An Examination of the View that Political Power in the Arab World Rests Simply on a Regime's Control of the Military and Security Services (Three Case Studies: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq)

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Abstract: Source of legitimacy of the political power in the Arab World is a very complicated issue. The problem of the regimes is in their dependence on the support of the coercive elements in society (viz. military and security services). The frequent and, sometimes, violent changes of the governments and heads of the states reflect the nature of these regimes. Does the power in the Arab World in general, and in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq rest on military and security service or these regimes rest on other sources of support? This question forms the statement of the problem of the study. There has been a great deal of confusion about the nature of the regimes in the Arab World, the various descriptions of these regimes range from a military dictatorship to a "democratic" multi-party regime, from a bourgeois reformist to a revolutionary mass-movement regime, and from a nationalist and pro-communist (case of Yemen in the past) to a Islamic regime. This study deals with the issue of political power and whether it rests on military and security services or on other sources of support? The historical scope of this study covers the period after the Second World War until the 1980. It concentrate on three case studies: Nasser's and Sadat's Egypt, Qasim's Iraq and after and Saudi Arabia monarchy regime. I will try to show the role of the military and security services in politics in these countries.

Keywords: Political Power, Security Services, Arab World

Introduction
In this paper I intend to discuss the issue of political power in the Arab World and to examine the view that it rests on a regime's control of the military and security services. I will concentrate on Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq as case studies.

The analysis also deals with the problem of democracy and sources of the regimes' legitimacy in the Arab World. In all cases, it will be appeared that the military and security services play a decisive role in supporting the political power.

Undoubtedly, it is important to analyze the political power in the Arab World, and to show whether it rests on popular support or on the military and security services. It is important to focus not only on the role of the leader, but also it is necessary to include the individuals or the groups and organizations who facilitate the leader's rise to power. It would be important also to analyze the role of the military and security services in politics in the Third World in general, and in the Arab World in particular in the light of absence of democracy and popular participation.

The objectives of the study are to discuss the relationship between the political power and security services in the Arab World. To analyze the source of support to political power and the increasing role of the military in political life at the same time the diminishing of popular participation in politics. To examine the source of "political elites" in the Arab World, especially in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. To show the military's role as a pool from which the majority of the leaders in the Arab World come.

In general, this study focuses on the background characteristics of those who reached the highest positions in the Arab regimes, especially in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The following hypotheses will be treated through the analysis: The political power in the Arab World in general, and in the case studies in particular, rests mainly on military and security services. Although, there are many political institutions (especially in the case of Egypt), the popular participation is absent.

Materials and Methods
Political power and the Military and security services: (Theoretical Background): "Covenants without swords are but words". Thus did Hobbes sum up, typically, one of the more elementary and depressing truths of political science. "The world is a garden, the fence of which is the dynasty. The dynasty is an authority through which life is given proper behaviour: Proper behaviour is a policy directed by the ruler. The ruler is an institution supported by soldiers. The soldiers are helpers maintained by money. Money is sustenance brought together by the subjects." "Attributed to Aristotle". (Huntington, 1962)

"In South America... The republics depend on military force. Their whole history is a continued revolution... only force and the forms which are called Constitutions are in this case only a resort of necessity, and are of no protection against mistrust." "HEGEL" (Huntington, 1962) Long before Mao Tse Tung stated his famous thesis that "political powers grows out of the barrel of a gun", a Prussian Emperor had his Guards armed with rifles upon which was engraved the warning: "The final word of the Emperor". The connection between violence and power had been learnt by the rulers and rebels over many centuries. (Kennedy, 1974)

Civil-Military Relations: Old Nations and New: Experience in civil-military relations in different Western nation-states has hardly been uniform. But where mass democracy has emerged, the intervention of the military establishment in domestic politics has become limited, and its influence is felt mainly in the conduct of foreign affairs and defense policies. Similarly, in the past, in
one-party Communist regimes, the military had been neutralized in its internal political power, although, as in mass democratic states, it remained an important agent in influencing foreign affairs (Janowitz, 1964) As a basis for comparing industrialized states with new nations, it is possible to identify three models of political—military or civilian-military relations: The aristocratic model of political-military elite: This pattern prevailed Western European powers before industrialism began to have its full impact. There is a comprehensive hierarchy in the aristocratic model, which delineates both the source of authority and the prestige of any member of the military elite. The low specialization of the military profession makes it possible for the political elite to supply the bulk of necessary leadership for the military establishment. The classic pattern is exemplified by the aristocratic family, which supplies one son to politics and one to their military. Birth, family connections, and common ideology insure that the military embody the ideology of dominant groups in society. Political control is civilian control, because there is an identity of interest between aristocratic and military groups. (Janowitz, 1964) The democratic model of civilian-military elite: Under the democratic model, civilian and military elite's are sharply differentiated. Civilian-political elite exercise control over the military through a formal set of rules, which specify the functions of the military and the conditions under which the military may exercise its power. In particular, these rules exclude the military from involvement in domestic partisan politics. Military personnel are professionals in the employ of the state, and their careers are distinct from civilian careers. In fact, being a professional soldier is incompatible with holding any other significant social or political role. Military leaders obey the government because they accept the basic national and political goals of a democrat, and because their duty is to their profession to fight. Professional ethics, as well as democratic parliamentary institutions, guarantee civilian political supremacy. (Janowitz, 1964) The democratic model has been achieved in western industrialized countries. The totalitarian model of civil-military elite: The totalitarian model, as it developed, originally, in Germany, in Russia, and, to lesser a degree, in Italy, rests on political control of the military by a centralized and authoritarian one-party political system. In part, the military supports the political elite because the totalitarian party places extensive resources at its control. Political control is enforced by the secret police, by infiltration of party members into the military system of officer selection. (Janowitz, 1964) The civil-military relations in the Third World: Neither the democratic nor the totalitarian model adequately serves to describe civil-military relations in the typical new nation the Third World. These models are not applicable because the military has wider involvement in domestic economic, social, and political change. Fundamentally, this derives from the weakness of civilian political institutions. It is the result of the sheer quantity of resources that the military establishment, in comparison with other bureaucratic institutions and professional groups, has been able to accumulate. In General, the political power, in the Third World rests on power and security services. This is a widespread phenomenon. More than of twenty states of Latin America have been subjected to waves of militarism for a century and a half. Though it is possible to discern signs that this influence on politics is diminishing, in the last years. The military revolution in South and Central America had become a joke because of its frequency and of its consequent temporary nature. In Africa and many counties in Asia, the military plays an important role in domestic affairs. The armed forces of the Third World countries are emerging as social and political institutions of prime importance. (Janowitz, 1964) Many of the Third World countries face the problem of all states: to establish their legitimacy. Seymour M. Lipset defined legitimacy as the "Capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society". (Gutteridge, 1964) In the Third World, we can distinguish between two theories of the military intervention in political affairs: The first: the permanent revolution theory: This is a notion that derives from Marx. During the period from 1960 to 1972 alone, there had been over 200 military coup d'etats in the regions of the Third World. The political power rests mainly on the support of the military. The second: the legitimacy thesis: Different states and powers ensure their legitimacy by different mean; in a parliamentary system legitimacy is inferred from the government's majority resting on the electoral mandate won in a freely contested election. In the ex-socialist countries, the legitimacy of the ruling party is tied to the theory of a vanguard party representing the historic interests of the proletariat and the revered model values of socialism. In some of totalitarian states the alleged genius of the leader is the legitimizing force. (Janowitz, 1964) Janowitz argues that for the purposes of analyzing the military in the political development of the new nations, five types of civil-military relations can be identified: Authoritarian-personal control: The first is an authoritarian of the type (which may be based on a personal autocracy. (Ethiopia's Sylasi for example). This type is likely to be found in nations just beginning the process of modernization. Authoritarian-mass party control: In a few countries, in the Third World, the military is no more than a mark of sovereignty and is exclude from domestic politics by the power of civilian authoritarian political power. (for example in Ghana, Mali, and Guinea after their independence). Such authoritarian power may be rooted in a one-party state, under a strong leadership, without parliamentary institutions. Democratic competitive: In these states, both the civilian police and paramilitary institutions operate as counterweights to the military, which is small and not yet fully expanded. The military has a limited role because it is organizationally undeveloped, or, as in the case of the officer corps took a long time after their independence. On the other hand in a few nations, e.g. in Nigeria, Malaysia, and India, the military is limited because of the strength of competitive democratic institutions. In a number of states there are semicompetitive systems, as in Morocco and Tunisia, civilian supremacy operate to limit the role of the military in part because colonial traditions implanted a strong sense of self-restraint on the military. In these states, there are competing civilian institutions and power groups which dominates domestic politics but permits a measure of political competition. Civil-military coalition: When the military expand its political activity and becomes a political bloc, the civilian leadership remains in power only because of the
Military's passive assent of active assistance. Here the military serves as an active political bloc in its support of civilian parties and other bureaucratic power groups. (for example: Turkey, Pakistan and Burma) The military may be forced to establish a caretaker government. **Military oligarchy:** The political initiative passes to the military, when actual takeover occurs and the military becomes the ruling group, civilian political activity is transformed, constricted, and repressed. (Janowitz, 1954).

The military may play an important role in the Third World more than supporting the political power, such as helping in modernization, assimilation and national integration and other functions. (Kennedy, 1974)

**Political change in the Third World is a violent process.** The military has played an active role in supporting the political power (Kennedy, 1974)

The rationalizations that the military regime-tippers adduced to justify their actions were standard. Their reasoning rested on two premises:

**Firstly:** that the former regime and the guarantors of the national welfare had betrayed their trust.

**Secondly:** that the army serves the nation or the state but not the government or the regime of the day.

Hurewitz argues that "In throwing the office-holding rascals out, the soldiers claimed that they were performing the highest duty to the nation. They were cleansing the country of corruption, tyranny, and selfish interest. In tearing up constitutions, deposing or even slaying monarchs, arresting cabinet members, dissolving legislatures, suppressing political parties, and introducing martial law, the military officers insisted that they were simply putting an end to sham parliamentary democracies whose manipulators had kept themselves in office through fraudulent elections and infringement of the laws (Howard, 1957)."

In every instance, the soldiers stated that they had intervened in politics reluctantly and for the sole purpose of setting public affairs in order. They promised to refashion the political system, insulate it against any recurrence of the former evils, and make it responsive to the popular will. They harbored no political ambitions, they said, and sought only to restore honesty honor and freedom to the land and efficiency to public administration and to reassert the rights of the people.

Once this mission was accomplished, the military rulers pledged to hand the reigns of power to elected representatives and to retire from politics. (Janowitz, 1964)

**Political power and the military and security services: three Case Studies:** In this part of the study I intend to show the role of military and security services in the political life of three of Arab Countries: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

**Case One: Egypt** The military and security dimension of power: Since the 1952 revolution, Egypt has been ruled by the military. The collapse of the monarchy opened the doors before the Free Officers. The rulers who have succeeded each other were officers in the Egyptian army: Naguib, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak.

Nasser spoke of the role of the military in his regime as "The vanguard and the shield" of the revolution. Baker argues that"This formulation is vague, and appropriately so, for it reflects a basic ambiguity in the relations between the Free officers movement and the larger military establishment. The conspiratorial origins of the free Officers and the mediation through friendships of their ties to the military make it difficult to define a vanguard or a shield relationship. Still, such conceptuality does recognize a salient reality of Egyptian political life: ruling power in Nasser's Egypt had a pronounced military coloration. Sadat assumption of power had not altered this fact. (Mcwilliams, 1967)

**The prominence of the Military as a source of the revolution:** In 1952, nationalist conspirators in the military, led by Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser and calling themselves the Free Officers, seized power. The Egyptian army put an end to the Mohammad Ali dynasty's rule. In doing so, it was the record of traditional subservience of the army to the British and to the Crown that dethroned King Farouk's vigi. The king was certain that by manipulating his firm control over the high command he could ensure its loyalty. Although the army was used as a tool in the hands of the King and the British to suppress any opponent movement, Farouk's confidence in the army proved naive. The military dimension of power in the Egypt of the Free Officers has been manifested in the prominence of military men in key political positions. In the formative years following the revolution, decisive power in Egypt was consistently concentrated in the hands of Nasser and approximately a dozen fellow officers, most of them veterans of the Free Officers movement. For less than two years, from September 1954 to June 1956, the eleven members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), as the Free Officers executive renamed itself after the coup d'etat, sat in the cabinet, where they outnumbered the civilians. The RCC members retained their military commissions, wore their uniforms, and used their military and ministerial titles interchangeable. No one doubted the military character of the regime at that time. Even the junta acknowledged it. (Bienen, 1986) Major- General Muhammad Naguib - the first president of the Egyptian Republic, the president of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the prime minister, and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, military governor, minister of defence, and minister of interior - was a generation older than his junta colleagues who viewed him as no more than their front man.

**The Revolutionary Measures To Keep Power:** (The Authoritarian Regime): The collapse of the monarchy set off a power struggle in which various political forces bid for a share of power. The ifad movements, by virtue of their links to the Free Officers and their support for radical change, all made a claim. The Free Officers soon decided, however, not to share power and to establish and authoritarian regime. The origins of the officer movement in a small personally knit "in-group", inhibited power sharing with 'outsiders'. Equally important, they feared that the sharing power would jeopardize the radical reforms they envisioned. The right opposed any change and the left, in the Officers' view, wanted too much. The Muslim Brothers' fundamentalism threatened their modernizing ambitions. The masses, they believed, were too imbued with particularism, too different to traditional leaders, or too susceptible to extremist appeals to participate politically except under strong tutelage. (Hurewitz, 1969) To surrender their newly won power in the name of democracy threatened to return Egypt to the stalemate and disorder of the pre-coup period and sacrifice their dream of a strong new state. Democracy was simply no important priority. The new regime attempted to eliminate all aspects of liberal action and thought that could be seen as an alternative to Nasserite rule. Toward this end the military rulers abrogated the 1923 constitution and replaced it on December 10,195, with one that granted

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strong executive authority to the president. The official documents of the 1952 revolution denigrated the historic role of the constitutional nationalists, and thus denied the legitimacy of the liberals’ struggles. The regime removed liberal spokesmen from public life and attacked their institutional basis, interfering in the internal affairs of such liberal strongholds as the Bar Association. In 1953 the government banned all existing political parties including the Wafd, and prohibited the formation of new ones. (Hurewitz. 1969)

According to the liberal historians, the greatest sin of the military rulers was the suppression of the 1923 constitution and the political parties. In their view ratification of the new constitution by referendum and all subsequent constitutional arrangements devised by the Free Officers were only a screen to conceal the reality of arbitrary military rule. (Hurewitz., 1969)

Step by step all dissidents political forces were repressed: Bourgeois political parties disbanded, leftwing workers smashed and finally, the Muslim Brotherhood crippled. Freedom of expression and activity was curbed, overt opposition driven underground. Officers who had put their connections to political forces above loyalty to the victorious Free Officers were purged and cohesion among the new leadership re-established. (Baker, 1978; 1990)

**Military and Monopoly of Power:** Gamal Abdul Nasser, with the military as the bedrock of his support was the master of Egypt. In the early years of the revolution, Free Officers avoided to share power with civilians. They would rule through the captured military establishment, acting as a king of poetical stage manager above politics, yet preserving the monopoly of decisive power political stage manager role for Nasser and the Free Officers might be clear in General Naguib’s appointment as front for the Free Officers.

**Nasser’s regime: one party organizations replacing the multiparty System:** (the role of the Military and Security Personnel). The institutional locus of Free Officer power was the Executive Committee, which after January 1953 was known as the Revolutionary Command Council. In 1956 the Revolutionary Command Council was dissolved in an effort to de-emphasize the military aspect of Free Officer rule. Nasser and his key Lieutenants resigned their military commissions to assume what ostensibly were to be civilian positions in a government outlined by a newly ratified constitution. Despite a certain symbolic importance, these costume changes did not alter the fact that the same military personalities, led by Gamal Abdul Nasser, continued to play the leading roles. In all governments after 195the top positions have been held by officers. Furthermore, the presence of the military at the ministerial level generally has been impressive: of the sixty-five men who held portfolios in the government between 1962 and 1967 twenty-seven were former officers. Such heavy reliance on military and security personnel freed the new regime of the necessity to ally itself closely and irrevocably with any social class or stratum. (Hinnebusch. 1985)In 1956 the Nasser regime created the first of series of one-party organizations to replace the multiparty system. The government announced that these political structures would give the masses an opportunity to participate in the new revolutionary political order. The liberals regarded these government parties; (The Liberation Rally, the National Union, and the Arab Socialist Union) as an effort to fill the vacuum created by the dissolution of the Wafd and other historic political parties “with artificial organizations that found no real echo or response from the people”. In fact, the regime itself recognized that the successive Nasserist parties never succeeded in winning the political loyalty of the masses. The liberals attributed this failure to the political impotence of the official parties; none of them, exercised any real check on the absolute power of the military rulers. (Hinnebusch, 1985)

The power in Egypt, during Nasser’s period, had been held by the Military; “Every one knew”, reported Soviet specialist G.I. Mirsky, “that the real power in the country was the army and important questions were decided by President Nasser.” Description of constitutional and political party arrangements and political party arrangements devised by the regime over the years can safely be left to traditional institutional historians: effective power for decision making has consistently lain elsewhere.” (Baker, 1978; 1990)

M.H. Haikal, in an article published during the self-critical period after the 1967defeat, wrote that in Nasser’s Egypt”. The dominant element is the old military element that took part in the operation of July 23, 1952 or was in contact with those who did have a direct part “Haikal acknowledged that “. The ensemble of those who hold power does not constitute a single but rather several formtions the strongest of which without doubt is represented by an alliance between the Army High Command and the Secret Police. (Baker, 1978; 1990)

The Military Rule and Absence of democracy: Real power in Nasser’s Egypt did not flow through the officially prescribed constitutional channels. Given the fact that power mechanisms in Nasser’s Egypt were highly personalized, the crucial to the actual system of rule was the relationship established by Nasser between his regime and the military establishment. Since that relationship set a pattern characteristic of Nasser’s rule generally, it merits close study. Analysis here will focus on the appointment of Abdul Hakim Amer as military commander in chief.

The army was used to guarantee Free Officer power and the success of the revolution. Once their coup had succeeded, the Free Officers were deeply concerned to win over those military officers still uncommitted to the movement. That concern is reflected in the initial choice of General Naguib to act as a figurehead for the younger officers. Nasser said that the man chosen should be “a middle-aged man. Some senior officer, older than any of us; someone whose name will command the respect of the entire army, and lead the people. (Hinnebusch, 1985)

When Naguib became the first president of the Egyptian Republic in June 1953, Abdul Hakim Amer succeeded him (at Nasser's insistence) as commander in chief. From that time until just before his reported suicide after Egypt's defeat in 1967, Amer retained that position. Nasser was concerned primarily lest the Free Officers lose their recently established control over the larger military establishment. The Egyptian journalist Aboul Fath quoted Nasser as arguing: We cannot leave the army without control...we will be threatened if we do not establish an effective control over it. You have ascertained that there is a certain malaise which has begun to make itself felt in the units. I would not be surprised if a faction of the army one night carried out our arrest. But the whole army loves Abdul Hakim Amer and that is why I insist that he be nominated commander in chief. (Baker, 1978; 1990)

Amer's dual commitment to Nasser and the military establishment was harmonized by the mutually beneficial relationship between the revolutionary government and
the army. Whatever his original intentions, Nasser’s own fate was bound up with the army insofar as he derived power from it; the army in its turn would owe great deal to the new regime. (Baker, 1978; 1990).

The mandate system secured for Nasser the essential support of the Egyptian army until Amer’s own loyalty apparently broke under the strain of the defeat by Israel in 1967. Until that time Nasser could congratulate himself for success of the Amer appointment in securing the military as the basic prop for his regime.

**Military as a source of Nasser’s regime elite:** The army came to represent for Nasser a personnel pool for far-reaching extramilitary tasks. Below the ministerial level, he military has been strongly in evidence throughout the political, administrative, and economic hierarchies. The pool from which these men have been drawn for government service comprises the approximately thirty-five hundred members of the officer corps who remained after the first purge of the monarchy elements in the armed forces immediately after the revolution. Since about twenty-three hundred of that group continued to pursue army careers, it can be figured that roughly a thousand officers over the years have been drawn into the service of the state in administrative or economic capacities. In 1961, for example an estimated three hundred men of military background were serving in the various ministries. In 1964, at least twenty-two of the twenty-six provincial governors were active or retired officers of the security forces. (Baker, 1978; 1990)

These military figures undoubtedly stabilized Nasser’s regime and guaranteed the political survival of the Free Officer rule. "The role of the Army" Nasser never tired of repeating, did not end on July 3, 1952. Army is not isolated from the people, Nasser described the revolutionary role for Egypt’s men in uniform. Addressing noncommissioned officers in 1962 he observed that each officer represented a "revolutionary cell among the mass of the people" (Baker, 1978; 1990)

Nasser characterized the military as the force that implemented the Syrian union. The integration of the Egyptian and Syrian armies under the Egyptian domination was to serve as a binding force, Nasser’s reliance on the army to rule Egypt was reflected in his policies toward Syria. The activities of the Egyptian military in Syria include not only the retraining of the army but active participation in the civilian administration.

**Advantages of the officers in Nasser’s Egypt:** In Nasser’s Egypt, the officers enjoyed social prestige on one hand and many privileges on the other with the selection of officers for a broader role in society. The political role played by the military could be attributed to Nasser’s personality.

Whatever patriotic zeal officers might feel has also been eroded by the very considerable privileges they have come to expect in Egypt. It has been profitable to be an officer in the new Egypt. Officers have found themselves at the top of the social pyramid, and great care has been taken to shield them from difficult aspects of daily living: army transportation is regularly available for their use. Officers have their own impressive social clubs. They have regularly been paid better than their civilian counterparts, and those salaries go even further with a whole net-work of consumer privileges, including special high-cost living allowances and well-provisioned cooperative stores for their exclusive use. (Baker, 1978; 1990)

The journalist Ahmed Bahaaeddin has argued that the effectiveness of the Egyptian army has been undermined by these benefits. (Baker, 1978; 1990)

**Military and the Bureaucracy:** Nasser created administrative bodies to expand the functional capabilities of his regime. The security and military figures occupied the key positions in the bureaucracy. The role of technocrats was very limited. The military and the political police became a law unto themselves at the expense and of the security and rights of the citizens on one hand, and at the expense of the efficiency of bureaucracy on the other. Around Nasser was a core elite whose members served as vice presidents, premiers or in strategic ministerial or party posts. Except for a handful of outstanding civilians, this group was exclusively military, recruited and replenished from the Free Officer movement. The military scattered across the heights of the state apparatus, functioned as a relatively cohesive political cadre who decided and enforced the regime’s policies; the civilian experts provided them with the technical competence to do this job. (Baker, 1978; 1990)

In 18 years, Nasser formed 18 cabinet with 131 different individuals. More than 40 per cent of them were officers or ex-officers. Under Nasser, the cabinet was heavily dominated by the military. The cabinet has rarely contained skillful, professional politicians. Technocrats were co-opted to handle specific ministries. (Baker, 1978; 1990 and Koldziej, 1982)

**Sadat’s Egypt and military and security:** In the Egypt of Sadat, as of Nasser, real power has rested with the military/police complex, not with civilian institutions. Sadat enhanced the power and prestige of Egypt’s officer corps. It is no accident that as Egypt entered the second half of the seventies, the regime of Anwar es-Sadat had its prime minister Mamdouh Salem, a man who had made his career in the security apparatus and who was rewarded by Sadat for minister of interior. The vice-president was Husni Mubarak, an air force general who had distinguished himself in the October War. (Baker, 1978; 1990)

Sadat has exploited Egypt’s performance in the October war to restore the prestige of the army, disgraced by 1967 defeat, and consolidate his support within it. In the wake of October, Sadat promoted a whole series of front-line commanders. The Second and Third, for example, in 1975 were commanded by the officers who led them during the actual fighting in 1973. Their predecessors, with less reason for gratitude to Sadat, have been moved into honorific, non-active positions as “advisers” in the Ministry of defence (It was named the War Ministry but this name was changed by Sadat and became Defense Ministry). Military salaries and other privileges have been increased. Egypt’s vice-president, during the Sadat’s era, has remained a military man (that has been true since 1952). And key decisions appear to require, at a minimum, high-level military acquiescence. Two events illustrate the pattern. In the spring 1975 Sadat replaced Hussein il-Shafiei, the last of the revolutionary Command and Council members other than Sadat still in power, with air force commander Husni Mubarak. The president chooses to respect precedent and accord the post to a leading military figure. In November 1977 when Sadat made his visit to Israel, great prominence was given to support of that decision by Minister of War and Commander in Chief Mohammad el Gamassy, who was pictured in the forefront of the officials seeing Sadat off. The general’s message to the president was widely quoted: " The armed forces are aware of the dimensions and responsibilities of the present situation and are closely watching your
courageous step toward a just peace. So, march ahead, Mr. President, with the blessing of God, and you have, from all members of the armed forces, greeting, esteem, and prayers for success". (Baker, 1978; 1990)
The military elite remained a critical force in the Egyptian political system under Sadat. Without its support, his rule would have been vulnerable to challenge. In the absence of a mechanism for regular replacement of the ruler, it was the only force with the potential to impose such a change at the top.

Case Two: Saudi Arabia: The Clannish regime and the military and security services The emergence of the Saudi state: The recapture of Riyadh by Ibn-Saud from the house of Rashid in 1902 marked the beginning of the territorial shaping of the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Apart from Rashidi Najd, the Arabian Peninsula was divided before Ibn-Saud’s conquest of Riyadh in 1902 into six regions:

- the Hejaz, extending along the western coast of Arabia on the Red Sea, which was ruled by the sheikh of Mecca and formed part of Ottoman domain.
- Asir, on the sea between Hejaz and Yemen, which was ruled by the Idressi dynasty and was also part of the Ottoman domain.
- Northern Arabia, ruled by the Rashid dynasty of Ha’il, which formed a tributary to the Ottoman empire.
- Hasea, along the Gulf between Kuwait and Trucial Coast, which was a province.
- Yemen, under Zaidi imams of San’a, which formed a part of the Ottoman Empire.
- The Gulf and South Arabia Principalities, Sultanates, and Shaykhdoms, which included Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Trucial Coast, Muscat and Oman, Hadramout, and Aden, and which were all under the British protection.

Ibn Saud expanded his domain gradually: In 1914 the British government concluded a treaty with him recognizing Najd, Hasea, Qatif and Jubail and its dependencies as part of Saudi domain. During the First World War, Ibn Saud aided the Allies’ war effort by avoiding military action against Sherif Hussein, the ruler of the Hejaz and supporter of the British. In 1924, Sherif Hussein proclaimed himself “Caliph of the Muslims” in addition to his previous title “King of the Arabs”. At the same time Ibn Saud called the ulama of Riyadh and the tribal leaders on June 2, 1924, to a conference and decided to conquer Hejaz. The forces of Ibn-Saud (Ikhwan) occupied Jeddah and the holy cities of Mecca and Madina in 1926.I In the same year, Ibn-Saud proclaimed himself king of Hejaz. In 1932, Ibn-Saud was proclaimed king of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (Baker, 1978; 1990)

The government’s institutions in Saudi Arabia: The government of Saudi Arabia consists of several major elements. The first is the Royal Family; the second the Ulama; the third its military institutions. I intend to give a general idea about these elements.

Saudi Arabia’s Royal Family: The history of the house of Saud, the Royal Family of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, goes back over two centuries. The name of Al-Saud, which means family of Saud or “House of Saud”, comes from Saud Ibn Mugrin who lived in the early 18th century. The first ruler of the House of Saud was Muhammad Ibn-Saud, who joined the forces with imam Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (the Founder of Wahhabism). Muhammad Ibn-Saud started first as the ruler of the town of Ad-Diriyah, in the heart of Najed; his reign lasted through 1765.

The series of the rulers extends form Saud Ibn Muhammad Ibn Mugrin to King Fahd. King Fahd is number 20 of the rulers’ series. (Hinnebusch, 1985)

The Ulama (Religious Leaders): The role of the Ulama in Saudi Arabia has a long history and great significance. The first alliance between Muhammad Ibn-Saud and Imam Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, and its continued success through the years reflect the important role played by the Ulama in Saudi Arabia. This alliance shows that the state and religion are inseparable. The religion is one of the sources of legitimacy of the Royal Family. (Maccormick, 1988)

The Military and National Guard: The military and the National Guard play an important role in supporting the rulers of Saudi Arabia. The current minister of defence and aviation is the second deputy Prime Minister, Prince Sultan Ibn Abdul Aziz.

There is no compulsory draft in the Saudi army; recruiting is conducted purely on a voluntary basis. The armed forces are a tribally recruited force. It was originally created as the Ikhwan who were destroyed in 1930 when they rebelled against Abd- al-Aziz. The National Guard is an independent force presided over by Crown Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdul Aziz, the deputy Prime Minister. To counterbalance the threat of the regular armed forces, the National Guard was established in 1964. The National Guard, which often called the “white guard” is separated from the army. The Saudi National Guard duties parallel those of the National Guard of the United States. In case of emergency, it can join with the armed forces for the defence of the Kingdom and the political power. (Baker, 1978; 1990)

The royal family and its allies: From the beginning, the power of the Saudi monarchy has depended on alliances with other forces inside the Kingdom. The new governmental apparatus also permits the ruling family to repay these faithful supporters through co-optation. The al-Sheikh, descendants of the founder of Wahhabism, is one of the most well known of such allies. Their influence has been commented by their permanent presence in the Council of Ministers.

Other traditional tribal allies include the Sudayris, a tribe from which Saudi Princes often choose a wife, and the Thunayyan, who brought to the family administrative experience gained in the service of the Ottoman Empire. Loyal but less prominent tribes are accommodated through financial transfers and the National Guard, where the sons of the chiefs naturally serve as officers, and their clients as soldiers. (Baker, 1978; 1990)

The Royal Family also depends on the military and the National Guard in supporting the regime. The interaction among the Royal Family, the clergy, the tribes and the military and security services plays an important role in the cohesion of the political power in Saudi Arabia.

Military and the established order: The Saudi military has been an important factor of support for the royal family. In contrast to the majority of Arab armies, however, the Saudi military establishment has not traditionally played any significant role in politics.

One detects in the royal family itself a reluctance to undertake major development of the armed forces. The monarchy, anxious to defend his wealth, seems to fear the potentiality high political price of a strong army. Too many dynasties and civilian regimes in the immediate vicinity of the kingdom have already paid it. Even aborted coups prove to be expensive. One attempt in 1969, originating in the Air force, triggered renewed doubts about its officer’s loyalty. (Al-Yassini, 1985)
The royal family wants a weak army. A strong army will endanger the ruling regime. Following the brief Saudi-Yemeni confrontation in 1934, when Ibn-Saud annexed Najran, the Saudi army was reduced to a minimum. (Safran, 1985)

The desire of Al Saud to modernize the military and control its activities is greatly influenced by two considerations:

- The royal family is aware that military establishments in the Arab World have acted as a destabilizing force.
- To protect its vast oil resources, the country must organize and train an effective, modern military establishment. The need for a modern military establishment was realized first during the 1962-1970 Yemen War which demonstrated the impotency of the Saudi military in confronting the Egyptian sponsored Republican army. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war impressed upon Al Saud that Saudi participation in any subsequent Arab-Israeli confrontation would be necessary for both domestic and Arab considerations. In addition, the British withdrawal from the Gulf area created a power vacuum that the Saudis realizes was urgently in need of filling. (Safran)

**The Saudi Regime’s fear of the military:** The army is feared by the Saudi regime. Armies have a habit of trying to seize political power in the Arab World. The fear has some basis. The air Force attempted a coup in 1969 and considerable dissent has been known to exist within the ranks of the regular armed forces. The Saudi regime faces a paradox. The dilemma between defending the country and defending the regime shows how limited the institutionalization of power remains. There are many signs show that the Saudi regime fears to establish a strong army.

- The insistence on “protracting the cities against the enemy” leads to posting garrisons close to the principal urban centers. This is only one sign of how much the regime fears the army and how it intends to keep this force under its thumb as an insurance against a sudden uprising.

Another sign is the regime’s reliance on two military corps—the army and the national Guard—, which were for a time almost equal in size. This is no mere holdover from the past, or a formal division with no practical meaning. The United States, responsible for the formation of both, considers them as two distinct forces, complementary certainly, but possibly antagonistic in case of conflict.

**The army and the national Guard are commanded differently:** The Ministry of Defence and Aviation as a stronghold of the Sudayri clan, represented by Sultan, the brother of the King. The guard is under the authority of Abdullah, probably the strongest counterweight to the influence of the Sudayri clan (the king and his sex brothers). The armed forces are charged with defending the borders and helping to put down internal rebellion. The guard is principally charged with the protection of the cities and oil wells. The guard is an extension of loyalist tribal groups, while the army is an outgrowth of the Hejazi troops inherited from the Sharif of Mecca. Both were used to quell the Mecca rebellion in 1979. (Al-Farsy, 1982)

**Great number of princes is in position of command:** It is difficult to provide an exact count of these officer-prizes, but they are generally estimated to be in the hundreds. The large size of the royal family allows it to place a great number of princes in positions of command. This holds true as much for the National Guard, the air force, and the services. As a rule, princes who have not received a military education abroad fill the high posts in the guard or the army, whereas graduates serve as officers in the other armed services.

**The National Defense sector is not reserved for Saudis alone;** but the regime is very reluctant to supply information on how many foreigners are or what role they play in the Saudi army. The information that is available indicates three categories of people serving in the armed forces:

- **Contracted foreign officers serving in an individual capacity.** This category includes Pakistanis, Bengalis, Palestinians, Egyptians, Syrians, Jordanians and others. These officers are treated like nationals; and they are very active in training and logistics.

- **Officers sent the kingdom by virtue of bilateral agreements between the kingdom and their country of origin.** This category includes Americans, British, Pakistanis, French and others.

- **Employees of foreign firms involved in Saudi military projects.** The greatest number of military-related. Foreigners working in the Kingdom belong in this category. There are more than a few American citizens (the number increased after the Second Gulf War), French and British number in hundreds. (al–Farsy, p. 75) Is this not a mercenary type of force? Will these soldiers be more active in the concrete concerns of internal politics than in the hypothetical defense of the nation’s borders? The fact that the French gendarmes, and possibly American soldiers, participated in the repression of the Mecca rebellion is no more disputed, and this is one example among many. One could also question the real role played by the American-manned AWACS stationed in the kingdom since 1980. (al–Farsy, 1982)

**The Saudi’s measures to avoid the potential threat of the military:** To avoid the potential threat of the military, Al Saud has adopted a two-fold policy:

**Firstly: The separation of the National Guard from the armed forces:** The National Guard is separated from the armed forces and is under the command of Crown Prince Abd Allah, a brother of King Fahd. The Guard act as a counterforce to the regular forces. It is a paramilitary force composed of more than 30,000 regular and irregulars, with a sophisticated light and heavy arsenal. A key feature of the guard is its tribal structure. All guard recruits are of tribal background, and battalions are structured on a tribal basis. In addition to its role in countering the armed forces, the National Guard has an internal security function, especially in oil-producing areas. It acts as an internal security deterrent against and potential uprising.

**Secondly: Financial rewards:** The second policy adopted by Al Saud to neutralize the potential threat of the military is one involving financial incentive to join the military. Enlisted men are given land and financial assistance to construct a house; officers are granted additional land and interest-free officers’ investment purposes. Moreover, military personnel pay taxes were doubled in 1981–for a lieutenant up to $2,500 a month, and for a general up to $6,500. (Berberoglu, 1989)

Another factor, perhaps, supports this trend, is that the Saudi military is a newly created organization that has no tradition of its own, nor it can claim national liberation victories. It was Ibn-Saud who mobilized the Bedouins. In addition to its recent creation, the military is not
polititized. It is identified with Al Saud, and the government policy of co-optation makes it an obvious beneficiary of the regime.

In addition to what I mention above, Before the Yemen civil war, the Saudi armed forces were inefficient and poorly equipped. The king trusted the security of the kingdom to what was known as the Royal Guard. Who were the personal bodyguards of the prominent members of the royal family. When Saud was ousted from power, the Royal Guard protested in support for the removed king. Faisal disbanded them ad dispersed them among the regular armed forces. He kept the National Guard and the Army as two separate bodies with different leadership.

To further neutralize the risk of a military coup, the Sāudi National Guard, which is more trusted, was stationed in most strategic locations near the big urban areas. The army and the Air Force occupied locations far from the major cities. (Berberoglu, 1989)

**The challenges that impose the strengthening of the Saudi military forces:** After the 1970, three major issues concerning defense came to a point where they could not be neglected any more:

**First:** The geographical nature of the Saudi Arabia, which provided a great security advantage, was negated. The large areas of Saudi desert were no longer and obstacle for air mobile units and modern fighters and bombarding vehicles.

**Second:** The significant arm race among the states that surrounded Saudi Arabia was Substantial enough so that even though there was no present danger, the Saudi could be overrun militarily by another regional state. The first Gulf War and the Second Gulf War enhanced this trend.

**Finally:** By 1970s the military establishment by its own organizational characteristics had developed and interest of its own. The Saudi armed forces entered the 1980 with a very modest forces compared with its neighbors. The military forces having interests of their own will be frustrated in the future by political constraints imposed upon them. They will press for more autonomy, more authority, and more coordination among the various military and security branches. Meeting such demands and not yielding to them, entails complications that might threaten the political system.

**The political power and the military and national guard (The military’s role in supporting the Saudi regime):** In this part of the analysis I intend to show that the Saudi regime, likes other regimes in the Arab World, depends on the support of the military in facing opposition and attempts of coups:

**Some of the attempted coups:** Although the Saudi military is generally supportive of Al Saud, a number of attempted coups have taken place:

In 1945, Abd Allah al-Mandeli, an air force pilot, attempted to bomb Ibn Saud’s encampment at Mount Arafat. He missed the target and was arrested and executed.

Following the July 14, 1958, Iraqi revolution, a number of air force pilots were also arrested on suspicion of conspiracy to assassinate King Saud.

In 1962, six officers were jailed communicating with the liberal prince’s faction in Cairo. In 1969, an attempted coup was uncovered, and 100 military personnel were arrested. (Al-Yassini, 1985)

In 1977, a number of army officers were court-martialed for their role in an attempted coup.

**The support of the military to the Saudi regime:** Here I will give some examples to show how the political power in Saudi Arabia regime rests on the support of the military and the security services in facing the challenges to the ruling family.

**The Neo-Ikhwan Movement:** On November 20, 1979, the Grand Mosque of Mecca was seized by a group of fundamentalists who denounced the Saudi regime and proclaimed the appearance of a Mahdi (Redeemer). The attack on the Great Mosque was led by Jahaiman al-Utaiyb, a former member of the National Guard and a student of theology at Mecca Islamic University. The proclaimed Mahdi, Muhammad Ibn Abd Allah al-Qahtani, was a former theology student of Shaykh Abd al-aziz Al-Baz, head of the Higher Council of Ifta and Research. The exact number of the insurgents remains unknown. It is estimated, however, to be around four hundred to thousand. From the sixty-three who were publicly excited, it is possible to ascertain that the majority were Saudi Najdis in their early and mid-thirties. Among the non-Saudis, there were ten Egyptians, six South Yemenis, one North Yemeni. Three Kuwaitis, one Sudanese and one Iraqi. (Al-Yassini, p.119)

The insurgents were equipped with machine guns, automatic weapons, and walkie-talkies. The news of the incident reached the Saudi authorities who were caught by surprise. At the time of the Incident, Crown Prince Fahd was in Turin for an Arab Summit meeting, and Prince Abd Allah, the head of the National Guard was on an official visit in Morocco. King Khaled placed responsibility on Sultan and Nayef, the Minister of Defense and Interior, to take care of the incident. (Hurewitz, 1969)

**Quelling the Shīites in the Eastern Province:** The disturbances of the Shīites in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia was another proof that the political power depends on the support of the military. The Shīte population of Saudi Arabia is About 250,000-300,000 people. They are particularly important because they are concentrated in the Eastern Province near the oil fields. They have an inferior status and are often treated as second-class citizens. They have no local government representation. Their only share in the economy is their 50 per cent employment out of 22,000 Saudis who are employed by ARAMCO. Even in the armed forces, they are never promoted to the officers corps. Approximately 60,000 Shīites live in the oasis town of Qatif, which is about 40 miles form the main Saudi refinery and the export terminal of Ras Tanura. When Qatif and its surrounding area came under the control of Abd-al-Aziz at the beginning of the Twentieth century, many attempts were made to convert the population to Wahhabism. In 1930, the Shīites revolted and favored the policy of annexation to Bahrain, a protectorate of the British. The refused to accept the proposal and the revolt was crushed. (Berberoglu, 1989)

In 1938, when the oil was discovered in Qatif, ARAMCO began to employ the Shīites at a salary of 7 cents per day. Given the poverty, they accepted but later on, the resentment was manifested. The Shīites participated in all the strikes, demonstrations, and other political demonstrations that have taken place in the Kingdom. The most significant were in 1969 strikes when the Saudi armed forces were called in. The Shīites are very receptive to Khomeini and his attacks on the Saudi regime.

When American jets landed in Dhahran for maneuvers, the Shīites organizes the biggest demonstration on
November 11, 1979, shouting slogans against the royal family and the Americans. The Saudi government responded by force and imposed a curfew on all the towns in the Qatif area, sealing off the area by tanks and armored trucks. A bloody showdown between the armed forces and the Shiites continued until November 30, 1979, in which hundreds of people were injured, thousands arrested and 24 killed. (Berberoglu, 1989) Case three: Iraq, The Qasim regime 1958-1963: military as a pool of the political elite: In July 14, 1958, the first cabinet was formed. The Free Officers occupied the most important posts: Qasim, Arif and Naji Talib took the portfolios of Prime Minister and Defence, Interior, and Social Affairs. The cabinet also included prominent political personalities and representatives of a number of political parties. (Al-Yassini, 1985)

The first cabinet chosen by Qasim was a coalition cabinet: the Free Officers were represented by three members as mentioned above. Three Kurds were in control of the Ministries of communications, Health, and Justice. Two members of the National Democratic Party headed the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture, while two nationalists headed the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education. The Communist Party was represented by one Minister, and similarly the Istiqal Party (Al-Yassini, 1985)

The power struggle and military: The Showdown between Qasim and Arif: While the July revolution was specially intended to overthrow the Ancien Regime, in common with the population at large, he Free Officers and those members of the armed were a highly heterogeneous and disparate group, united only by their desire to overthrow ancien regime. Thus there were considerable differences of opinion among them over the policies that the new government should pursue. (Al-Yassini, 1985)

Sluglett argues that the fact most of the Free Officers were approximately the same age and rank, and that none of them had emerged as undisputed leader by the time the coup actually took place, meant that there was no pressing reason for any of them to defer to any particular individual or individuals among colleagues, although Qasim and Arif emerged relatively quickly as the main contenders for power. Arif's enthusiasm for joining UAR was regarded by Qasim as threatening his own position as well as being downright imprudent. Furthermore, Arif's own ambitions were constantly encouraged by suggestions from a variety of sources that he was the rising star of the Iraqi revolution, and that he might soon be in a position to kick Qasim upstairs in the way that Nasser had done to Naguib. (Neheme, 1983)

On 10 September 1958, Arif was dismissed as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. He was eventually relieved of his political functions on 30 September, and appointed ambassador in bon on 12October. At first he refused to take up the post, but was eventually persuaded to accept it after an incident in which he threatened Qasim with revolver in the Ministry of Defense. He returned secretly to Baghdad in November, was immediately arrested, and tried in camera, and sentenced to death, but reprieved in February. (Neheme, 1983)

Qasim also confronted the communists and the communists and the Ba'athists. The Ba'athists tried to assassinate Qasim on 7 October 1959. The assassins, included the twenty-three-year-old Saddam Hussein. The Ba'athists planned to seize the power by close coordination with sympathetic officers.

The Power and Military during Qasim's Regime 1958-1963: During Qasim's rule, the political power rested mainly on the military and security services. This may be clear in the light of these observations.

- According to the Iraqi provisional constitution which was proclaimed after twelve days of overthrowing of the monarchy, a Council of Sovereignty was established to exercise presidential authority, and a cabinet was formed to exercise presidential authority and a cabinet was formed to exercise both executive and legislative powers. The Free Officers occupied commanding positions in the Council of Sovereignty.
- The composition of the Council seemed to have been determined by Qasim. In fact, Qasim imposed his views in the political management of the country and to use the Council as a rubber stamp to increase the legitimacy of his decisions.
- Although, the various factions and ethnic groups were represented in the five cabinets which were formed during this period, one should not be misled by the numerical presence of representatives of certain parties and communities in cabinets in general, because the real power actually lies in the hands of the occupants of the strategic posts, namely the military.

A power struggle emerged in the very early stages of the revolution. In this struggle, Qasim began to promote officers loyal to himself to key positions and to demote the partisans of Arif to subordinate positions. In September 1958, Qasim relieved Arif of all his posts.

- The military was a source of the political elite. Qasim's regimes seized power by military means and continue to rule by the support of the military and used the military to defend the regime. The military aborted the attempted coup of Rashid Ali on 9-10th of December 1959 and the second attempted coup of Abd al-Wahhab al-Sawwaf on March 8, 1960.
- From the frequent shifts and power struggle during Qasim's rule, it may be deduced that Qasim's identity was neither nationalist nor communist; neither was he a democrat or a socialist. His pragmatic behaviour could only and survival. He can be described as "Qasimite". His personal interest took clear precedence over political ideology. (Batatu, 1978)
- Qasim opted to recognize and strengthen the army. It appeared that any move against Qasim based on the state of the parties a lone could be crushed immediately by military force. To guarantee its loyalty, Qasim had not only expanded, equipped. And improved its material well being, but he made sure that no senior officer would appear as a potential rival. It was stated that during the Qasim regime, 2000 in Qasim's regime the dimensions of the military, secret police, and personal security arrangements were very clear. (Sotos, 1982)

The Arif's Regimes 1963-1968: The Ba'athist coup: The February 1963 coup was well prepared: detailed planning, close coordination with the sympathetic officers, who were to seize key military and communications installations; the killing of the head of the state and his entourage; and the nomination of a "military figurehead" as the new president. The actual perpetrators of the
coup were a group of Ba'thist and nationalist officers. Having captured the main strategic points, and having executed Qasim, the Ba'thist about the physical elimination of their rivals. This was largely achieved through the agency of their irregular paramilitary force, the National Guard, whose number rose from about 5,000 to about 34,000 between February and August 1963

The political power and military and security services during Arif's regime 1963-1966: The power was seized by force. The Ba'thist coup was another example how the political power rests on the military and security services. I intend to give some signs to this trend.

- The Revolutionary Command Council issued a proclamation of the day of the coup. The proclamation described the military and security services: "In view of the desperate attempts of the agent-Communists, the partners in crime of the enemy of God (Abdu al-Karim) Qasim, to sow confusion in the ranks of the people and their disregard of official orders and instructions, the commanders of the military units, the Police and the National guard are authorized to annihilate any one who disturbs the peace. The loyal sons of the people are called upon to cooperate with the authorities by informing against these criminals and exterminating them".
- The killings, arrests and torture continued throughout the Ba'thists period in power. The communist party leadership was arrested and subsequently murdered. Thousands were arrested, and sports grounds were turned into makeshift prisons to hold the flood of detainees. People were killed in the streets, tortured to death in the prison, or executed after mock "trials".
- In the first few months of the new regime, neither the President, Abd Al-Salam Arif, nor the rest of the government, held undisputed power. The National Guard controlled the streets.
- The struggle for power showed the role of the military during Arif's regime: on 1 November 1963, Mundhir al Wandawi was dismissed from his post as commander of the National Guard but he refused to budge. The National Guard took to the streets, where it was allowed to rampage for five days until it was crushed by military units loyal to Arif. It was then summarily dismantled. Moreover, the Al-Saidi's faction was ousted, Arif, with the support of the armed forces, moved to exercise his own personal control. (Bligh, 1982)

Popular participation versus military dictatorship: During Arif's regime, all hope of establishment of any form of democratic political life based on representative institutions had been crushed, and a system had emerged that had no other source of legitimacy except that conferred by military force and the possession of a monopoly of the means of coercion. Sluglett argues that Abd al -Sallam Arif's regime can be divided into two parts: The first lasting from February to November 1963: during this period rival Ba'thist and Nationalist group were jockeying for power, with the "Sa'dist" Bath relying substantially on their paramilitary support forces, which doubled as the shock troops and the bodyguard of the regime.

The second ending in Arif's death in April 1966: after November 1963, a more integrated force, the Republican Guard, was created, based largely on men form the armed forces, to be the elite corps of the regime. The Republican Guard acted as the President's personal instrument. (Niblock, 1980)
- The National Council of the Revolutionary Command, hitherto an exclusively military body created in February 1963 and consisting of the President and the chiefs of staff and other senior military officers both inside and outside the cabinet, dissolved itself in 1965 and a legislative power was transferred to the cabinet giving the impression that the real power was at last passing into civilian hands. However a new military organization, the National Defence Council, maintained the overall control of the military over the cabinet, together with the Republican Guard, constituted the essential mainstay of the regime. (Niblock, 1980)
- During the Presidency of Abd al-Rahman Arif, April 1966 to July 1968, the same features characterized this period the political power continued to depend on the support of the military and security services.
- From 1963 to 1968 eleven cabinets were formed, the role of the military was very clear, the National Command of the Revolutionary Council was a self-appointed body which derived its authority from de facto control of authority by the military. The NCRC included the President of the Republic who is also the President of the NCRC the Command-in-Chief of the armed forces, the vice -President of Republic, the Deputy Command-in-Chief of the Armed forces, the Chief of General Staff and his assistants, Commanders of Divisions, Commander of the Air Force, the Military Governor General. The Council concentrated the power in its hands. (Safran, 1985)

The al-Bakr/Sadam Husain Regime, 1968: the political power and military: Another time, the armed forces played an important role in the coup of July 1968. The 17 July "Revolution" seemed to exhibit all the elements of a classic military coup, where key members of the armed forces take power simply by seizing a few vital installations or by gaining control of key military units. In this coup the al-Bakr/Sadam Husain wing was emerged. Here are some signs that prove the decisive role of the military in the Iraqi regime during al-Bakr/Sadam Husain regimes:

On 18 July 1968, the formation of a seven-man Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was announced, consisting entirely of officers. The table shows that the military is the source of the political elite:
- Al-Bakr and Sadam Husain occupied the key positions in regime. In addition to that, they were "Ba'thising" the armed forces. They also purged the armed forces; in the autumn of 1968, the Chief of Staff, Faisal al-Ansari and eight divisional commanders were dismissed at the end of December and replaced by Ba'thist or trusted sympathizers. Al-Ansari was succeeded by Hammad al-Shibab of the RCC. On a broader level, more than 3000 new commissions were announced by the end of 1970, enabling al-Bakr and Husain to install what amounted to political commissars at all levels, individuals who were part of a chain of command that bypassed the formal military hierarchy and led ultimately to Sadam Husain.
Astal: An Examination of the View that Political Power in the Arab World

- While the Iraqi Ba'th regime of the 1970s and 1980s is normally described as "civilian", and while the civilians have always outnumbered the military on the RCC since 1969, these civilians buttressed by an officer corps.
- The Iraqi regime during al-Bakr period, depended on the support of the military and security services. Sadam Husain controlled the National Security Bureau of the RCC (māktab al-amn al-qawmi), the President's personal security apparatus, which dealt particularly with the collection of information on political and religious opposition movements within the country. He also had overall control of the official security service (Al-amn Al-amm), which was in charge of the Ba'th militia, the National Guard. Hence Al-Bakr was able to concentrate on trying to maintain or to gain the support of the armed forces, while Sadam Husain at apex of the various security services and also at the head of the party organization, was able both to check all potential threats to the regime and to ensure the Ba'thists, and especially the Bathists loyal to him, were placed in key posts in the security apparatus and civil service generally. Until shortly before al-Bakr departure in July 1979, the two men together managed to achieve domination over the regime by the support of both the armed forces and security service. (Battis, 1978)
- During the period from 1968 coup to 1975 six cabinets were formed in Iraq. The civilian repetition in these cabinets did not conceal the upper hand of the military as a source of legitimacy of the regime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Civilian Function</th>
<th>Military Function</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr</td>
<td>President of the Republic</td>
<td>President of the RCC and C-in-c Armed Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salih Mahdi Ammash</td>
<td>Minister of Interior</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardan al-Takriti</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Chief of staff: commander of Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd al-Razaqal-Nayif</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Formerly Director of Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim abd al-Rahman al-Da'ud</td>
<td>Minister of Defence</td>
<td>Deputy C-in-s, Armed Forces; formerly Commander of Republican Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hammad Shihab al-Takriti</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Commander of Baghdad Garrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'dun Ghaidan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Commander of Republican Guard; formerly Commander of 10th Armored Brigade (Republican Guard Tank Regiment)</td>
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Conclusion: The military has played an important role in the Egyptian political life. From the inception of 1952 revolution, the military has occupied key positions. The power in Egypt depends on military support more than the popular support. For more than 40 years Egypt's heads of the state are military personnel. Military is the pool from which the authority chooses figures to occupy positions in the bureaucracy. Moreover, military is considered the shield of power in Egypt. The military and security service have been playing political role in Egypt. Nasser envisioned the military role as the "vanguard and the Shield". Sadat built his power with the help of the security police and officers. Sadat named the army's "the Shield and Sward" of Egypt. From Nasser to Mubarak, it is the officers who become president of Egypt and provincial governors, ministers, and so on. At recent, Egypt's Mubarak has used the military and security service to confront the arising influence of the Islamic movements. Cairo has witnessed another time, the tanks, armored vehicles and the security forces in its streets and neighborhoods. Mubarak resorts to military to support his regime. The advent of soldier-politicians in Egypt led to the creation of a durable regime.

Case Two: Summary and Conclusion: In general, the Saudi regime, likes other regime officers cannot be traced with any precision before 1956, although a number of discontented officers had been meeting secretly since 1952. (Al-Yassini, 1985) The movement attracted increasing numbers of adherents after the accession of Iraq to the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and even so after he tripartite invasion of Egypt in 1956.

In December 1956, a Supreme Committee of the Free Officers was formed consisting of ten officers, all of whom were army or air force officers of the rank of major and above. At this stage the Supreme Committee did not include Abd al-Karim Qasim and Abd al-Salam Arif both whom were stationed in Jordan. However, Qasim and Arif were members of another group of Free Officers. Altogether the Free Officers numbered about 200, less than five per cent of the entire membership of the officer's corps. (Al-Yassini, 1985) The army under the leadership of the Free Officers managed to control of the whole Baghdad in the evening of 13 July, Nuri al-Said managed to escape capture until the following day, but the king, the Crown Prince and several members of the royal family were shot in the palace courtyard. Early in the morning of 14 July the citizens of Iraq awoke to the strains of martial music on the radio. At 6.30 a.m. Arif read the first proclamation of the new regime, to the effect that the army had liberated "the beloved homeland from the corrupt crew that imperialism installed". (Al-Yassini, 1985)

Case Three: Summary and Conclusion: In reviewing the various Iraqi regimes since 1958, it is observed that through the Qasim regime (1958-1963) there were total numbers of five cabinets. In the period of Arif's regime (1963-1968), there were eleven cabinets. And in first stage of al- Baker/Qasim regime (1968-1975), there were six cabinets. The military established these regimes through coups, and continued to form a source of political elite and a source of legitimacy. The civilian representation in power is misleading, because the actual power vests in the hands of military. (Farouk-Sluglett, 1987).

General Conclusion: First of all, I agree with the view that political power in the Arab World, in general, and the three cases which have been studied, in particular, rests on the military and security services.

In Egypt, the military junta had forced the king Farouq to abdicate on 26 July 1952. In the first days of the Revolution, the new regime set up a Regency Council to
serve, in theory, as the custodian for the infant King Ahmed Fuad 11. under this umbrella of legitimacy the new military rulers abolished the monarchical constitution, to suspend parliamentary life of three years, and in the following month, to liquidate all political parties except the Muslim Brethren (Which survived until the end of 1954. prime Minister Naguib issued in February 1953 an interim constitution that vested supreme authority under his leadership in the Revolutionary Command Council. Since 1952 Revolution, political power has rested on the military and security services. Naguib, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak are all Egyptian officers. Mamdouh Saleem, The Egyptian Prime Minister in 1975 was a security service officer. Sadat resorted to military, in 1980, to face the opposition, in what Mohammad Haikel Described as the "Autumn of Fury". Mabark also has used the military to face the Islamic movements in Egypt. In December 1980. More that fifteen thousands of the Egyptian army put Ambaba neighborhood, in Cairo under curfew and arrested thousands of the Islamic movements, members. In general, the political power in Egypt has been created by the military and exercised by the military and rested on the military and continued to be actually in the hands of military and security services.

In Saudi Arabia, the military are deliberately wakened to protect the regime. The political power rests on the military from negative point of view, namely, the Audi regime sees the military as a potential threat of the regime, so, the authorities resorted to weaken the army on the one hand, and to create the National Guard, as a counterbalance, on the other. The Saudi regime depends also on the foreign armies and forces which have bases in the country.

Finally, the military junta in Iraq destroyed the monarchy outright, and therefore a Sovereignty Council was established. The Iraqi political power has rested on the military and security services since 1958 revolution. From Qasim to Saddam, the military has had the upper hand in the Iraq regime. The civilian, representation, even if it outnumbered the officers, is misleading. The real power vested in the military and security services.

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