

## Road Map to Failed State: The Neuxs Between Bad Governance and Failed State

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**Abstract:** The essential argument of this study is that Nigeria has remained in lockstep with violence and instability since independence in 1960, mainly due to the failure of past and present leaders to effectively manage and/or reduce conflict drivers within the country. To surmount this problem and prevent the country from careening towards the vortex of a failed state, the study recommends the emergence of leaders that are honest, sincere and committed to social justice, equity, rule of law and other democratic values that help to bond society and promote stability. This is what the library retrieval technique, the methodology employed in writing this study, suggests.

**Key words:** Bad-governance, instability, violence, failed state, democratic values and nation-building

### INTRODUCTION

Nation building is a long, costly and complex process. It is an unending process in the life of any nation. Available evidence in extant literature shows that no country has gone full-circle in its nation-building enterprise. This is mainly because the process itself generates its own crisis that sometimes frustrates the process. However, some countries like the United States of America, Britain, France, Switzerland and Germany have developed enduring institutions and values, which enable them to cope with the dangers and emerging threats associated with nation-building, while many others like Chile, Nicaragua, Iraq, Zimbabwe and Haiti are unable to do so due to both internal and external influences.

It is abundantly clear that due to differences in culture, geography, political and socio-economic factors that there are no manuals or handouts on nation building states could adopt to surmount their peculiar nation-building problems. We have countless prognosis of action that unwittingly did not research in other places but generated internal upheaval here and there. For example, to a large extent, while Western style democracy has work perfectly well in North America and Western Europe, it is yet to produce the desire results in Nigeria, Iraq, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Pakistan and many other countries that have so far experimented with it.

Indeed, the history of modern nation-states has proved beyond reasonable doubt that nation-building exercises triggered most of the socio-economic and political conflicts we have experienced so far. Examples of these abound in the instances of the French revolution (1789-1799); the American civil war (1861-1865); the First

and Second World wars (1914-1919 and 1939-1945, respectively); the Soviet-Afghan war (1978-1988); the Arab-Israelis war (1948-1949); the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) and many others. We have a growing number of literatures by scholars that seem to reinforce the above conclusion. Nevertheless, our most powerful indication comes from empirical events on ground in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan and many other trouble spots around the globe.

These events have triggered the debate on nation building in the 21st century, which most scholars considers exasperating. That is not my major concern. My purpose is to examine critically the menacing dangers and emerging threats, which the process of nation building in Nigeria has compromised and to answer the question why Nigeria is still steeped in violence and instability 47 years after independence. Consequently, how can we prevent the country from sliding into a failed state?

### THE NEUXS BETWEEN BAD GOVERNANCE AND FAILED STATE

The phenomenon of bad governance is becoming more and more visible globally. Its essential characteristic is the failure of the political leadership to embrace and respect the virtues that bond society and promote stability and harmony such as social justice, equity, rule of law and respect for individual/group rights and other democratic principles. Bad governance triggers conflict drivers in the society such as communal tension, social division, militarization, elites' fragmentation and competition and the emergence of ethnic and sectarian militias. It also reduces the state capacity to make

authoritative decision for the entire citizens, provide basic public services and the ability of core state institutions to regulate the activities of individuals and groups within the society. This leads to declining legitimacy and the desperate use of repressive laws and violence to cling to power by the ruling elites.

The nexus between bad governance and failed state is bidirectional, in the sense that, bad governance precedes failed state, but failed state reinforces bad governance. Thus, it is not unidirectional, it oscillate like waves. In existential terms, the immanent linkage between bad governance and failed state is non-linear, but dialectical. Bad governance breeds failed state and failed state in turn sustains bad governance. Methodologically, it is important to note that bad governance is the independent variable, while failed state is the dependent variable. This is because the internal political, economic and social crises that normally triggers weak, failing and failed state are cause by bad governance. However, the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables is symbiotic in nature, as the dependent variable tends to reinforce the attributes of the independent variable as soon as the process is set in motion. Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe provides ample evidence in this regard. In an attempt to settle the crisis of nation building in Zimbabwe, Mugabe's government policies in the last 5 years have reinforce the dangers and emerging threats to the country within the context of the relationship between bad governance and failed state.

Thus, once the process has been triggered care must be taken to ensure that good governance, which embodies the rule of law, respect for human/group rights, religious tolerance, social justice and other essentials of democratic governance are install to arrest the situation before things get out of hand. These are the preconditions for stability in the society. There cannot be peace and stability in any society where these preconditions are lacking.

The terms "weak", "failing" and "failed" states have become engagingly popular among scholars of peace and conflict studies globally. Intensely current as political concepts from 2002 in the aftermath of the bombing of the world trade centre in the US by terrorist on September 11, 2001, these concepts quickly gained seminal focus in the debates on world peace and security by students, scholars and practitioners of foreign policy. These concepts have generated substantial literatures that one might think the leading scholars in the field could define them easily. Although, these concepts now dominate peace and conflict studies as an umbrella under, which

intellectuals investigate the problems of international peace and security, they remain fundamentally contentious. Specifically, the concepts are unnameable to consensual definition. However, there are common indices scholars and experts in the field use to identify and describe them. Extantly, scholars use the terms "weak", "failing", "failed" or "diminished" states to describe those states that are unable to settle internal political, economic and social crisis caused by the process of nation-building. The crisis usually creates an environment of lawlessness, which leads to violence, and instability that may or may not require foreign intervention (Chomsky, 2006; Baker, 2007; Stewart, 2006; William, 2007). The following examples would suffice. First, William (2007) defines weak and failing states as follows:

By definition, diminished states are unstable. Lacking a strong central government, adequate army and police, as well as an effective rule of law, the environment of lawlessness and its consequences inhibits society. As violence spirals from ethnic tension to sectarian violence and on to full-scale war, the instability usually bleeds beyond borders.

Failed states Noam Chomsky (2006), the world's foremost critic of U.S. foreign policy writes, are those "that do not protect their citizens from violence and perhaps even destruction, that regard themselves as beyond the reach of domestic or international law and that suffer from a 'democratic deficit', having democratic forms but with limited substance". With added intellectual verve, Baker (2007) in turn remarks, "while there is no universal definition of a weak and failing states, most scholars agree that they have common attributes". In his delineation:

These include loss of physical control over territory, lack of a monopoly on the use of force, declining legitimacy to make authoritative decisions for the majority of the community, an inability to provide security or social services to its people and frequently, a lack of capacity to act as a full member of the international community.

The phenomenon of weak and failing states as Baker (2007) demonstrates became more visible and worrisome by the tragedy of September 11, 2001. He writes: In 2002 the US National Security Strategy stated that America is threatened more by failing states than it is by conquering states, over turning decades of US national security thinking (2006). Since then, much of the rest of the world

have come to see security challenges from that perspective as well. In addition, scholars of peace and conflicts studies agree that weak and failing states rank among the world's greatest threats to international peace and security. Baker (2007) tellingly argues the point with this observation:

While, major threats to world peace used to come mainly from ideological, militarily, or economic competition among competing states, in modern times lethal threats are growing within states from communal tensions among rival factions, extremists groups with radical political agendas and faltering regimes clinging to power and asserting militaristic ambitions. These are the driving forces of a growing world disorder.

Thus, the major threat to world peace no longer comes from states but from individuals and groups such as Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network, who have found nourishing environments in weak and failing states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Sudan to mention just a few. These extremist groups and individuals are able to do what they do because the institutions and political structures that are supposed to manage such elements in those states are weak and vulnerable.

It is imperative to note, that all countries of the world (developed or developing) exhibit internal weaknesses, which largely explains why terrorist are able to attack the US, Britain and Spain in spite of their sophisticated security network. What makes the difference is the ability of each country to manage its internal weaknesses using core state institutions (police, military, civil service, system of justice and executive/legislative leadership) and values so that they do not degenerate into violence and instability. From empirical and documented evidence (particularly the Failed State Index, 2005 and 2007), Africa has the largest number of weak and failing states in the world, however, this does not mean that the phenomenon is peculiar to Africa alone. What it means is that African states are weak and vulnerable on all indices of weak and failing states such as lack of respect for human/group rights, religious tolerance and the rule of law, an independent judiciary and representative government. These are the major sources of violence and warfare in most African states such as Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Liberia.

In these states, sometimes the violent and warfare has turned into a long and brutal civil war. The consequences of violent conflict on the African continent have been

devastating. The UK Department for International Development report of 1997 on the issue said this much:

Violent conflict generates social division, reverses economic progress, impedes sustainable development and frequently results in human rights violations. Large population movements triggered by conflict threaten the security and livelihood of whole region (Bassey, 2007).

The destructive interface between violent social conflict and crisis of underdevelopment in Africa has persuaded scholars like Elbadawi and Nicholas (2000) to conclude that:

The relatively higher incidence of war in Africa is not due to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries, but rather to high levels of poverty, failed political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources (Bassey, 2007).

Thus, it is now the collective wisdom of proponents of weak, failing and failed states that more germane to the violent conflicts spectrum of most African states is the problems of bad governance (Joseph, 1991; Rothchild, 1997; Deng and Zartman, 1991; Bassey and Oshita, 2007). Nonetheless, it would be a grave mistake to ignore historical and primordial factors entirely, since available empirical evidence supports their explanatory and predictive exposition.

According to this thinking, weak, failing and failed states are now global trend. Many countries in Western and Eastern Europe, Asia, America and the Middle East, are immerse in internal conflicts occasioned by the inability of the central government to provide the right leadership to tackle nation-building crises. Bosnia, Kosovo, Timor Leste, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, China and the former Soviet Union are some of the foremost examples.

Chomsky (2006) considers the United States of America as much a failed state as those it is quick to label as such. In his powerful and controversial book, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and Assault on Democracy*, he provides abundant and incontrovertible evidence to show how the U.S. domestic and foreign policies since Woodrow Wilson to George Bush 11 have recklessly placed the world at the brink of disaster, systematically dismantling America's long claim to being the world's arbiter of democracy. For Chomsky (2006) and his followers, a failed state is not only necessarily a state whose central government is weak or ineffective and has little practical control over much of its territory; non-

provision of public services; widespread corruption and criminality and sharp economic decline. Thus, the essential characteristic required to be label a failed state is contentious and varies considerable amongst the leading scholars and practitioners in the field. Furthermore, the declaration that a state has “failed” is generally not only controversial but also political. According to the Crisis States Research Centre, based in the United States, the concept “failed state” is use in contradictory way in the policy community. For instance, there is a tendency to label a “poorly performing” state as “failed”-a tendency the Crisis States Research Centre rejects. There is also the difficulty of drawing a dividing line between “failed state” and an “enduring state”. That is because even in a failed state, some elements of an enduring state might continue to exist and vice versa. This is a fact that the United State think-tank, the Fund for Peace and the Foreign Policy magazine, the originators of the Failed States Index can hardly controvert.

Since 2005, the United States think-tank, the Fund for Peace and the magazine Foreign Policy, publishes an annual index called the Failed States Index. The index is use to assess only sovereign states that are members of the United Nations. The index’s ranks are based on twelve indicators of state vulnerability (Appendix 1), the indicators are not meant to predict when states may experience violence or collapse; instead, they are meant to measure a state’s vulnerability to collapse or conflict. In 2005 and 2007, Nigeria ranked 17 and 21st, respectively in the failed state index. These rankings generated many controversies across the globe. My contribution to the debate follows subsequently.

### **NIGERIA: WEAK, FAILING OR FAILED STATE?**

Nigeria is the most populous black nation in the world. It obtained political independence from Britain on 1 October 1960. Going by the 2007 census figures her population is about 140 million. Although, this figure is highly contentious the national office of statistics and economic development rely on it for planning and budgeting. The country has 36 states with >400 ethnic nationalities and linguistic groups. Nigeria’s economy revolves around her vast oil mineral resources found mainly in the Niger Delta region of the country.

Before oil became the mainstay of her economy, agricultural products such as palm oil, cocoa and groundnuts were the major commodities it derived her export earnings. However, oil earnings have relegated these agro-products to the background. This largely explains why many scholars describe Nigeria has a mono-cultural economy.

Since, independence in 1960, Nigeria has witnessed many upheavals. The greatest of them all being the civil war, which claimed >2 million lives by conservative estimates. On the death toll and the story of the Nigerian civil war, see the following sources (Kirk-Greene, 1971; Obasanjo, 1981). Apart from that, there have been several ethnic, religious and political crises, which threatened the corporate existence of the Nigerian state. Notable examples of ethnic clashes are Tiv/Jukum, Tiv/kusur, Ife/Modakeke, Itu/IkotOffiong, Itsekiri/Ijaw, Urohobo/Itsekiri, Aguleri/Umuleri and a host of others, especially among the oil-producing communities of the Niger Delta. Suberu (1996) and Akpan (2000) have provide detailed account of ethnic minority conflicts in Nigeria and efforts by the government and others to broker peace and so we do not need to elaborate much on the issue. Examples of Violence between Muslims and Christians, a post-civil war phenomenon, which has continued until date are too numerous, the most scandalous was in 2002 during the Miss World Pageant, held in the Nigeria capital, Abuja. The organizers of the pageant move it from Abuja to London in the wake of religious violence, which left over 500 people dead and over 1000 injured in the northern part of the country. The rioting erupted after a newspaper suggested Mohammed would have approved of the Miss World beauty contest for personal reason.

The country has also faced external challenges, the Nigerian-Cameroon border skirmish being the most alarming. Given all of that, the country was able to weather the storm and remain one indivisible entity. However, since 1980s, it is becoming increasingly clear that the situation is getting worse. The Nigerian state is unsafe and more unstable after over four decades of independence. The country began to decline seriously under Shehu Shagari, continued its precipitous drop under Mummandu Buhari, Ibrahim Babagida and Sani Abacha and reached disturbing lows under Olusegun Obasanjo presidency (1999-2007). Whether military or civilian, successive Nigerian governments degenerated into an entity, which has failed its citizens considerably. Despite its vast government revenue from the mining of petroleum, a number of societal problems inundate the country due primarily to a history of inept governance. Some of these problems are human/group rights abuses, ethnic and sectarian violence, endemic corruption, widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes. Others include, atrocities committed with impunity against minority groups in the Niger Delta region by the state and chronic sustained human flight from the country to America and Western Europe.

Ironically, in spite of the fact that things are not alright at home, Nigeria has been involved in restoring peace and stability in many weak, failing and failed states across the globe such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Kosovo to mention a few. Nigeria involvement in peace mission abroad gives the false impression that all is well at home, but the picture on ground tells a different story.

Nigeria exhibits internal weaknesses. It is one of the most unjust and unequal countries in the world, with 54.34% of her 140 million people living on below one dollar a day. This engenders widespread social dislocation ranging from crime, communal warfare, religious crisis, political crisis and diminishing state legitimacy.

Nigeria is a very rich country but corruption and bad leadership have reduced her economic opportunities and growth. Because of corruption and lawlessness, investment is too risky. Thus, the citizens languish in abject poverty. The potential for development, thus, is unrealized. Consequently, the acrimony that exists among competing social and ethnic groups deepens and creates fragmentation and convulsion that breeds violence and instability.

For example, many ethnic militant groups such as the Oodua People Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDPVF) have emerged and now demand both political and economic rights from the federal government of Nigeria. From time to time, they engage government forces "fire for fire" to use a phraseology, popularized by the Nigerian police. For examples, the Niger Delta militants have made life unbearable for foreign oil national workers in the region. At the last account, the militants had taken not >200 of these persons hostage in recent times and both the government and their employers had to pay heavy ransom to secure their release (CNN Report, 2006). This has seriously affected oil production and other economic activities in the areas. It is impossible for a nation to expect stability in a situation where these militants freely use force to enforce whatever they like and show brazen contempt for the state and its security agencies.

Allied to the problems of ethnic militias is the problem of declining legitimacy to make authoritative decision for the majority of the citizenry at all levels of governance (local, state and federal). There cannot be peace and stability and by implication socio-economic development in an environment where the government lacks legitimacy. Political corruption and electoral fraud are the catalysts for diminishing legitimacy (Agbor, 2007). In Nigeria people

do what they like not minding what the government says since the government is not responsible and accountable to them. This largely explains why core institutions such as the civil service, the police, the judiciary, the legislature and executives are not performing the way they are supposed to, thus impeding any meaningful democracy.

On the socio-economic front, the story is worse. Nigeria is the sixth largest oil producing country in the world but her citizens have nothing to show for it. The government underpays and overtaxes them. Not only that, the country has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world. This is because the manufacturing and other allied industries are either dead or performing below capacity. In addition, social infrastructures and services that would have helped promote socio-economic development are in deplorable conditions. The country has one of the worse public health systems. Clean water is not only scarce but also limited. The roads are dead traps, electricity supply is erratic and people in urban areas often live in crowded squalor.

In the light of the above, it is easy to understand why the environment of lawlessness and its consequences are fertile seedbeds for the flourishing of area boys, ethnic militias, child labour, industrial disputes, religious crisis and many other socio-economic predicaments. It is in connection with these political, economic and social crisis that ethnic groups and civil society organisations are calling for a national conference or constitutional conference to address what they have tagged the "Nigerian question". It is also, against this background that the recent US intelligent report on Nigeria ranks it as one of the most unsafe places to do business in the world. It is also, in connection with the above situation that the inventors of the Failed State Index ranked Nigeria 21 on the list of the states most vulnerable to violence and conflict in 2007.

All these are evidence that the country has become weak and vulnerable to conflict and violence. There is no doubt that, the current state of affairs if not checkmated will lead to a systematic breakdown and an inescapable degeneration into a full-blown failed state.

### **FIXING THE NIGERIAN STATE**

When one contemplates what could happen if Nigeria slides into a failed state, the impact on the West Africa sub-region, Africa and the international community as a whole, the full scope of the danger becomes clear. But fixing failing states like Nigeria is difficult and complex, but no matter how difficult building secure and stable state is vital not only to Nigeria national interest but to

the whole world. This is because the possibility of failing states endangering national and global peace is becoming alarming. Commenting on fixing failing states Baker (2007) remarks that:

Fixing failing states requires a two-track policy: building core state institutions while, at the same time, reducing the conflict drivers. It is a long, costly and difficult process that requires ample resources, leadership, commitment, patience and multilateral cooperation (2006).

What Baker (2007) submission above makes clear is, the fact that fixing failing states like Nigeria must come from within the society. Most significantly, Baker (2007) highlights a crucial variable in fixing failing states- leadership, which Chinua (1983) and other Nigerian scholars had long recognize as “the trouble with Nigeria” to use the title of Achebe’s political pamphlet that deals with the issue.

A critical look at Nigeria, since independence reveals that none of her leaders has been able to deal with conflict drivers within the country such as economic inequality, corruption, rigged elections and census, religious intolerance, ethnicity, resource exploitation, state creation and revenue allocation effectively. Rather most of their policies do not only aggravate the situation but also throw up new drivers of conflicts within the country. For example, the inability of Nigerian leaders past and present to resolve the problems of revenue allocation since 1960 resulted in the emergence of militants in the Niger Delta region. These militant groups are now one of the top drivers of violence and conflict in the country. In addition, almost all the policies and institutions initiated in the past to manage conflict drivers in Nigeria such as the Federal Character Principles and Quota system, National Youth Service Corp (NYSC), Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), National Directorate of Employment (NDE) and a host of others, perform below expectation mainly due to poor leadership and implementation.

The leadership problem connects with building core state institutions like the police, civil service, the legislature, the judiciary and the executives. Without a good and committed leadership, these institutions cannot function properly. For instance, if you have leaders who have no respect for the rule of law, human rights, minority rights and other values that help to tie and make society stable, you cannot expect the judiciary to function properly. In other words, if leaders desecrate their core institutions, those institutions cannot work creditably. This is the situation in Nigeria. Thus, to pull Nigeria back from the brink successfully, the following are required:

good leadership, policies that would tackle problems associated with top conflicts drivers, comprehensive reform of the electoral system and the judiciary, economic reforms, poverty reduction and infrastructure and social services improvements.

These fundamentals appear quiet easy, but they are not, because you require strong, sincere and decisive leadership to get it right. Observable reality in South Africa and India, two examples of failing states that have successfully pulled themselves back from the brink confirms this. It is not as if these countries do not have their own internal problems, they do. However, they have been able to devise policies that ensure that their top conflict drivers do not degenerate into full-blown conflict. As a result, India is the world’s largest multiparty democracy with one of the fastest growing economies in the world. South Africa is also not doing badly compared to Nigeria.

## CONCLUSION

The crux of this study is that going by the “Failed State Index”, which started in 2005, Nigeria ranked among the top 20 states at risk of violent internal conflicts that can erupt like a volcano any moment. Thus, what we have done is simply to draw our attention to the impending catastrophic situation, which Nigerian leaders have continued to ignore at their peril. Other scholars have discussed the issue touched in details elsewhere. The presentation is however a continuation of the on-going debate on the survival of the Nigerian state. What Nigeria needs to mitigate the situation is leaders that can manage her myriad of conflict drivers within the country with sincerity of aim.

### Appendix 1:

#### **[edit] Indicators of state vulnerability**

The index's ranks are based on twelve indicators of state vulnerability - four social, two economic and six political.<sup>[2]</sup> The indicators are not designed to forecast when states may experience violence or collapse. Instead, they are meant to measure a state's vulnerability to collapse or conflict. All countries in the red, orange, or yellow categories display some features that make parts of their societies and institutions vulnerable to failure. Some in the yellow zone may be failing at a faster rate than those in the more dangerous orange or red zones and therefore could experience violence sooner. Conversely, some in the red zone, though critical, may exhibit some positive signs of recovery or be deteriorating slowly, giving them time to adopt mitigating strategies.<sup>[1]</sup>

**[edit] Social indicators**

**Demographic pressures:** including the pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources. The pressure from a population's settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites and proximity to environmental hazards.<sup>[3]</sup>

**Massive movement of refugees and internally displaced peoples:** Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries.<sup>[4]</sup>

**Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance:** Based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries. Including atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups and/or specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression. Institutionalized political exclusion. Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric.<sup>[5]</sup>

**Chronic and sustained human flight:** Both the "brain drain" of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents and voluntary emigration of "the middle class." Growth of exile/expat communities are also used as part of this indicator.<sup>[6]</sup>

**[edit] Economic indicators**

**Uneven economic development along group lines:** Determined by group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs and economic status. Also measured by group-based poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education levels.<sup>[7]</sup>

**Sharp and/or severe economic decline:** Measured by a progressive economic decline of the society as a whole (using: per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures.) A sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or debt payments. Collapse or devaluation of the national currency and a growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling and capital flight. Failure of the state to pay salaries of government

employees and armed forces or to meet other financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments.<sup>[8]</sup>

**[edit] Political indicators**

**Criminalization and/or delegitimation of the state:** Endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites and resistance to transparency, accountability and political representation. Includes any widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes.<sup>[9]</sup>

**Progressive deterioration of public services:** A disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation. Also using the state apparatus for agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies.<sup>[10]</sup>

**Widespread violation of human rights:** An emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule, in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated. Outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians. A rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices. Any widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution.)<sup>[11]</sup>

**Security apparatus as 'state within a state':** An emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity. Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition. An "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique. Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces.<sup>[12]</sup>

**Rise of factionalised elites:** A fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines. Any use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith.")<sup>[13]</sup>

**Intervention of other states or external factors:**

Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict. Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions.<sup>[14]</sup>

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