**CONCLUSIONS**

This study describes the implementation of an attack on the Bluetooth security mechanisms. Specifically, we describe a attack, in which an attacker can find the PIN used during the pairing process.

Since Bluetooth is a wireless technology, it is very difficult to avoid Bluetooth signals from leaking outside the desired boundaries. Therefore, one should follow the recommendation in the Bluetooth standard and refrain from entering the PIN into the Bluetooth device for pairing as much as possible. This reduces the risk of an attacker eavesdropping on the pairing process and finding the PIN used.

**REFERENCES**
