Arab Unification Movement and the Limited Success:
Multi Approach and Poly Causal Analysis

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Abstract: From its very inception, just before the First War, the doctrine of Arab nationalism was a doctrine of pan-Arabism. The doctrine, then as it took shape during these years, claimed that Arab, because they spoke Arabic, formed a distinct nation which was entitled. As such to enjoy an autonomous political existence within the Ottoman Empire, or perhaps even to secede from it. The territory which the proponents of pan-Arabism then had in mind comprised the Arabian peninsula (considered by them to be the cradle of the Arab nation), Mesopotamia, and the Levant, i.e., the territories known as Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. Egypt was not part of the Arab world as they envisaged it. Since that time, the Arab world has been gotten its independence. The Arab Unity is still a very important and controversial subject. The Arab World (al-alam al-arabi), or still better, the Arab Fatherland (al-watan al-arabi), refers to that vast stretch of territory from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arab/Persian Gulf. It engulfed all the Arab countries. Arab unification movement has attempted, unsuccessfully, to achieve Arab unity. In this paper I intend to discuss why the Arab unification movement has not achieved this goal. The analysis deals with this paradox.

Key Words: Arab Unification, Arab Nationalism, pan-Arabism

Introduction
Arab nationalists conceive of the Arab world as a single homogeneous whole and the Arab people as a single nation bound by the common ties of language, religion, and history. In reality, however, there is more diversity and differentiation in the Arab world than there is perhaps in either comparable regions in the world. Why Arab unification movement has failed to achieve its goal? Has the limited success of the Arab unification movement been mainly due to the lack of a championing class whose interests can be realized within a unified Arab state? Is there an explanation for the failure of the Arab unification movement?
The objectives of the study are to discuss the idea of Arab unity and to follow the developmental process of the Arab unification movements. To deal with the obstacles which face the achievement of Arab unity. Moreover, to discuss the main reasons which have hindered the unification of the Arab world. Also, to show whether the class-analysis-approach is relevant or not in this respect.

This study deals with a main hypothesis: It is illogical to use a moncausal-analysis approach to explain the failure of the Arab unification movement. I think that it is necessary to analyze the main factors which affect, negatively, this phenomenon. Thus, I can explain the limited success of the Arab unification movement as a result of the interaction among many internal and external factors.

Materials and Methods
In this part of the analysis I intend to discuss, briefly, sources of Arab unity. The analysis, here, concentrates on two branches: the first, the idea of Arab unity and the second, the movement of Arab unity. The aim of this part of the study is to give a general idea about the Arab unity and the evolution of the Arab unification movement.

The Idea of the Arab Nationalism and Unity: The Arab world has not constituted a single political entity since the brief period of Islam's expansion and consolidation into a Muslim empire during the seventh and eighth centuries. During its first three centuries, Islamic civilization was marked by two major processes: the spread of the Islamic religion itself and the development of Arab national consciousness (Arabism). The latter initially had an ethnic focus, but later took on a linguistic and cultural connotation. The two currents were closely linked at first, but subsequently followed separate courses. While both remained important to Arab development, it was the successes and failures of Arabism that determined the eventual geographic and human boundaries of the Arab nation. (Duri, Abd Al-Aziz, 1983).

The dissolution of the central state began shortly after the fall of the Umayyad Empire, which collapsed as a result of the Abbasid revolt in the mid-eighth century. The consolidation of the Abbasid control (ca. 750-1250) created new centres of power throughout the empire. Effective Abbasid control broke down first in north Africa toward the end of the eighth century, as autonomous states arose in Tunisia and Morocco, then in Syria and the eastern provinces, which paid only nominal allegiance to the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad. By the early sixteenth century, when the Ottoman Turks rose to a position dominance in Islam the Arab world was already in a state of disintegration and collapse. Syria and Egypt were conquered by the Ottomans in 1516 and 1517, Algeria was taken in 1561, Tripoli in 1555, and Tunis in 1574. Iraq was finally annexed by the Ottomans in 1639.
In Arabia the Ottomans sultan laid claim to the Persian Gulf area, then to Yemen and the Hegaz. Central Arabia (Najd) and Morocco were the only two areas in the Arab world that never fell under Turkish rule (Sharabi, Hisham B 1965). The Turkish rule continued four hundred years. It declined most rapidly in North Africa. The Arab
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provinces, which were most effectively controlled, were Egypt, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, and Syria and Iraq (Sayegh, Fayed, 1958).

The ties between the Arab East and the Arab west (Maghrib) began to slacken as early as the end of the tenth century and the beginning of the eleventh. The East had always enjoyed a position of ascendency over the west, even though its political domination was short-lived. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the French conquest of north Africa-Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881, and Morocco in 1912, the isolation of the Maghrib from the rest of the Arab world was nearly complete. This was further strengthened by France’s policy which aimed at creating in the Maghrib “an African France that would be an extension of the mother country”. Travel to the East was severely restricted, and circulation of ideas originating in Egypt and Syria was blocked. “Nous sommes Mussulmans et nous sommes Français. Nous sommes indigènes et nous sommes Français.” Is the eloquent phrase in which Ferhat Abbas summarized the Maghrib dilemma in the twentieth century (The political economy of the middle East: 1973-1978, A compendium of papers submitted to the joint economic committee Congress of the United States, Washington, 1980).

In the East, national awakening came much earlier and under quite different circumstances. It was in Syria and Iraq that the idea of Arab nationalism, embracing all Arabic-speaking territories, was born. Nor Syria nor Iraq had ever experienced a separate political existence in the past, but had been the centres consecutively of the two greatest Arab empires, the Umayyad and the Abbasid. The Young Turk revolution of 1908 had frustrated all hopes for an autonomous Arab existence under a decentralized form of government free from the new government’s policy of Ottomanization. While in Egypt, the Ottoman empire was still viewed as Egypt’s natural ally against British domination, the Arab nationalists in Syria in Iraq, moved further away from the concept independent Arab nationalism (The political economy of the middle East: 1973-1978, A compendium of papers submitted to the joint economic committee Congress of the United States, Washington, 1980).

As late as the Second World War Arab nationalism really had only two centres, Damascus and Baghdad. Neither Cairo nor the Maghrib took any part in the Arab nationalist movement until after the end of World War II. Arab unity was the goal to be achieved after foreign domination had to and end (The political economy of the middle East: 1973-1978, A compendium of papers submitted to the joint economic committee Congress of the United States, Washington, 1980, Khalidi, Anderson, Lisa and others (eds.), 1991).

Finally, a catalyst for the rise of Arab nationalism, qaymiiyya Arabiya, was undoubtedly the growth of the Zionism movement in Palestine, culminating in the establishment of Israel in 1948. (Bill, James A., and Leiden Carl, 1979)

The Arab Nationalism and Unification Movements: Arab nationalism received a great push during the First World War. The British, who found themselves at War With the Ottomans, encouraged the Sharif Mecca to declare a rebellion against the Ottoman empire. He eventually did so alleging that the Arabs were being persecuted by the Young Turk regime then in power, and claiming that his movement would liberate his fellow-Arabs from the foreign yoke. At one point he even proclaimed himself king of the Arab countries. The Hejaz in 1916-1918, formed the nucleus of the post-war Arab nationalist movement which now had official standard-bearers in the person of the Sharif and that in his sons (Naraya, Col. B.K., 1981).

Between the two World Wars, With Syria and Lebanon under French control, And Jordan and Palestine under the British mandate, and with Egypt interests as ever its own problems and very little interested in the Arab world or Pan-Arabism, Iraq was the centre of the movement (Bill, and Leiden. Ibid, see also: Rejwan, Nissim, 1976).

In the post second World war period, a radical change took place: The domination of the old-guard nationalist leaders came to an end and was replaced in most Arab countries by a new type of leadership. The last greatest effort of the old leadership was to create the League of Arab states, a loose regional organization which joined together the six independent Arab states in 1945 (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen). The League fell far short of the hopes and aspirations of most Arab nationalists. It provided for closer political, economic, and cultural cooperation between the Arab states, but at the same time it gave formal recognition to the political divisions of the Arab world and confirmed the right of each state to complete sovereignty. Thus instead of providing a springboard toward Arab unity, it served to freeze the political status quo and strengthen the foreign-created political structures. In that time, however, Pan-Arabism had found expression in the League of Arab states (Bill, and Leiden, ibid, Sayegh, ibid).

The Arab nationalist movement was represented in several movements, after the Second World War, especially, after the Arab-Israeli war in 1948. The main trends and movements were: The Ba’thism, the Nasserism, and the Arab Nationalist Movement (Amin, Samir, 1978). All these movements are, unsuccessfully, aiming at achieving the Arab unity.

The uneven drive for Arab unity can be seen in a number of attempts at cross-national political integration. The high-water mark of Pan-Arabism was reached in February 1958 when Egypt and Syria joined together in the United Arab Republic and it seemed that this union would prove irresistible magnet for the rest of the Arab world. (This union had been dissolved in 1961); a few days later, the Arab Federation (of Jordan and Iraq) was formed (to last until July 1958). The United Arab Republic plus Yemen became for a time the united Arab states. In 1971, Libya, Egypt, and Syria formed the Federation of Arab Republics. In 1973, Libya and Egypt were to emerge. Most of the attempts at integration stemmed largely from the disgrace of defeat at Israeli hands, and the realization that only a united Arab front could defeat Israel; all collapsed because the forces of disunity were still paramount in the 1950s and 1960s. The existence of Israel was not in itself sufficient to create an affective unity (Gershoni, Israel, 1981, pp. 67-68).

Pan-Arabism faced a crisis after the 1967 war. Many of the Arabs spoke in the aftermath of 1973 war about Arab solidarity or Arab coordination rather than the Arab
unity. At the time being, Arab unity seems an ambition out of reach (Abd al Hai, Walid, 1987).

Approaches of the Arab unity: The famous saying: "The Arabs agree only to disagree" may precisely describes the Arab political life. The issue of the Arab unity has been preoccupied by the majority of the Arab leaders, ideologues, writers and even the Arab laymen. The central question is very clear and simple: How to achieve the Arab unity? What is the right and shortest way leading to this aim?

There is only one question, but, at the same time, there are many answers and approaches. In this part of the analysis I intend to give a brief idea about the different approaches for the Arab unity. These approaches, per se, form an obstacle in the way of the Arab unification movement (Gershoni, Op. Cit).

The First Approach: the Infrastructure Approach: Economic Integration is the way to the Arab unity:
The main thesis of this approach is to start by economic integration to reach the political unification. The European model is a very clear. The Arab must follow the European model if they want, Actually, to achieve their unity.

Some of the Arab writers consider that "Arab unity was the historical product of the mercantile integration of the Arab world, as carried out by a class of merchant-warriors. It was only with the decline of trade relations that national disintegration set in, a disintegration which was accentuated by integration of the Arab world into the imperialist system" (Gershoni, ibid, p. 69. See also: Halpern, ibid).

The proponents of Pan-Arabism presented economic unity as an additional central objective to be realized on the road to the final political goal. With regard to a time schedule, the economic stage of action ought to coincide with the cultural stage or follow immediately afterwards. Close economic cooperation between the Arab countries; strengthening and encouraging commercial ties; signing economic and commercial agreements; establishing a unified monetary system for all Arab economies; convening economic conferences: exchanging economic and financial information; and founding a central Arab bank are intended, according to this approach, to be realized in practice and thus will prepare the groundwork for the establishment of an all-Arab political framework (Gershoni, Israeli, ibid, and see: Halpern, ibid).

In addition to outlining the means to a cultural and economic realization of Arab unity, the spokesmen of Pan-Arabism proposed the following plans of action:

- Abolition of existing tariffs between the Arab countries in order to create and all-Arab common market and a free-trade zone among the various Arab countries.
- Unification of curricula and systems of instruction and education in the Arab world at all levels, from primary school through higher education.
- Establishment of all-Arab bodies on the leadership level as well as on the popular level, the aim of which will be to decide on a single common path for the Arab nation.
- Convening of periodic inter-Arab congresses, establishment of Arab clubs and associations in every city in the Arab world and so on (For more details see: The platform of the Ba'th Party and the Arab Nationalist Movement and Nasser's speeches).

The infrastructure approach considers the economical dimension a decisive factor to impose the suprastructure (political) unification. In the nineteenth century, the German unity had been achieved through the economical unification and by setting up a railway net work in addition to the BesmankRed Prussia which was a Pilot-state in pioneering the German unification movement (Bergeroglou, Berch, 1989).

The Second Approach: the Suprastructure Approach: the Political Unification Is the Way to the Arab Unity: Against the above-mentioned infrastructural approach stands the suprastructural approach. The proponents of this view maintained that Arab unity must be realized in a single, total wave governing and unifying all areas in the lives of the Arabs, politically, socially, culturally and economically. This approach, which I can name it "A unified integral approach", presupposes that the establishment of a unified Arab political framework is a realistic goal, which is destined to be attained in the near future. Moreover, it is stirred by the belief that only within single, all Arab political framework and through the power embodied in it will it be feasible for the Arabs to organize and strengthen all other bonds of unity, such as unity of culture, economics, society, law, and means of education (Ahamd, Ahmad).

This way has failed to lead to realization of Arab unity. The unification attempts continued for a short time. The Arab-summit diplomacy succeeded, partially, to unify Egypt and Syria (1956-1961), Egypt, Syria, Libya and Sudan (1970), but these suprastructural-led experiences had achieved a limited success (Bili, James A., and Leiden, Carl, 1979).

The Third Approach: Liberation of Palestine Is the Way to Arab Unity: The prolonged struggle against the West, on one hand, and the growing longing for Arab unity, on the other, placed before the supporter of Pan-Arabism a poignant question on the order of priorities: Whether to grant first priority to the struggle against Israel and the liberation of Palestine and only after this to step forward toward Arab unity or, perhaps, first to turn to unity as a means of realizing local national liberation. In other words, is liberation the means to unify the means to liberation? (Amin, 1978).

According to this approach, the realization of national liberation must serve as a pre-condition of Arab unity. The main supporters of this approach can be found in the file and ranks of the Palestinian resistance movement, especially, the central stream of the Fateh Movement. In the Arab World many writers expressed their support to this approach such as Taha Husyn who said: "I am one of the people who most loves Arab unity (Al-wahda al-arabiyya) and desires its realization, provided that the national independence of the home land (al-istiqai al-qawmi al-watani) is its foundation and that the culture and economic cooperation are the most important steps to it." (Halpern, M, ibid).

Unity, therefore, is to be achieved only through liberation. Only the Arab countries free from foreign rule Jointly establish Arab unity. Unity is a whole made of independent, firm, proud Arab components. In short, the focus of the national effort should be the struggle for "complete liberation" of the Arab homeland; only in the
post-independence era should all efforts be directed at the struggle for Arab unity.

The Fourth Approach: Arab Unity Is the Way to the Liberation of Palestine: Against the above-mentioned approach, there are many of the spokesmen for Pan-Arabism contended that the struggle against Israel and the West, by its virtue nature, has been a common struggle of all Arabs and thus demanding of their unity. The yearning for complete national liberation, the determined desire for deliverance from "the terror of the foreign conqueror", is not an exclusive Palestinian legacy. These are the interests and aspiration of all Arabs wherever they are. Moreover, proponents of this view maintained the Palestinians' struggle against Israel would be successful only if it is integrated within the web of the struggles of the Arab people for liberation and independence. The promise of the long-awaited deliverance of Palestine is dependent on the unification of the Arab forces into a single fighting front. Therefore, there is no liberation except through unity and Palestinians will realize their independent within Arab unity ant through its potency (Hudson, Michael, 1977). Nasser and all the supporters of the Arab unity supported this approach. The Ba'th Party and the Arab Nationalists Movement also defended this trend. In short words, in their unification, the Arabs will rediscover the potential power concealed within them, will realize the energy and vitality embodied in their personalities and will achieve a breakthrough to complete liberation and independence.

The Fifth Approach: the Arab-sub-system-coordination Is a Step Towards Arab Unity: The supporters of this approach see that Arab unity is a goal out of immediate reach. So, the adoption of step-by-step approach is this right way to unify the Arab countries as a whole. The regional-Arab-coordination-organizations are the clear expression of this approach. During the last decade several Arab-system organizations have been established.

In 1981, Six Arab countries, in the gulf area, have formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This "regional" coordination organization has proved itself as a framework for the Gulf states' policies. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, The united Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain formed it.

Dr. Ehteshami argues that "The GCC's assertiveness established a new pattern in inter-Arab relation. Unlike of its many predecessors in the Arab world, the GCC was not created to bring about Arab unity" (Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, , in Gow, James (ed.), 1992).

In North Africa, on the other side of the Arab world, five Arab countries- (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania)- formed another framework for cooperation and coordination. The Arab Maghrib Union (AMU) is another attempt which has been considered a step towards Arab in unity.

In 1989, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen formed another framework, which was called Arab Cooperation Council (ACC). Of course, the ACC has been, negatively, affected by the second Gulf war.

The Sixth Approach: Arab Solidarity Approach Vs. Arab Unity Approach: During the last two decades, a new trend has been emerged in the Arab world. The proponents of this trend have argued that it is difficult to achieve the goal of Arab unity. Thus, The Arabs must follow the path of Arab solidarity, coordination and cooperation. Moreover, this kind of Arab relations does not entail a loss of every Arab country's distinctive identity. Arab unity, according to this approach, is out of immediate reach. The alternative to Arab unity is the Arab solidarity, Arab solidarity, according to the proponents of this idea, does not hinder the progress in the way to Arab unity. On the contrary, Arab solidarity is a step in the right way to achieve Arab unity. The failure of the Arab unification experiences has enhanced this trend in the Arab world (Al Astal, Kamal, 1980).

The Arabs Agree to Disagree: In the light of what I have mentioned above, I can assure that Arab unity has only been achieved in the field of disagreement. The Arab famous saying: The Arabs agree to disagree, is epitomizing the case of the Arab world. The differences cover all aspect of the Arab political life. Arabs have achieved the disintegration, disunity, disagreement, differences, intra-Arab wars, Ideology, and clashes, And competition for the leadership and power. I agree with Dr. Ehteshami that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait exacerbated the fractional tendencies of the Arab system. "It both challenged the existing rules and set new precedents in inter-Arab relations" (Ehteshami, Ibhid).

Obstacles Facing Achieving of the Arab Unity: In this part of the analysis I intend to discuss the Limited success of the Arab unification movement. I think it is illogical to give a moncausual approach to explain why the Arab unification movement has failed to realize its goals.

I think the failure is a logical result of many factors. Here some of these factors that have led to the non-achievement of this aim. I argue that the limited success of the Arab unification movement has come as a result of several, internal and external factors. The interaction among these factors has led to the logical result of the unsuccessful attempts of the Arab unification (Ehteshami, Ibhid).

The Intra-arab Factors Hindering Arab Unity: Many factors have made and obstacle hindering the Arab unity such as the intra-regime cold war, the ruling elites, who see in the Arab unity a direct threat to their power, the backwardness in the whole aspects of life within the Arab countries... And so on. I intend to discuss a number of these causes which hinder Arab unity.

The First Approach: The Class Analysis: the Absence of a Championing Class to the Arab Unity: This approach rests on the idea that rising middle class in the Arab world has been failed to accomplish the Arab unity mission. It is right that this class adopted the Arab nationalism ideology, but Arab unity has seemed out of reach. In this part of the analysis I intend examine the approach that the absence of a championing class whose interests can be realized within a unified Arab unity is a reason on not achieving this goal.

Classes as Political and Social Factor: The idea that classes and the relations between them are fundamental aspects of political life has played an important part in the formation of the modern world. Two of the most political movement in the last hundred years, communism and European social democracy, have been based on some version of this idea and it is impossible to understand contemporary politics without taking their
impact into account. Nevertheless, the precise significance of class in the modern world remains a matter of considerable dispute, and it does so for two distinct but related reasons:
The first: there is disagreement as to the nature of the concept of the class and of the place it should play in a general understanding of society.
The second: a number of recent development have brought in question the understanding of society as a matter of classes and relations between them on which the earlier successes of European social democracy, the internal collapse of the majority of communist regimes.
The question of the role of class in contemporary politics is also, inescapably, a question of the role of ideas of class both in political analysis and in the practical conduct of politics (Hawkesworth, Mary, and Kogan, Maurice (eds.) 1992).

The Problem of Class Definition: Two Approaches:

On the conceptual issue we distinguish two broad approaches:
The first: treats class simply as a category of persons (usually identified by reference to occupational characteristics) that may or may not prove useful for the purpose of distributional analysis. Here class is used as one of a number of variables (such as sex, age, ethnicity, union membership, or housing tenure...) that may be related to the social distribution of political attitudes and voting behaviour because it relates to education, life expectancy, and other aspects of the life chances of the population that are thought to be important on normative grounds. There are competitive theories views as to how the categories of class themselves should be identified, giving rise to competing accounts of the political significance of class (Hawkesworth, Mary, and Kogan, Maurice (eds.) 1992).

The second: at the other extreme is a treatment of classes both as categories of persons and as major social forces that are characteristic of certain types of society, and of modern capitalist societies in particular. In this view classes and the most significance relations between them arise put of basic structural features of society and that they inevitably have major social and political consequences. This approach to class has been influential in the politics of communist parties throughout the world and the left wing of labour and social democratic movements (Hawkesworth, Mary, and Kogan, Maurice (eds.) 1992).

Class Definition: Sociologists identify class as one of fundamental types of social stratification, along with caste- (a caste system is a form of social stratification in which castes are hierarchically organized and separated from each other by rule of ritual purity).- and estate- (estate is a system of stratification found historically in Europe and Russia which like caste contained sharp differences and rigid barriers between a small of strata. Unlike caste, estate were created politically by man made laws rather than religious rules) (Abercrombie, Nicholas, Hill, Stephen, and Turner, Byayans, 1988).

The major theoretical tradition within class analysis derives from the work of K. Marx and M. Weber on the newly emerging class structure of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century. In this classes are defined in economic terms. Marx analysed class in relation to the ownership of capital and the means of production. Marxist definition of class is "any aggregation of persons who play the same part in the production mechanism." (Sills, David, (ed.), 1968).

Marx divided the population into those who owned property and those who were propertyless. Marx in capital outlined the main classes differentiated according to relation to the of production:
• Capitalists: or owner of the means of production.
• Workers: or all those who are employed by others.
• Landowners: who in the Marx's theory seemingly differ from capitalists and are regarded as survivors of feudalism.

Marx saw classes as tangible collectivities and as real social forces with capacity to change society (Abercrombie, Op. Cit.).

Class and Class-consciousness: The incessant drive of capitalists to create profit led to the exploitation of proletariat in work and, so Marx believed, to its increasing pauperization. In Theses circumstances workers would develop class consciousness and proletariat would grow from being a class "in itself", that is an economically defined category with no self-awareness, to become a class "for itself", made up by workers with a class-conscious view of the world and ready to pursue class conflict against the capitalists (Abercrombie, Op. Cit.).

Class consciousness describes a situation when the proletariat becomes aware of its objective class position vis a vis the bourgeoisie and its historic role in the transformation of capitalism into Socialism. The proletariat would develop from a class "in itself", simply a collection of workers sharing a common class position but with no collective awareness to become a class "for itself" i.e. of their collective identity and destiny (Gould, Julious and Kolb, William L., 1954).

Classes as Social Forces: "The history of all hitherto existing is the history of class struggles, Freeman and the slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and self... in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted now open fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or on the common ruin of the contending classes"(Marx and Engels: The Communist Manifesto, 1948).

In Marx's view, classes are the main contending forces in society. Class and relation between them, is the key to understanding of politics and, in particular, to the identification of the forces promoting or resisting progressive social change. Class struggle may be open or it may hidden, but it will make its presence felt for as long as classes themselves exist (Hawkesworth, Op. Cit.).

Classes and Society: Championing Class: European Model: Judgements about the political significance of class must depend first on whether or not classes are regarded as social forces. If they so regarded, then the judgement, then depend on whether classes are regarded as characteristic of capitalist (or possibly other) societies, as Marxism and much non-Marxist class analysis suggests, or as forces that have been
superseded by non-class forms of political life.
If classes are not regarded as political forces, then the
significance of class is a matter either of the distribution
of voting behaviour in the population or of the
significance of class and related patterns of inequality in
the political ideas of the major social parties.
Historically, classes played an important role in the
political life in Europe. The French revolution of 1789 was
led by the bourgeoisie class. The Bolsheviks revolution
was led, mainly, by the proletariat.
The question, which is raised: Is there any championing
class in the Arab world which can lead Arab unification
The Question of a Championing Class in the Arab
and Arab Unity: Historically, Amin argues that Arab
unity was the product of the historical mercantile
integration of the Arab world, as carried out by a class of
merchant-warriors. It was only with the decline of trade
relations that national disintegration set in, a
disintegration, which was accentuated by integration of
the Arab world into imperialist system. At the same time
imperialist domination transposed the Arab feeling of
unity on to another level. This feeling is now mainly one
of struggle against a common enemy. Naturally, none of
the dominant Arab classes of the imperialist era (the
comprador and Latifundist bourgeoisie, and then the
state bourgeoisie), are capable of bringing this Arab
unity to its fruition (Amin, Op. Cit.).
Arab World and Non-capitalist Path (Transition) of
Development: Conception of a non-capitalist transition
to socialism can be found in Marx and Engels’ writing
side by side with their advanced level of capitalist
development. The sage of bourgeois-democratic
revolution is a precondition for the stage of socialist
revolution in the Third world. Trotsky’s theory of non-
capitalist transition to socialism, known as the theory of
permanent revolution (Hosseinizadeh, Esmail, 1989).
Lenin’s formula of the “two-stage” transition to socialism
remained the catchword of the Bolshevik party until April
1917. Thus when the February revolution of 1917
replaced the Tsarist monarchy with the bourgeois
government of Kerensky, the Bolshevik perceived it as
the realization of the bourgeois-democratic “stage” of
revolution. The second stage came after Lenin had
returned from exile (Hosseinizadeh, Esmail, 1989).
In the Third World, in general, and in the Arab World, in
particular, many countries have gone the non-capitalist
path of development. Post-colonial era witnessed many
experiences of non-capitalist path of development. Post-
colonial era witnessed many experiences of non-capitalist
path of transition.
Arab Unity and Championing Class: a Model of
Analysis: Richards and Waterbury argue that "outcomes
in LDCs political economy can be best conceptualized as
the product of interaction of three variables:
1. Economic growth and structural transformation.
2. State structure and policy.
3. Social class." (Richards, Alan and Waterbury, John,
1990).
In the Arab World its difficult to find a class able to
champion Arab unity. Classes are in the process of
crystallization. Perhaps, it is not objectively to speak
about classes despite there is some kind of stratification.
Peasantry is not interested and not qualified to
undertake this mission;
Working-class, in the Arab World, may be has existed "in
itself" but not "for itself"; bourgeoisie may the most
crystallized class in the Arab World. So I will try to show
role of the ruling middle class in championing Arab unity.
This class adopted the ideology of pan-Arabism, but in
final analysis, it has failed to achieve Arab unity.
The Emergence of the New Salaried Middle Class:
Today, Halpern argues, a new salaried middle class is
emerged and is seizing control of the Middle Eastern
government, unlike the traditional bourgeoisie, it is eager
to modernize society and the body politic no less than
the economy.
The majority of the middle class in the Arab World is now
salaried. They may be managers, administration,
teachers, engineers, journalists, scientists, layers, or
army officers. The salaried middle class constitutes the
most active political, social, and economic sector from
Morocco to Iraq.
Leadership in the Arab World is increasingly being seized
by a class of men inspired by non-traditional knowledge,
and it is being clustered around a core of salaried civilian
and military politicians, organizers, administrators, and
experts (Halpern, Op. Cit.). In its style of life, however,
thus new middle class differs from its counterpart in the
industrialized states. The Middle East moved into the
modern administrative age before it reached the machine
age. Its salaried middle class attained power before it
attained assurance of status, order, security, or
prosperity. In the Arab World, the middle class therefore,
uses its power not to defend order and property but to
create them. The men of the middle class are therefore
committed ideologically to nationalism and social reform
(Halpern, Op. Cit.).
It is also true that some members of the middle class are
interested only in ideas (hence inspire and clarify, or
merely stand by), only in action (hence rise spectacularly
and fall), or only in safe careers (hence merely serve)
(Halpern, Op. Cit.).
The Relation Between the New Middle Class and
Other Classes: The new middle class is distinguishable
from all other classes in the Arab world by being the first
to be composed of separate individuals. It is therefore
the first class for which the choice between democracy,
authoritarianism, and totalitarianism is a real and open
choice.
The facts the goals of the new middle class demand
the mobilization of the entire society in way implies that the
role it assigns to others in its national design will
correspond to the interests felt by other classes. Even
the communists, whose ideology declares their
dictatorship to be in the interests of the Proletariat, can
not escape this clash of class interests. Revolution was
no longer signify "liberation of the toilers" but "all power
to the planners" (Halpern, Op. Cit.).
A discussion of the strata's of classes' interests shows
the vast gap among these interests: In Egypt, for
example, a landed ruling class was economically
dispossessed, socially displaced, and politically
overthrown. A new class seized power and took its place,
the greater part of the economy was nationalized, or at least placed under effective state control. The legal basis of authority and the structure and functions of political institution were fundamentally altered, and a religion-bound culture was secularized (Center of Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1980). The Intelligentsia, that is those with knowledge or awareness to see that a social and political revolution is in progress, forms the largest and politically most active component of the new middle class. The new intelligentsia acts in behalf of the older ruling classes until it strong enough to win control of the government. When this occurs it acts in the interests of the new middle class of which it is an integral part (Amin, Samir, Op. Cit.).

The Middle Class and Arab Unity: Unlike the traditional elite of landowners and treading bourgeoisie or the tradition-bound artisans or peasants, the middle class is the first that is wholly the product of the transition to the modern age. Also, unlike the emergent new generation of peasants and urban workers, it is already powerful and self-conscious enough to undertake the task of remolding society (Center of Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1980).

According to Halpern "the new middle class has been able to act a separate and independent force because:
1. Prior to its seizure of power, it is freer any other class from traditional bonds and preconceptions, and better equipped to manipulate armies and voluntary revolutionary political instruments.
2. Once it controls the machinery of a modernizing state, it possesses a power base superior to that which any other class in the Middle East can muster on the basis of prestige, or physical force.
3. It is numerically one of the largest groups within the sector of the society.
4. It is, so far, more obviously cohesive, more self-conscious, and better trained than any other class.
5. Its political, economic, and social actions, in so far as they come to grips with social change, are decisive in determining the role other classes will play in the future.

And finally, it has shown itself capable of marshaling mass support. Wherever the salaried new middle class has become dominant in the Middle East, it has become the chief locus of political and economic power and of social prestige" (Halpern, Manfred, 1970)

The middle class regimes failed to achieve Arab unity. The conflicting interests of the ruling elites and the other classes interests have hindered Arab unity. The slogans alone do not delete the artificial border in the Arab world. The ruling middle class commitment to the ideology of the Arab unity proved to be vain.

The Second Approach: Arab Unity Contradicts the Ruling-elites’-(class') Interests: The main idea this approach concentrates on the argument that the interests of the ruling classes, strata and elites contradict with the achievement of the Arab unity. Moreover the interests of the decision-makers, or at least who affects the process of decision-making in the Arab countries, are not in harmony with the Arab unification movements. Thus, according to this point of view, the political unification of the Arab nation threatens directly, these strata's interest. The reiterating of the slogans for Arab unity and nationalism does not change the reality. These slogans constitute a source, besides other sources, of legitimacy of the ruling regimes " (Halpern, Manfred, 1970).

According to a field study, in ten of the Arab countries, it was clear that 54% of the sample maintained that Arab rulers have been and obstacles in the face of Arab unity. At the same time, 33% refused absolutely, the idea that the Arab rulers hinder the unification process. At any rate, 78% of the sample considered the Arab rulers responsible for preventing the Arab unity.

There are many differences among the opinions in this respect. While 68% of the Palestinians and 64% of the Kuwaitis agreed that the rulers form an obstacle in the way of Arab unity, only 41% of the Sudanese, 47% of the Lebanese and of the Jordanians supported this idea " (Halpern, Manfred, 1970).

The Third Approach: The Lack of Political Consciousness and Backwardness as an Obstacle to Arab Unity: This approach says that the general backwardness, which prevails the Arab World, is mainly responsible for the most of the Arab World problems. While Arab unity demand the popular participation, many problems lead to the absence of the masses' role such as illiteracy and the lack of political consciousness. In the survey, abovementioned, 34% of the simple saw that the decrease of the political consciousness is one of the obstacles facing the Arab unity. Meanwhile 42% supported partially this, it is clear that three-quarters of the sample (75.4%) agree totally, or partially that the political unconsciousness is an obstacle in the way of Arab unity (Al Astal, Karna, 1980).

The Fourth Approach: the Structural Difference among the Arab Countries as a Hindrance in the Way of the Arab Unity: This point of view concentrates on the hypothesis that the stages of the development in the Arab countries are different from country to another. The structural differences among the Arab countries is one of the obstacles in the way of the Arab unity. Moreover, some countries may be achieve more benefits that the others communities are not interested in Arab unity. The "patriotic" loyalty is also very strong in many of the Arab countries. At the same time nationalism can assert itself without demanding loyalty to any form of government or society, economic organisation or values, or any particular religious beliefs. It offers and demands the most intense form of "togetherness" even before there has been a genuine encounter of individuals and issues. Thus one of the basic attraction of nationalism is precisely that it is nothing more than an organization of insecurity (Faris, Hani A., 1987).

The Fifth Approach: the Arab Unity and Arab Cold and Hot War: The period which runs roughly from the Suez War of 1956 to the 1967 War was what Malcolm Kerr has called the Arab Cold War. It was also the period when the Arab world began to be commonly described as being divided between "conservative" and "Radical" states. One must not be misled by these expressions, for in the Yemen in 1962-1967 the Arab Cold War was actually a shooting war, while the labels "Conservative"
and "Radical" are by no means an infallible guide to the actual policies and alignments of these states (Cantori, Louis J., and Harik, Iliya, 1984)

Several Arab countries engaged in one or another of limited actual wars, or at least armed clashes such the clashes between Egypt and Libya in 1976, the clashes between North and South of Yemen. The lash between Algeria and Morocco, the Lebanese civil war and the involvement of the conflicting Arab countries' interests. And finally, the war against Iraq and the role of several Arab armies in it.

The Sixth Approach: The Ideological Factor and the Unity: The ideological differences in the Arab World, especially in the last three decades, formed an obstacle in the way of the Arab unity. The interests of the holder-groups of these trends were not similar. The Islamic religion contradicts with communism, the nationalists were not in compatible with "patriots", the national idea was divided into three main competitive trends: Nasserism faced Bathism, the Arab Nationalists Movement opposed Nasserism.

The gap was very vast among the Arab leaders' point of views. The Palestinian cause, instead of being a focal point of Arab unity, has become a source of the differences among the Arab countries (Al Astal, Kamal, Ibid. And see also: Ahmad, Ahmad Y., ibid)

The Seventh Approach: Pilot-state and the Arab Unity: The absence of a pilot-state, which can lead the unification process in the Arab World, has been considered as an obstacle in the way of Arab unity. Historically, Prussia, as a strong pilot-state, had led the German unification process. In the Arab world, Egypt under Nasser was qualified to play this role but it failed.

The revolutionary regime of Nasser Adopted nationalism and supported the idea of the Arab unity, and at the same time, the Egyptian regime under Nasser, instead of consolidating all Arab countries around the core of Arab unity, engaged in differences and clashes with the other Arab so-called "reactionary" and "Conservative regimes". This fact abortive any attempt to achieve the goal of the Arab unity. In addition, the historical competition between Cairo and Baghdad over leadership in the Arab world has been continued since the early ages. After the Arab defeat in 1967 war the "Revolution" gave way to "Wealth". The Saudi Arabia and other not interested and disbelieve with the Arab unity- oil-rich countries have become more influential in the Arab World (Halpern, Ibid).

The Eighth Approach: Tribal Political Elites and Arab Unity: In the Arab world, although the national-states have been formed, Tribalism is still prevailing the political life. Consequently, the new states still reflect certain tribal habits and have to accommodate a certain measure of tribal power (Khoury, Philip S., and Kostiner, Joseph, 1989).

In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, and even in Syria and Morocco, tribes constitute the main element in the central and peripheral arease of each country. The tribal mentality and (territorial) local interests have controlled the political behaviour in the region. This phenomenon, of course, hinder the Arab unification process.

In Saudi Arabia, a clan has governed the whole state for more than two hundred years. The tribal mentality prevent the unity the Arabs. In the Gulf, where there are a kind of city-state or even avillage-state, the extended-families have defended the colonizer-made borders. Every clan or tribe resorts to force from time to time (Kerr, Malcolm, 1971).

The new states that emerged in the twentieth century had to adapt to the borders that had not previously existed. Encouraged by the European powers, several states signed treaties among themselves demarcating these borders. Frontier regions thus become hubs for domestic and intrastate rivalries.

Clashes over border's demarcation are a familiar phenomenon in the Arab World. This commitment to the artificial borders contradicts directly and inhibits unity. In Yemen, also, in the time of the Imam Yahya, and until the recent days, the ruler has set out to strengthen his rule by reinforcing his family's grip on the state's provinces and by taking hostage family members of recalcitrant tribal chiefs (Halpern, Manfred, 1970).

The political parties in the Arab world look tribes and clans. In Syria, for example, the Ba, th party is a tool in the hands of the Alawite sect. Syria has been governed by direct command of relatives and confidants of the president. Al Assad's relatives are actually seizing the power. The regime has become more personalist and has been increasingly composed of and identified with individuals from minority communities (Halpern, Manfred, 1970).

The Syrian regime depends upon the national slogans, and lip-service, as a source of its legitimacy (Khoury, Philip S., and Kostiner, Joseph, 1991).

In Morocco, the king Al Hassan II had been considered as the heir of the sharifian regime derives its legitimacy from the historical link with the prophet and the Imam Ali.

This kind of "Isolation" regimes are found in the Arab World. Moreover, these regimes support the "Local" and "territorial" trends such as the Pharoism, the phenocianism, and Babylonism and so on.

In the light of these circumstances, there is no immediate hope that Arab unity will be achieved.

Arab Unity and the External Factors: The Imperialism and Colonialism: This approach sees that the limited success of the Arab unification movement has been to the international imperial powers and the existence of Israel in the heart of the Arab World. In the survey, which I mentioned above, The majority of the Arabs believe that the major obstacle facing the Arab unification process is the super power and Israel. According to the sample which was collected from ten of the Arab countries, it is clear that 60% considered the USA as a hindrance to the Arab unity. At the same time 34% saw that the EX-Soviet Union was a cause for non-Arab unity. 4.3% agreed that Israel has been an obstacle in the way to the Arab unity (Hudson, Michael C.; 1977).
### Astal: Arab Unification Movement and the Limited Success

Table 1: The External Powers and Arab Unity The Sample from Ten Arab Countries (%): The Reason for the Limited Success of the Arab Unity Is: the Negative Role of External Powers (Arab Unity Studies Center, Op. Cit.).

(Hudson, Michael C., 1977).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Arab country</th>
<th>The USA</th>
<th>X-USSR</th>
<th>E Israel</th>
<th>Other Foreign countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>80,5</td>
<td>12,6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>85,5</td>
<td>8,7</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>41,6</td>
<td>53,4</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>34,9</td>
<td>61,0</td>
<td>2,6</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>77,8</td>
<td>14,0</td>
<td>5,1</td>
<td>3,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>85,5</td>
<td>5,9</td>
<td>29,2</td>
<td>5,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>83,1</td>
<td>2,7</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>81,9</td>
<td>10,2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>84,9</td>
<td>8,1</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>80,2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>4,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here is an analysis of the reasons of the limited success of the Arab unification movement. All the aforementioned information is from the same reference (Arab Unity Studies Center, Op. Cit.).

Table 2: A Ten-country Sample’s Opinions about the Obstacles That Are Facing the Arab Unity: (%) The Reason for the Limited Success of the Arab Unity Is: the External Powers (Arab Unity Studies Center, Op. Cit.). The Response of the Sample (5040 Persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The country</th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Not agree absolutely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>64,1</td>
<td>27,8</td>
<td>8,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>35,9</td>
<td>9,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>63,2</td>
<td>23,4</td>
<td>13,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>53,0</td>
<td>32,5</td>
<td>14,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>47,8</td>
<td>47,8</td>
<td>4,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>64,5</td>
<td>24,3</td>
<td>11,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>55,8</td>
<td>27,1</td>
<td>17,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>46,2</td>
<td>25,7</td>
<td>28,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>54,6</td>
<td>27,3</td>
<td>18,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>65,6</td>
<td>25,8</td>
<td>8,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58,0</td>
<td>27,1</td>
<td>4,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: A Ten-country Sample’s Opinions about the Obstacles Which Are Facing the Arab Unity: (%) The Reason for the Limited Success of the Arab Unity Is: the Arab Rulers’ Unwillingness (Arab Unity Studies Center, Op. Cit.): The Response of the Sample (4883 persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The country</th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Not agree absolutely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>49,3</td>
<td>37,6</td>
<td>13,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>67,6</td>
<td>27,9</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>44,6</td>
<td>44,6</td>
<td>8,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>63,9</td>
<td>27,8</td>
<td>8,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>57,1</td>
<td>33,3</td>
<td>9,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>58,3</td>
<td>29,3</td>
<td>12,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>51,9</td>
<td>33,9</td>
<td>14,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>40,8</td>
<td>37,4</td>
<td>21,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>59,3</td>
<td>28,3</td>
<td>12,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>58,1</td>
<td>26,0</td>
<td>15,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53,9</td>
<td>32,9</td>
<td>13,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: A Ten-country Sample’s Opinions About the Obstacles That Are Facing the Arab Unity: (%) The Reason for the Limited Success of the Unity Is: the Absence of the Arab People’s Willingness (Arab Unity Studies Center, Op. Cit.). The Response of the Sample (4558 persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The country</th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Not agree Absolutely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,7</td>
<td>16,0</td>
<td>18,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>6,3</td>
<td>19,9</td>
<td>73,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12,3</td>
<td>30,7</td>
<td>57,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>24,8</td>
<td>57,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>31,8</td>
<td>68,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>13,7</td>
<td>78,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>21,5</td>
<td>69,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>29,4</td>
<td>25,0</td>
<td>45,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>8,0</td>
<td>21,4</td>
<td>70,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>11,6</td>
<td>16,8</td>
<td>71,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>21,1</td>
<td>68,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: A Ten-country Sample's Opinion about the Obstacle Which Are Facing the Arab Unity (%): The Reason for the Limited Success of the Arab Unity Is: The General Backwardness and Lack of the Political Consciousness. (Arab Unity Studies Center, Op. Cit.) The Response of the Sample (4698 persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The country</th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Not agree</th>
<th>Absolutely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>30,7</td>
<td>43,1</td>
<td>26,2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>35,5</td>
<td>44,9</td>
<td>19,6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>36,5</td>
<td>40,3</td>
<td>23,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>33,3</td>
<td>42,2</td>
<td>24,5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>31,6</td>
<td>47,4</td>
<td>21,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>28,3</td>
<td>44,4</td>
<td>27,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>35,6</td>
<td>39,4</td>
<td>25,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>36,22</td>
<td>38,4</td>
<td>25,4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>28,2</td>
<td>42,9</td>
<td>28,9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>34,1</td>
<td>45,2</td>
<td>20,7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33,9</td>
<td>41,5</td>
<td>24,6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: A Ten-country Sample's Opinions about the Obstacles Which Are Facing the Arab Unity (%): Arrangement of the Four Reasons According to the Priority in Hindering the Arab Unity. (Arab Unity Studies Center, Op. Cit.): The Response of the Sample (4748 persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The country</th>
<th>External powers</th>
<th>the Arab rulers</th>
<th>Lack of political Willingness</th>
<th>Low degree of popular Consciousness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>55,9</td>
<td>31,3</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>10,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>46,4</td>
<td>38,9</td>
<td>1,9</td>
<td>12,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>51,8</td>
<td>27,0</td>
<td>3,6</td>
<td>16,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>46,2</td>
<td>40,0</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>10,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>54,5</td>
<td>36,4</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>61,3</td>
<td>27,3</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>8,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>45,2</td>
<td>34,5</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>16,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>35,8</td>
<td>24,2</td>
<td>21,8</td>
<td>17,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>47,7</td>
<td>36,7</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>10,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>53,3</td>
<td>30,9</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td>10,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48,5</td>
<td>32,5</td>
<td>4,9</td>
<td>13,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

In the light of what has been mentioned above, one notices the inadequacy of the concepts on which a moncausual approach was based (Arab Unity Studies Center, Op. Cit.). On one hand, it is easy to support the idea that the limited success of the Arab unification movement has been mainly due to the lack of a championing class whose interests can be realized within a unified Arab state. It is also easy to say that the rule of the middle class has been hindered Arab unity (Jawad, Haifa, 1992). But, on the other hand, its illogical to neglect the other factors that have been made an obstacle in the way of Arab unity. I think that the failure of achieving Arab unity is mainly due to the interaction among many, internal and external factors.

When goes beyond the European field one notices the inadequacy of the concepts on which the Stalinist theory of the nation was based. The theory assumes that the nation is a social phenomenon produced by capitalism, or rather by indigenous capitalism, since it is indigenous capitalism that founded the nation (Amin, Ibid). According to this assumption, nations would only exist at the center of the world capitalist system, in the areas the bourgeois revolution has established the national power of the local bourgeoisie. What then we are to say of the social realities-which formed nations-of the pre-capitalist world? Arab nation for example, has been formed in the pre-capitalist era. In this respect I support Amin's argument that:

Firstly: The nation is a social phenomenon which can appear at every of history: It is not necessarily and exclusively a correlate of the capitalist mode of production.

Secondly: The nation appears when there exist not only the elementary conditions of geographical contiguity, reinforced by the use of a common language (which does not exclude variants of dialect), but also a social class which controls the central state apparatus and ensures economic unity in the life of community: This class need not necessarily be the capitalist national bourgeoisie.

Thirdly: The phenomenon of nationhood is process: It can develop and grow stronger or, on the contrary, it can weaken and fade away, according to whether the social class-in addition to the other factors-in question reinforces its unificatory power or losses it altogether (Amin, Ibid).

Finally: the Arab nation is existed, but it failed to achieve unity. The failure has been due to many different reasons.

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