

Religious and Fundamentalism Symptom: Case Study of Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia

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Abstract: Symptoms of Islamic fundamentalism-including Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia, here in after referred to HTI, primarily from the Middle East countries adapted Indonesian students who were studying there. In Indonesia, HTI began to appear and was introduced by Al-Baghdadi and Musthofa, since, 1982. This study analyzes HTI as a social movement which can be identified by three categories. Firstly, HTI is a specific movement, obsessed to apply Islamic law as a whole through the Khilafah state. Secondly, HTI is a radical movement that intends to implement the Islamic system in every facet of life. Thirdly, HTI is a movement that seeks to restore Islamic order as the center of world civilization. However, in reaching his goal was HTI does not use violent approaches.

Key words: Fundamentalism, HTI, Indonesia, movement, symptoms, students

INTRODUCTION

Historical data shows that there is a growing accumulation of stories about political resistance and opposition movements against a regime that considered authentic and repressive throughout the world (Cliffe, 1999; Aspinall, 2005). Social scientists generally put the phenomenon of the French Revolution in the 18th century as the taproot of the emergence of social movements in the world (Prowe, 1994; Boroumand and Boroumand, 2006). Similar, social events taking place across the 19th century and the 20th century and even up to the 3rd millennium now.

Experts generally agree that in recent decades, variations, frequency and intentions of political resistance movements and increasingly complex (Vinthagen and Johansson, 2013). This is partly evident from the emergence of the civil rights movement in the United States (Hall, 2005), peace movements (Klandermans, 1991), environmental and feminist (Ferre and Mueller, 2004) as well as resistance to authoritarianism both in Europe (Hughes *et al.*, 1995) and in developing countries (Bellin, 2004) has brought the masses to the streets to demand change. The same is done by the Jewish and Islamic religious extremism in the countries of the Middle East (Iannaccone and Berman, 2006), militarism Hindu in India (Banerjee, 2006), Christian fundamentalism in the United States (Woodberry and Smith, 1998) as well as ethnic nationalism in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union

(Carmichael, 2013). Movements were often successful but if ever they failed, their actions have influenced changes in the political, cultural and even internationally.

Similar, movements and political opposition it also keeps popping up in Indonesia. From the trail we have a repertoire of historical documentation about the peasant uprising in colonial, nationalist movement in the early 20th century, the democratization movement, the feminist movement and the environmental movement in new order era until now as well as the movement of "Anti-globalization" (Buttel, 2003), since, the late 1990's an up to now. All of it has caused many significant changes in this archipelago country.

In an attempt to understand and explain the phenomenon, social scientists have developed a repertoire of knowledge and discourse that is very rich and growing ever, since. On the plains of theoretical, it has spawned a variety of theories about social movements. Some of them are the theory of collective action, theory of value added by Smelser, resource mobilization theory, the theory of the political process, and the theory of new social movements. This study primarily refers to political process theory developed Tarrow (2001) and Fligstein and McAdam (2011) as well as a new social movement theory which has been widely adopted in the studies of social movements in the world.

Dealing with the development of theories of social movements are increasingly plural, there is no single definition of the concept of social movement as a social

phenomenon. Giddens (2013), for example, defines social movements as collective efforts to pursue a common interest or to achieve common goals through collective action outside the scope of the established institutions. The same definition was formulated leading theorist Tarrow (2001) that social movement is the collective challenges that are based on common goals and social solidarity in continuous interaction with the elite opponents and authority holders. This presupposes two definitions of social movements as collective action is opposed to embrace the collective goals anyway.

This is a broad definition because social movements have parasplural. The social movement can be in the form of small groups and limited up to thousands and even millions of people. Social movements can also operate in a level-formal legality of a society but can also move illegally or as a group of "Underground" groups.

Tarrow put the social movements in the more general category as contentius politics. Contentius politics could include social movements, cycles of contention and revolution. Political resistance happens when ordinary people and citizens who are more influential and join forces to fight the elite authority and the other opponents of the parties. Matches like this usually arise when political opportunities and constraints of change and creating incentives for all actors who lack the resources to herself. When matches supported by a strong social network and driven by cultural resonance and symbols of action, the political opposition led to the ongoing interaction with opposing parties and the result is a social movement.

According to Tarrow, measures underlying the politics of resistance is contentius collective action. Collective action may take many forms: short or sustained, institutionalized or quickly dispersed, dull or dramatic. Most collective action takes place in an institution when those incorporated in it acts to achieve a common goal. Collective action has the feel of resistance when the action was carried out by people who lack access to the institutions to file new claims or claims that cannot be accepted by the authorities or parties other opposed. collective action against a base of social movements because the action is often the only resource that is owned by lay people in opposition to the other parties are more powerful such as the state.

Still does not necessarily imply any form of political dissent were scattered in various parts of the world can be called as a social movement. For Tarrow, the concept of social movements must have four basic properties. Firstly, collective challenges. This movement always marked by challenges to fight through direct action that interferes elites and authorities. Secondly, a common purpose.

Thirdly, solidarity and collective identity. Something that move together is usually sourced from nationalism, ethnicity or religious beliefs. Fourthly, maintaining political resistance. Therefore, maintaining collective action in interaction with the strong opponents shift marks the point where a contention turned into a social movement. At this point, this study attempts further examine patterns of social movement Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This study is based on research library, then the source data is obtained from material library, especially, works involving HTI social movements. This research is descriptive analysis by utilizing critical to the socio-historical approach and qualitative analysis. Descriptive method used to present an objective picture and processed, interpreted and evaluated. While the method of analysis is intended to give critical analysis of ideas and social movements related action of HTI.

Data and documents obtained classified into primary data, namely the writings associated with HTI includes ideas, action and characters. While secondary data are posts sources that are relevant to this study.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Watt (2013) argued that almost every muslim believes the importance of the principles of Islam in political life. But how does this idea manifested in a more pragmatic political life is still difference. As far as can be captured from a trip discourse of Islamic political thought and activism there is no agreement, especially, regarding the form and content of the relationship between Islam and the modern political system or democracy.

The theme of Islamic thought as a political ideology in the context of the region and the infinite period is part of the struggle of social movements discourse of Islamic revival. When the Islamic movement has materialized into a force of political praxis, then the political values in religious dimension in itself be an integral part. At this point, the tension between the "Hegemonic discourse" and "The values of Islamic fundamentalism" continued feuding within the realm of praxis two Islamic movements: religion and country. As long as it be captured from intellectual discourse and historical trip, there are three spectrums of thought concerning the relation between religion and country.

Firstly, Islam is not simply arrange human relationship with God but a complete system of governing the whole breath of human life, including the life of the

state (Effendy, 2003). Secondly, assuming that Islam has absolutely no connection with affairs of state. Prophet Muhammad is a messenger like the messengers before that do not have a political mission (Modood, 1998). Thirdly, Islam does not recognize the raw state system, but in intrinsic value contains the principles of ethics in the life of the state (Galston, 1995).

Various responses and appreciation appears tied discourse relation between religion and the state of a number of Islamic organizations in Indonesia and outside the mainstream Islamic organization which known as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah like: Muslim Forum (FUI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Assembly Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The latter Islamic organization is an organization associated with Hizb al-Tahrir (HT) and very concerned discussing and articulating the importance of enforcement of sharia law in the caliphate.

Hizb al-Tahrir was established in al-Quds Palestine in 1953 by Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani. Previously, in early 1953, HT has filed permit the establishment of a political party to the Ministry of the Interior of the Government of Jordan but rejected, even forbidden because it is considered illegal. Since, its inception, the organization has big ambitions for sustaining life and carrying the message of Islam to the world. To uphold Islamic values in public life, should be done through the country with emphasis on the Daulah Islamiyah or Caliphate led by a caliph and democratically elected by the people.

Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) as derivation of HT is one of Islam social movements that has a revolutionary vision. HTI despite having the same concern with MMI-the implementation of Islamic law but the strategy and discourse used is slightly different. HTI is also different from JI and FPI who tend to use violence in the enforcement of Islamic law. HTI supposes that supremacy of the governance system of the Caliphate and the formalization of the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia may only be upright when the country was led by the Caliphate. HTI development arguably overtake Islamic social movements such as the FPI and MMI. HTI now have offices in almost all regions in Indonesia. In 2001 and 2007, HTI was able to bring tens of thousands of masses of various areas in Jakarta. In fact, the middle of 2009, HTI successfully held the National Ulama Council (MUN) which collects about 6,000 Muslim leaders from across Indonesia in the indoor tennis building in Senayan.

Muhtadi (2009) argued that in the middle of the tendency of a number of Islamic social movements that sprung up after the new order, HTI has a unique typical

presupposes of islamiyah that Khilafah ruling system could guarantee the formalization and implementation of Islamic law in the country. Another important aspect that distinguishes HTI with other Islamic organizations is the HTI choice in the method or strategy of struggle that does not use the instrument of democracy (elections) in order to accomplish its goals. At this point, HTI chose extra-parliamentary way of doing social movement for example such social mobilization and campaigning through halaqah integration of religion and state on which Islamic law is applied thoroughly.

Ahnaf (2011) argued that there was a ruling on the prohibition of the involvement of Muslims as voters in the election of candidates and heads of state. According to him that the law to participate in the selection of board members is illegal. A number of arguments were presented the authority to create and assign them in law was against the teachings of Islam because that authority belongs to God, the duties and obligations they necessarily represent the aspirations of the people, submit corrections and became a Caliph solicit feedback about the affairs of the Muslims the possibility of the election of the representatives of unknown credibility and ability, even a religion other than Islam.

He also confirmed that the prohibition of voting for the election of the head of state in the election, arguing the format of elections based on the current state of the Western democratic system kufur heads of state have been selected to carry out the broad outlines of state policy which is based on a decision of the people and not on the Quran and Sunnah the possibility of the election of women, infidel, unjust, wicked, even a fool as a head of state, since, getting majority support.

Review above assumes a genre of Islamic political movement that is anti-democratic ideals and the inforcement of law and life in the frame of the Islamic system which by Tibi (1995) characterized as "Political Islam". Meanwhile, a dichotomous reading HTI-Muslims and non-Muslims-against reality as well as a literary thinking on religious doctrine, assumed Ibrahim Abu Bakar as the level of religious fundamentalism.

Besides associated with religious fundamentalism, the emergence of political Islam is also conditioned by the social and political realities are: the deteriorating global position of Muslim countries vis a vis the West, the rapid social changes that occurred in the Muslim community following their effects are disturbing the crisis of legitimacy in the political systems oriented secular and the lack of popular participation in the policy making process, so that, what is called Tibi (2009) with the "Third wave of democratization of the world" not up to the Islamic world. 1970's can be seen as the beginning of a wave of

fundamentalist Islamic movements in Indonesia. It was triggered by two events, the victory of the ruling party (Golkar), the exclusion of "Political Islam" (ex-Masjumi). But strangely in the midst of the euphoria of the victory of the new order regime, in 1972 Amir of Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), Taqiyuddin Al-Nabhani, thus, to visit Indonesia without a hitch but at that time the regime forbade the rise of ex-rejected and the characters in the stage national politics. It is not clear agenda HT leaders in Indonesia, who figures he visited Islam. Uniquely in this year, Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi come to Indonesia. Qardawi bring a souvenir book for KH. Abdullah Shafi, a teacher of Grace Abdullah (founding fathers of the Congregation of MT). In this year, the first campus and famous Mosque Salman in ITB Bandung Indonesia was completed its construction.

The fundamentalist Islamic movement are bred after the 1980's and the era of ICMI power. There salafi, Jamaat MT, HTI and Tabligh Jamaat. They proliferated in the campus mosque, usroh and past movements. Campus missionary movement arose when Muh. Natsir and friends founded the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII), the gains will be seen in mosques campus activities such as Salman ITB, UGM Salahuddin and Endeavor-UNHAS.

In the context of the most cutting-edge, the students who study in the Middle East seemed to be the most important distribution channels Islamist ideas. In the midst of a repressive social and political situation at the time of the new order regime, precisely made this idea growing and most in demand among the Muslim youth urban (Chaudet, 2006).

It is interesting to note from the study of Bubalo and Fealy (2005) on the influence of the Middle East Islamism in Indonesia is the assertion to not see this transnational movement as a monolithic movement. Transmission line Islamism ideas, according to the study at least take three paths. Firstly, social movements. At this point, the transmission of ideas brought by a student or students who study in the Middle East. Secondly, educational paths and propaganda for example Rabita Alam Islami, International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and Word Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) or a charity non-government such as al-Haramain-with branches in Indonesia blamed America as organizations supporting terrorism. Thirdly, publications and internet lines.

Regarding transnational network of Hizb al-Tahrir (Osman, 2010a, b), it can be described that HT is an international political party whose activities and its members have spread to many countries across the continent. According to Rachmat Labib, Chairman of the DPP HTI, there are some activities that are coordinated

with HT in other countries. Among these is the international conference on "Islamic Caliphate" and the conference "Reunite Muslim countries". All areas have a chance instructed to organize two activities.

In addition to scientific activities, the coordination of the international movement HT can be seen in the case of the following actions. On January 8, 2004, HT region of France submitted a letter to the office of French President Jacques Chirac at the Elysee Palace. The letter contained a statement HT with regard to ban Hijab in France (Ghodsee, 2008). Similar protests then held by HTI in front of the embassy of France on January 15, 2004 which was attended by about 200 people. A similar protest was held in front of the French embassy in London on January 17, 2004 which was attended by about 3000 people.

Even the phenomenon of two demonstrations were held under the name "Islamic Action Peace I" on November 4, 2016 and "The Islamic Action Peace II" on December 2, 2016 involving millions of Muslims poured into the street, looked if HTI is involved as one of the very serious encouraging the movement. Waves of demonstrations exploded following allegations and to further Islam blasphemy suspect status to prospective governor defense capacity DKI Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok).

Meanwhile, the official website of HTI built since 2005, also revealed that HTI transnational networks (Osman, 2010a, b) as well as providing information HT events and developments around the world. In addition to loading domestic news, local site also carries news and various position statements issued by HT in other countries. There are eleven internet sites which became the world's information access movement HT. These sites use a variety of languages: English, Arabic, Urdu, Russian, German, Turkish, Dutch, Danish and two other sites in Indonesian.

It is undeniable, in conducting the demonstrations and protests HTI never use violent means even spurred peaceful demonstrations and polite (Fealy, 2004; Karagiannis and McCauley, 2006; Orofino, 2015). At this point, theories of social movements such as "Resource mobilization theory", "Political opportunities theory" and the "Theory of the frame" was unable to explain why HTI remains opposed to how to violence and become a distinction with the movement of radical Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia.

This is understandable, especially when trying to track patterns of political thought HTI. As is known, there are three genres of political thought in terms of the relation between religion and state. Firstly, "Integrative" which presupposes substantive linkages between the ideas of universal Islam and local political movement

Secondly, “symbiotic” relationships that put the reciprocal and interdependent. Thirdly, “Secularistic” who explicitly separating religion and state. HTI, the attitude seems to choose shades of “Integrative”.

Therefore, although, HTI has made the caliphate as a form of state transnational aspired aimed at continuing Islamic life and carry out propaganda Islamiyah to all corners of the world and encouraging the revival of Islam in the right way, through the brilliant mindset and enlightened as exemplified by Islamic leaders and intellectuals in the heyday ago but in ways that being introduced not through violence.

CONCLUSION

HTI as an institution and transnational fundamentalist Islamic movement has unique characteristics when compared to radical Islamic fundamentalist group to another. Especially, in view of the relation between religion and the state, following a political stance in voicing and protesting and demonstration, HTI chose paradigm “Integrative” and therefore, presupposes peaceful means, polite and non-violence. With its characteristics, it is understandable why HTI as a social movement, although, explicitly aspire to establish a transnational caliphate state, still getting the public sympathy in homeland.

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