

## Dag Hammarskjöld and Concept Formation of Peacemaking Operations

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**Abstract:** Actuality of the problem to be investigated depends on the circumstances that the armed conflicts have become widespread in the modern world. To settle up them the UNO carries out the peacemaking operations and the study of the process of formatting the peacemaking operation concept provides today an optimal policy of its fulfillment. The study aims at investigating the formation process of the concept of the peacemaking operations and the role of the Secretary General of the United Nations D. Hammarskjöld there. The study deals with the formation process of the concept of peacemaking operations major contribution to which was made by the second UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld who was holding the post in the period of the years 1953-1961. The researcher considers, the attempts of forming international armed forces for the response to threatening to international peace and security. By way of the example of settlement of the conflicts in the Middle-East and the Congo the basic principles of peacemaking concept of Hammarskjöld are stated. The materials of the study may be useful in the process of discussion of a possible concept reformation of peacemaking operations of the UNO.

**Key words:** The UN charter, the International armed forces, conflict, the UN Secretary, Egypt, the Congo. Dag Hammarskjöld, peacemaking operation, concept, the Security Council, Resolution. The general assembly

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### INTRODUCTION

United Nations Organization, created on initiative of the leading powers of antihitlerite coalition in April 1945 and aimed at concern for keeping international peace and security, faced with a series of conflicts and was obliged to settle them up from the 1st years of its activity. The predecessor of the UNO, the League of Nations did not manage to make an effective mechanism of armed conflicts settlement, though the charter provided for the measures prevention of the armed aggression, in particular, the mechanism of imposition of economic sanctions. Unfortunately, the League of nations failed to use it effectively. This circumstance led in the end to the war breaking out.

One of the most effective and widespread tools in the arsenal of this important international organization have become the peacemaking operations. This term itself, widely used in the UN official documents and in the documents of other international organizations in normative legal acts of many states and also in scientific literature and periodicals, requires additional explanations. The UN charter that is the basis of legal base for carrying out peacemaking operations does not comprise such term. In the meantime, Chapter 5 lays the main responsibility for keeping international peace and security on the Security Council. "For guaranteeing prompt and effective actions of the UNO its Members place the main responsibility for

keeping international peace and security on the Security Council and agree with what the Security Council on executing its duty appearing in this responsibility acts on their name On executing this duty the Security Council acts in accordance with Objectives and Principles of the United Nations ". Hereinafter, Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 12 of the chart designate the authority which this main UN body is endowed with.

### MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study uses historical-comparative method, retrospective method, system method by means of which the author reveals reasons for evolution of the UN approach for regulation of the international conflicts and active involvement the Secretary General into the process. It is also used bibliographic method for analyzing D. Hammarskjöld's activity. Military staff committee and the international armed forces.

A particular interest in connection with the subject under consideration is represented in Chapter 7 "Actions concerning threatening to peace and act of aggression. Study 42, according to the standpoint of many political scientists and legal scholars, contains original legal germ of the activity that acquired the name of peacemaking at a later date. In accord with it the Security Council is authorized to undertake the actions by means of the air, naval or land forces that turn to necessary for keeping or

re-establishing peace and security. Such actions may comprise demonstrations, blockade and other operations of air, naval or land forces of the Members of Organization". Therefore, the point is here a potentiality of the international peace and security by applying the armed forces. The international armed forces, designated to implement such intervention according to study 46 are governed under the charter by specially established Military Staff Committee. The MSC consists of Chiefs of Staff of the countries that are the permanent members of the Security Council. Besides, the Committee can invite for interim participation in its activity the representatives of the countries the UN members that are not permanent members of the Security Council if their cooperation turns to necessity for more effective fulfillment of the duties of the latter.

The Charter specifies that the Military Staff Committee is subordinate to the Security Council. The main responsibility of the MSC provision of advice and assistance for the Security Council "on all issues concerning defense requirements of the Security Council in case of keeping international peace and security".

The need in competent consultation of the MSC, relating to defense requirements of the Council can arise also in cases of ascertainment by the Security Council a situation that threatens to peace, breaches peace and is the act of aggression and at the solution of the problem about measures taken for prevention the threat to peace and the act of aggression in order these measures to be sufficient to eliminate the arisen threat and to suppress aggression. Since in this case the measures not connected with the armed force use can be applied in particular, full or partial termination of economic relations, railway, sea, air, post, telegraph, radio and other means of communication and also rupture of diplomatic relations and activities with air, naval land armed forces, consultations of the MSC are to assist the Security Council in making a decision of choice of optimal measures of influence.

In general training, the committee is to assist the Security Council in conclusion of the agreements with the countries about assigning by the latter the armed forces, assistance and relevant support, including the right of passage, at its disposal.

In terms of these agreements, the Military Staff Committee is to help the Security Council determine the strength and degree of readiness of contingent of troops of some countries and work out a plan of their concerted joint actions in case of application.

Besides, the Military Staff Committee is responsible for strategic leadership of the international armed forces represented by the UN member states at the disposal of the Security Council.

Thus, the function of the Military Staff Committee in accordance with UN Charter, consists in assistance of the Security Council in all military issues concerning:

- Maintenance of the international peace and security and in particular, determination of threat occurrence to peace, violation of peace or act of aggression, measures choice to eliminate this threat or suppress the acts of aggression and violation of peace
- Negotiations of treaties between the Security Council and the member states about presenting the armed forces, other support and relevant service facilities including the right of passage at the disposal of the latter
- Planning of joint concerted actions of the international armed forces
- Strategic leadership and development of terms and conditions and principles of armed force command
- Use of armies to implement military sanctions under the protection of the Security Council
- Establishment by authority of the Security Council of its own regional subcommittees

The Military Staff Committee was established in accord with the UN Charter at the beginning of 1946. Its first session was held in February 4 of the same year. After resolution of organizational problems in February 16 the MSC received the instruction of the Security Council to study from the military standpoint the provision of study 43 of the Charter, providing for assignment by the UN members of the armed forces, assistance and needed service facilities on the basis of special agreement to be concluded by the Council with member states at the disposal of the Council. The discussion of this issue in the Military Staff Committee kept on for more than one year. On April 30, 1947, the chairman of the MSC sent to the Secretary General a letter that contained the report to the Security Council, entitled "General principles, defining the organization of the armed forces assigned by the members of the UNO at the disposal of the Security Council". From his 43 studies only 25 studies had been adopted unanimously. The rest of the studies had created divisions.

What studies provoked controversy and dispute among the permanent members of the Security Council? The studies specifying the objects of international armed force formation were easily conformed. The first chapter of the project of the general principles suggested consolidating the provision about that "the armed forces are assigned by the UN member states for maintaining and restoring the peace in the cases of:

- Presence of any threat to international peace
- Any disturbance of international peace
- Any act of aggression, when measures taken by the Security Council in accord with study 41 of the UN Charter turned to be imperfect and the threat to the international peace and security is such that it arises the necessity of using these armed forces”

At the same time, these armed forces are impossible to use notwithstanding the objectives and principles specified in the charter.

An exclusive role of the Security Council on all issues concerning the international armed forces had been supported unanimously. In this respect the unanimously adopted Articles 12, 15 and 18 of “General principles” that define the order of application of study 43 of the UN Charter are significant. It was decided that the size and staff of the national contingent of troops were to be defined by the Security Council on recommendation of the Military Staff Committee in the process of negotiations with every UN member state. Article 18 clearly designates the role of the Security Council: “The armed forces, assigned by states to the Security Council are to be used, entirely or partially, only under the solution of the Security Council and only for the period required for task implementation specified in Article 42 of the charter”.

The representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council also conformed the wording that defined the armed forces assigned to the Security Council as “national armed forces land, naval, air that are usually embodied in the armed force personnel of member states”. In the armed forces, implementing the decisions of the Security Council, the national contingents must be strictly governed by their national statuses and their commanders preserve the “keep in direct contacts with the authorities of their own country on all issues”.

It is necessary to underline that in the text of “General principles” the term “the armed forces, assigned by the UN members at the disposal of the Security Council” instead “the UN armed forces” was used. Then, after making an amendment, its wording was defined more precisely as “the armed forces, assigned by the UN members to the Security Council on request”. This precise definition was based on the provisions of the Charter (Studies 42, 43, 47), providing formation of not its own permanent UN armed forces but the armed forces of the member states assigned by them at the disposal of the Security Council on request. Nevertheless in the sequel in the official documents and scientific literature the other, less precise but shorter term “the UN armed forces” was mostly used. The researchers who usually use the latter wording specify that they do it for brevity.

The controversy was provoked by the issue on the strength of the armed forces assigned on request of the Security Council. The representatives of the USA insisted on creation of sizable military alignment comprising 3800 airplanes, 20 land divisions, 90 submarines, 6 aircraft carriers and 84 destroyers.

On statement of the representative of the USA at the meeting of the Security Council these forces “are to be composed of the assigned by the UN members strongest and well-armed contingents”. The delegation of the USSR stated that the Military Staff Committee could not come to agreement even about approximate structure and strength of the UN armed forces before the adoption by the Security Council of the general principles of organization of such armed forces”.

The American representatives by discussing “The General principles” insisted on the assigned military contingents to be outside the territories of their countries, at specially prepared bases (That idea had been implemented before long in the terms of military-political bloc of the NATO formed in 1949).

The Soviet delegation suggested assuming as a basis of the treaties the principle of equality regarding general size of the armed forces according to corps with possible departures in case of special decision of the Security Council. Besides, the USSR insisted on the military contingents to reside in the territories of their countries and be dispatched at the disposal of the Security Council on request in accord with Article 43 of the UN Charter for taking measures in cases of threatening to peace, violation of peace and acts of aggression.

The issue of forming united armed forces under the defense of the Security Council was being discussed from June 4 to July 15, 1947 and unfortunately, without any positive results. The delegation of 5 permanent members of SC could not work out the general principles of formation and use of such forces and that circumstance led to gradual curtailment of activity of the Military Staff Committee (since August 1948 this structure has practically stopped existence being nominally in force).

Thus, the first attempt to proceed to practical formation of basic international structures capable of consolidate norms and principles specified in the UN Charter via powerful military-political potential failed. The international armed forces aimed to become an iron curtain on the way of the potential aggressors and warmongers and conflict instigators have never not been formed. The military contingents that participated in peacemaking operations and operations on keeping peace in the second half of the 20th century and in the 21st century have been formed on other legal basis in spite of the provisions of the UN Charter. The “cold war” to be

broken out considerably corrected the activity of the United Nations Organization and did not admit to form the international armed forces under its defense. That circumstance forced this organization to make changes into the activity and to begin to prepare to the peacemaking operations or operations on maintaining the peace in violation of the charter.

The realia of the postwar development of the international relations and split of the former allies, caused the beginning of the cold war, made considerable changes into the activity of the UNO and induced it to correct its activity on the spur of the moment.

On November 3, 1950 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution No 377 "Unity in favour of peace". This resolution played an important role in further development of the concept of the international peacekeeping and allowed to promptly react to the conflicts arising in different regions. It objectively met the interests of the whole world community and further peacemaking UN practice and other international clearly corroborated it. So what was new in that resolution? First of all, the general assembly was vested a right in the cases when "The Security Council in the result of split of permanent members, turns to be unable to fulfill its main duty on maintaining international peace and security in all cases when there exist the grounds to see the threatening to peace, violation of peace and act aggression to make the members of the organization necessary recommendations concerning collective measures, including the use of the armed forces in case of violation of peace and act of aggression". Thus, the General Assembly acquired the right, equally with the Security Council, to make decisions about the use of coercive measures, including the measures connected with the use of the armed forces. In the second place, the General Assembly constituted". The Commission on supervision of peace keeping that will be responsible for the situations in any district where the tension of the international relations occurs and the growing of which may pose a threat to maintaining the international relations and security and for submitting the reports about it. At the invitation of or with the consent of the state where the Committee is going to the general assembly or the Inter-session committee between the sessions can use this Committee if the Security Council does not perform functions on this issue vested by the Charter on it".

So there appears another body which is originally extra in the UN Charter that will undertake some of powers of the Security Council. In the third place, the General Assembly established "the Committee of joint activities, consisted of 14 members" that was commissioned to

investigate and submit in the report to the Security Council and the General Assembly the methods which would be used for maintaining and strengthening the international peace and security. That was the most important item which enabled to enrich the UN peacemaking practice. Finally in the fourth place, the General Assembly recommended to "the members of the Organization each to have its own personnel of the national armed forces to be trained, organized and armed in such a way that they could be used promptly as a tactical unit or UN units upon recommendations of the Security Council or the General Assembly". This item of resolution is also very important as it stipulates for special training of military companies that have to take part in peacemaking operations.

So, this resolution, passed in the period of flare-up between the East and the West the symbol of which had become the Korean war was of great importance on the arrangement of many regional conflicts and implementation of peacemaking operations. In 6 years exactly on November 1956, during the Suez crisis, the UN General Assembly formed the first UN Emergency Force, following the ideas of the resolution "Unity in favour of peace".

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

**Dag Hammarskjöld and the Suez crisis:** The special role in conceptualization of peacekeeping operations belongs to the United Nations Secretary General D. Hammarskjöld. Dag Hammarskjöld was born in Jonkoping, on June 29, 1905. His childhood passed in Uppsala where his father Jahlmar Hammarskjöld held a post of governor in 1907. His father was a law professor and a specialist in international law. He participated in the second international peace conference the Hague in 1907. In the years of World War I, he held a post of prime minister in Sweden. The future Secretary General of the United Nations, having graduated from gymnasium, entered the Uppsala University, where he received his bachelorhood in law in 1930 and defended his D.'s dissertation in economics in Stockholm college in 1933. The during 10 years, he was holding various posts in the Ministry of Finance. In 1947, he moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sweden. In 1951, he entered the government as non-party minister without portfolio (Wallesteen, 1995a). In April 10, 1953 he assumed an office of the United Nations Secretary General.

In July 1956, the president of Egypt Nasser made decision to nationalize the Suez canal so called "Universal company of the Suez maritime canal", majority shares of which belonged to the Great Britain and France. The Great

Britain, France and Israel, discontented with that decision at the turn of October 1956 organized aggression against Egypt.

At night in October from 29-30 the first who intruded into the territory of Egypt were the Israel troops with overall strength of about 100 thousand men. It took few days for them to occupy the whole Sinai Peninsula. Then the troops of the Great Britain and France joined in with Israel. On the very day in October 30 the United Nations Security Council argued a point of aggression of Israel against Egypt. The representative of the USSR made a proposal to take all the necessary measures to curb the aggression and withdraw the international forces from the territory of Egypt. However, the Great Britain and France declined the project of resolution of USSR having used veto powers.

Thus, two countries permanent members of the Security Council blocked in fact the activity of the main body of the world community that was to take effective and urgent measures, aimed at restoration of peace in the Middle East. Under the circumstances on October 31 the Security Council by a majority vote adopted resolution No. 119 in which having noted that "absence of unanimity among permanent members of the Security Council in its 749th and 750th meetings prevented from bearing its main responsibility for keeping international peace and security", resolved "to create extraordinary special session of the General Assembly as it was provided in resolution 377A(5) by the General Assembly of November 3 1950, so as to make competent recommendations". Thus, the initiative on resolution of the Suez crisis moves from incapable and split the Security Council to the General Assembly.

In October 4 the extraordinary session of the General Assembly at its Ha 563d plenary meeting adopted resolution No. 998 according to which the Secretary General was charged "within 48 h with presenting a plan on formation of emergency international armed force of the United Nations Organization for ensuring cessation of hostilities and supervising maintenance of the hostilities". At first, the idea of forming peacemaking forces and dispatching them to the district of conflict was advanced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Canada Lester Pearson. This Canadian diplomat and politician showed his worth, working in a team precisely in the United Nations Organization. He worked the best in tandem with the Secretary General D. Hammarskjold (John, 2007).

After that proposition D. Hammarskjold formulated the main provisions of the peacemaking concept within several days (Bildt, 2011).

The main ideas of Hammarskjold, further embodied in the concept of peacemaking, were laid down in the report

of the Secretary General of November 4, 1956. In Hammarskjold's judgment, the emergency international armed forces are to be based on three main principles.

Firstly, they are due to be based in accordance with the UN Charter. It means that the leader of these forces is assigned by the United Nations Organization and is responsible for the General Assembly and the Security Council. Secondly, the United Nations Organization is due to charge a country or a group of countries with forming such forces as it does not have its own army. Thirdly, these forces can be formed as a result of agreements between the member states of the UNO.

Another main principle underlying in the concept of peacemaking operations of D. Hammarskjold is that the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East is to act by authority of the receiving party. Under the circumstances it was necessary to extract agreement from Egypt to station peacemaking forces in its own territory. As Wallesteen writes, "the most difficult thing for Hammarskjold was parley with Egypt, the consent from which was required to deploy the foreign troops even under the sponsorship of the United Nations in its own territory. Recognizing sovereignty of Egypt and at the same time accentuating the importance of forthcoming deployment there of the armed forces of the UNO provides opportunity for withdrawing the French and British troops. Hammarskjold managed to get consent to bring the first UN contingent in Egypt. The Egypt's sovereignty problem was then solved by means of adoption of special procedure providing Egypt with the right to require the UN force withdrawal" (Wallesteen, 1995b).

Further in his researchers D. Hammarskjold kept on developing the concept of peacekeeping operations. He often said, "We live in the developing world, the history is developing and acting according to predefined plan means to sacrifice flexibility one of the most important quality of a diplomat". When in 1958, he was asked about the possibility of using Emergency Force in the Middle East in settlement of the Lebanese crisis he answered: "The peacemaking operation in the Middle East is an operation that is based on the series of emergency and I would caution against blind and inconsiderate copying of this operation".

At the same time on February 18, 1960 at the press-conference, answering the question of a journalist, Dag Hammarskjold said that there existed a certain tendency of expecting from the UN Secretary General actions that ought be taken by the Security Council.

**The conflict in the Congo and the concept of peacemaking operations:** Such situation took a unique concrete turn in Summer 1960 in the Congo. On June 30,

the republic of Congo became an independent state and almost immediately in the country began the disturbances that developed into armed clash. The situation was brought to the flash point after the leader of the richest province Congo Katanga Moise Tshombe to announce of its secession and to appeal to Belgium for military assistance to restore public order. In July, the 1 president of the Congo Kasa-Vubu and prime minister P. Lumumba appealed to the UNO for help because of the aggression of Belgium: "The government of the republic Congo is insistently applying to the UNO for immediate military assistance. This application is conditioned by the movement of the Belgian troops in the Congo in breach of treaty signed between Belgium and the Republic Congo. Under the treaty the Belgian troops can stay in the country only at the request of the government of the Congo. Such request has not been appealed that is why, we consider the actions of the Belgians as the act of aggression against our country" (Ernest, 1967).

The United Nations Organization reacted to this request immediately. On July 14, the Security Council adopted resolution No 143, that contained the requirement to Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorized the Secretary General "to take in consultation with the Republic of Congo necessary measures for needed military assistance to this government". It should be emphasized that this resolution has been voted for by 8 members of the Security Council with 3 abstentions (China, France and Great Britain). Then commenced one of the most difficult and large-scale peacemaking operations of the UNO, served as a peculiar firing ground for working of different variants and methods of peacemaking.

The basic parameters and conceptual framework of this operation were developed by D. Hammarskjold and stated in the reports to the Security Council. Of special interest is the first report of July 18 when the first sub-units of peacemakers from Ethiopia, Ghana, Tunisia and Morocco arrived already to the Congo and launched fulfillment of their mission. In this report, the Secretary General stated the main principles of functioning of peacemaking forces of the UNO in the Congo:

- Firstly, the dispatched armed forces should be considered as interim security forces that station in the country with the consent of the government for a certain time and on purpose
- Secondly, the forces of the UNO in the Congo notwithstanding their being dispatched at the request of the Congo and pursuant to the United Nations Security Council resolutions about military assistance are to be under the UN command in the person of the Secretary General and the Security Council

- Thirdly, the UN forces in the Congo cannot take part in the internal conflicts and take a side in them
- Fourthly, the peacemakers in the Congo are to have freedom of movement all across the territory including Katanga

Further D. Hammarskjold in his report dwelt in detail on the principle of recruitment for the peacekeeping forces. He stressed that the UNO in its operations was always guided by the principle of nonparticipation in them of the sub-units from the countries the permanent members of the Security Council and the countries having special interests in the country of realization. Another important principle underlined by the Secretary General is that the peacemakers are not to be used as the means in the political struggle in the country of service.

One of the most important peacemaking operations principles is the use of the armed force by the peacemakers extremely in self-defense.

D. Hammarskjold also made a speech of the initiative to use the police force along with land subdivisions to fulfill special functions on keeping public peace in the Congo and to train the national police of the Congo.

As the situation was developing in the Congo the mandate was changed. In early 1961, the atmosphere in the Congo remained as usual hot. Central government of the country, torn by antagonisms, made a series of considerable errors. The peacemaking forces were restricted in their actions by the mandate of the Security Council. One of the most burning problem remained the problem of the separatism of Katanga. The leader of the Mutinous Province Tshombe formed effective and well armed army that was colliding with the National army of the Congo.

The escalation of the situation in the country was reacted to by the Security Council that on D. Hammarskjold's recommendation on February 2, 1, 1961 adopted resolution 161 that stated the requirement to the forces of the UNO "to take all the due measures to prevent from flare-ups of the civil war in the Congo including the cease-fire activities, suspension of all arms and prevention from clashes resorting if necessary to the use of force as extreme measures".

Thus, the Security Council, having received information from the Secretary General and his representative in the Congo about escalation of the situation and start of the armed conflict between the Congo national army and the army of Katanga, seriously amended the mandatory powers of the peacemaking forces. Before this resolution the UN powers had a right to use the arm only in the last resort and exceptionally in self-defence. After adoption of the resolution the

peacemakers were at liberty in the framework of fulfilling their tasks to use the armed force first. This decision in principle played a determining role for further activities of the peacemakers in the Congo and has made a major contribution to the development of the peacemaking concept.

To the development of this resolution the Security Council on November 24, 1961 already after D. Hammarskjöld's death in plane crash passed resolution No. 169 that marked a new period in the peacemaking operation in the Congo. At that stage, the peacemakers broke principle of neutrality and non-interference with political struggle in unambiguous favour central government. The resolution stated that the Security Council "resolutely denounces the separatist policy, illegally pursued by the administration of the province of Katanga, denounces the armed activities against the UN armies". Besides, this resolution empowered the Secretary General "to take resolute measures, including if necessary, the use of the force to the extent it is required for immediate detention, arrest and dispatch of all Foreign military and paramilitary personnel and all political counsellor".

By adoption of this resolution, the peacemaking forces of the UNO in the Congo obtained rightful principles for active interference in the internal conflict and turned out to be involved in the armed confrontation between the central government and the mutinous Province of Katanga. In January, 1963 the separatists suffered a defeat and capitulated. The peacemaking forces of the UNO fulfilled their mission and in 1964 were withdrawn from the country.

At the very beginning of the peacemaking operation in the Congo Hammarskjöld worked out a code of fundamental rules that established definite interrelations between the UN forces and the central government of the country. Using these rules as the basis he formulated the following principles of the peacemaking operation:

- First; the forces of the UNO must be in exclusive subordination to the UNO Secretary General who is accountable only to the security Council. None of the national subdivisions from the personnel of the UNO Force does not have the right to be ordered by its government or the government of the Congo. All the operations of the UNO must be transparent for control and be separated from any activity sponsored by the national states
- Second; the UNO must not interfere in the internal conflicts
- Third; the Forces of the UNO must have freedom to travel through the country, including the province of Katanga

- Forth; the forces of the UNO have the right to use the force only in self-defence and in this case have the right to use it first
- Fifth; the UNO Secretary General by agreement with Congolese government, designates the personnel of the peacemaking forces (Ernest, 1965)

The UNO Force Mission, from the first, was simple in comparison. It consisted of five tasks:

- Rendering assistance to the government of the Congo in restoration and maintenance of legality and order
- Providing withdrawal of all foreign armed formations and political counsellors not subordinated to the UNO and mercenaries
- Preventing the civil war
- Restoring and maintaining the territorial and political integrity of a country (Rosalyn, 1980)

The main goals and objectives of the peacemaking mission had not been cardinally changed for four years. But the method that they used have been changed several times.

Four resolutions of the principal organ of the UNO adopted in the course of implementation of the peacemaking operations in this country directly concerned the powers of "blue helmets". Each of these resolutions sanctioned a more profound operation and at the same time restricted the methods of fulfillment of the operation. Originally, the Security Council sanctioned with the resolution of July 14, 1960 the interference of the UNO and summoned to withdraw the Belgian troops from the Congo. The resolution also admitted the Secretary General to use necessary military and engineering support to the central government of the country for restoration and maintenance of the legality and order. At a later date, the UNO reached an agreement with the central government of the Congo about free movement of the peacemaking forces all over the country's territory. But, the absolute refusal of Tshombe to admit the peacemakers to sovereign in his judgement, State Katanga and his open statement in favour of the armed resistance of "intervention" of the UNO, obliged Hammarskjöld to reconsider the position concerning, he mandate and authorities of "blue helmets" in this country. The primary resolution did not permit the peacemakers to use the armed force but after the Tshombe's speech, it became clear that they would have to use it in the province of Katanga. On August 9 the Security Council in its resolution condemned the provocative military statements of Tshombe about peacemaking forces and one more time

confirmed the power of the Secretary General on resolution of the Congolese crisis. The members of the Security Council increased mandatory powers by having appealed to the immediate withdrawal of the Belgium troops from the country and sanctioned engagement of peacemakers into the Katanga with the aim of implementation of the resolution of July 14. To diffuse fear of Tshombe who apprehended force repression of province sovereignty, it was emphasized in the resolution that the UNO Force would not intervene with the internal problem of the country (David, 1973).

Though, this resolution did not authorize the UNO forces to use the armed force it noticed Tshombe and permitted the peacemakers to enter into the mutinous province. Though, it was not able to ease the situation of military personnel who attempted to reestablish the order of the plunging into chaos country.

By February 1961, the central government of the country made a series of serious errors and could not function effectively. The forces of the UNO could act only in the framework of the restricted mandate. However, though a certain stabilization had been achieved in some regions of the country, the problem of the separatism of Katanga had remained very urgent as before. Tshombe managed to organize effective well armed army that was led by the Belgium officers who were personally faithful to him and his government and volunteers served exceptionally for money. The Lumumba's murder in the Katanga brought a sharp reaction from the Soviet Union that insisted on the immediate arrest of Tshombe and cessation of the civil war in the country. In the meantime, the clashes were increasing between the Tshombe's army and subdivisions of the Congo national army. The tribes Baluba in the north of Katanga opposed to Tshombe and started the armed struggle against his adherents. The UNO forces turned out to be between two fires. Since they did not have opportunity be first to use force they had not managed to cease the bloody conflicts.

The UNO Security Council reacted to the situation changes in the country on February 21, 1961 by having adopted resolution No. 4741 that provided to authorize the peacemakers to use any facilities to stop the civil war in the Congo. This resolution also demanded for immediate withdrawing the Belgium troops and military personnel of other countries who were not the members of the UNO structure. Those activities could considerably weaken the military power of the province of Katanga. Besides, the resolution authorized the commanders of the peacemakers to use the armed force to prevent the civil war and solve the problem of separatism of Katanga. Nevertheless, this resolution did not authorize the peacemaking subdivisions to realize offensive operation.

After coming to power Adoula's government in August 1961, the situation had been slightly stabilized. But in the very mutinous province the tension was increasing. The peacemakers and the army of Tshombe were thoroughly keeping track of manoeuvres of each other while the UN governing body and the central government attempted to come to an agreement with Tshombe. It became evident that the government did not have sufficient financial and military resources to struggle against separatism of Tshombe. As the result of it, there had been stalemate situation.

In September, the peacemakers faced another problem in the mutinous province. In particular in early September the peacemakers collided with the army Tshombe, though the initiative had been theirs under the circumstances. The UNO and peacemakers were at once subjected to criticism of the world press and some Western countries, particularly of England and France. The UNO had refused courteously but resolutely to support any party to a conflict around Katanga. Afterwards, however, the Security Council took a stand on the question of support of the government of the Congo by resolution of November 24, 1961. In this resolution, it was expressed regret over the September conflict and at the same time it was disapproved the independence of Katanga proclaimed by Tshombe. This resolution demanded to stop separatist activity in the territory of the Congo and noticed that the central government had used all-round supporting from the UNO. Besides, this resolution sanctioned vigorous actions of the peacemaking forces including the use of the armed force for detention, disbarment and deportation of all foreign military personnel that were not under the UNO's.

Thus, resolution of November 24 affirmed that a certain compromise had been achieved in the Security Council. It authorized the UN military command to solve the problem of Katanga with using armed force. And though after resolution adoption the peacemakers had never initiated offensive actions to exclude foreign mercenary from the Congo, the fact of authorizing them to do it influenced considerably on the relations between Tshombe and peacemaking forces. The adoption of this resolution implied that the United Nations Organization decided to put an end to the separatism of mutinous province, even if it would necessary to take an active part in the armed activities on the side of the central government.

The peacemaking operation of the UNO in the Congo presents a very interesting and actual example of the peacemaking as it touches the problems that exist in the 21st century. First of all, the example of the Congo shows the complexity and complication of the peacemaking



operation. As far as we know, originally the request of the government of the Congo consisted in technical assistance to establish internal order of the country. The second request of P. Lumumba concerned already military assistance to reflect the aggression of Belgium. The UNO governing had to answer two questions. Firstly, did the political struggle between different parties or colonial intervention of Belgium result in the chaos in the country? Secondly is the separatism of Katanga the internal problem or the result of aggressive intervention from outside (Janeen, 2005). In the 21st century the United Nations Organization conduct a series of peacemaking operations a major part of which part falls on the African continent and the experience, received in the Congo in early 1960s as been applied by politicians and peacekeepers today.

### CONCLUSION

The Second Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold holding his post in 1953 in the midst of the cold war, faced serious problems. The international peace and security were under threat of many armed conflicts the resolving of which was obligation of the United Nations Organization. The international armed forces aimed to promptly restore peace and penalize an aggressor was quite real at the end of the Second World War. However opposition between the USSR and the USA made their formation impossible. Moreover that confrontation often blocked the activity of the Security Council. Under the circumstances the initiative on conflict regulation was taken by the Secretary General and the General Assembly. The Suez crisis threatened to the security not only of the Middle East, it might provoke new world war. Dag Hammarskjold authorized by the General Assembly had taken up the development of the peacemaking operations concept in the zone of the Suez Canal. The activity of the Emergency armed forces was a model for subsequent analogous operations. The further development of the peacemaking concept acquired in the years 1960-1961 when D. Hammarskjold was taking an active part in settling crisis in the Congo. In this African country, new methods have been tried out and used with varying degree of success in different peacemaking operations in 20th and 21st centuries.

### RECOMENDATIONS

The items and conclusions of this study can have theoretical and practical importance. They can be used in further investigations of the UN peacemaking operations concept in the investigations of concrete peacemaking operations of the UNO and other peacemaking organizations and also in the discussion of the concept reformation of the peacemaking operations.

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