

Study of the Relationship Between Moral Intelligence and Tendency to Democratic Values (Case Study of Orumieh)

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Abstract: Supportive culture of democracy has been emphasized by many social theorists. They have examined the role of a broad array of attitudes, values and behavior patterns on democratization and democratic processes in societies. These studies have demonstrated the importance of knowledge, belief, morals, custom and so on for democracy and the tendency of individuals to democratic values. Longitudinal studies also support the theory that intelligence has an impact on political orientations and behavior. The study of the relationship between moral intelligence as a mental and behavioral ability-and the tendency of individuals to democratic values can be seen in this line of studies. The study was administered in Orumieh (capital city of West Azarbaijan province) which is one of the most culturally and ethnically diverse cities of Iran. A survey was created and administered to 600 citizens of this city. Using multistage cluster sampling of 5 districts in Orumieh, 600 citizens were selected and the study was performed among them. Obtained data were analyzed using Pearson correlation and linear regression and the result shows the existence of a significant relationship between moral intelligence and the tendency to democratic values among Orumieh citizens. Statistical findings also show religion and ethnicity affect the tendency of individuals to democratic values. Thus, both our first hypothesis about the relationship between moral intelligence and the tendency of individuals to democratic values and the second hypothesis about the effects of religion and ethnicity on the tendency of individuals to democratic values are confirmed according to acquired data.

Key words: Democracy, democratic values, Moral Intelligence (MI), cultural diversity, cultural adaptation, Orumieh

INTRODUCTION

Theorizing and empirical study on the underlying determinant factors of the tendency of individuals and groups to democracy and democratic values have always been one of the important attempts in social and political sciences. As Gorodnichenko and Roland pointed out very large literature has developed analyzing empirically the determinants of democratization. They point to poor share of culture in this literature and state "To our knowledge, the role of culture has generally been absent in this literature". In fact, culture plays a much more crucial role in democracy than the literature of the past two decades would indicate (Vanhanen, 2003). Since culture as Tyler (1871) defined it is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society, intelligence including Moral Intelligence or (MI) as part of "that complex whole" has also been neglected

in the study of democracy and the tendency of individuals to democratic values. It is worth noting that philosophers such as Plato, Kant, Leibnitz, Wundt and May suggested that intelligence includes aspects of knowing and thinking, valuing and emotion and volition and ethics. And moral intelligence has special position amongst other kinds of intelligences because as Lennick and Kiel (2005) have stated moral intelligence is the "central intelligence for all humans. It's because moral intelligence directs our other forms of intelligence to do something worth while"

In this study, we present a very simple model of the tendency of individuals to democratic values that includes the effects of having different rates of moral intelligence on having different rates in the tendency to democratic values. Hence, our aim here is not to develop a full description of moral intelligence and its aspects or democracy and its principles and values but only to study the relationship between Moral Intelligence or MI as the

independent variable and democratic values as dependent ones. We consider whether and how MI enhance the likelihood that individuals from different religious and ethnic backgrounds in Orumieh-which is according to Iranian population and housing census results of 2011 one of the most culturally and ethnically diverse cities of Iran-have tendency to democratic values.

Definitions of democracy and democratic values: The concept of democracy is one of the most used concepts of the socio-political vocabulary but there is not now, nor will there likely be, a final consensus on the definition or full content of it. As Buhlmann *et al.* (2008) have stated there is an abundant literature relating to democracy theory with countless definitions of what democracy should be and what democracy is. These definitions range from Schumpeter (1942)'s minimalist "competitive struggle for votes" to more extensive definitions that include reference to equality, political freedoms, tolerance, economic rights and so on. The main definition of democracy in the present study is an extensive one that focuses on the role of knowledge and culture. This concept accords with the one adopted by Lipset (1994) who believes democracy requires a supportive culture, the acceptance by the citizenry and political elites of principles underlying freedom of speech, media assembly, religion, the rights of opposition parties, of the rule of law, of human rights and the like. As the case of the concept of democracy, there is no consensus on measures, principles, criterion and values of democracy also. As Kekic stated there is no consensus on how to measure democracy, definitions of democracy are contested and there is an ongoing lively debate on the subject (Kekic, 2007).

Nevertheless, there are certain principles and values of democracy about which there is a significant consensus. In their inspiring book introducing democracy: 80 questions and answers, Beetham and Boyle (1995), suggest that democracy entails the twin principles of "popular control" over collective decision making and "equality of rights" in the exercise of that control. Sodaro believes Tolerance, fairness and compromise are among the most important of these values (Sodaro, 2001). And Buhlmann *et al.* (2008) identify the key concepts of equality, freedom and control as three fundamental principles of democracy. It can be said by referring to many of conceptualizations of democracy that freedom (with all its different aspects and dimensions), tolerance and socio-political participation of people in public affairs are among the most important values and principles of democracy.

Arendt (1993), sees freedom as one of the most important features of democratic societies and Sen (1999)

defines it the absence of disabling conditions for an individual and the fulfillment of enabling conditions. The (United States-based) Freedom House organization underscores in its mission statement: "Freedom is possible only in democratic political systems in which the governments are accountable to their own people; the rule of law prevails and freedoms of expression association and belief as well as respect for the rights of minorities and woman are guaranteed the most certain test by which we judge whether a country is really free is the amount of security enjoyed by minorities. Acton (1907) in his book the history of freedom and other essays writes.

Thus, one of the important measures of a country's freedom (especially in a multicultural- multiethnic society as Iran) is type of dealing with cultural, religious and ethnic minorities but it should be noted that this treatment is strongly under the influence of moral intelligence because moral intelligence as Clarken has stated is an essential element to individual and collective well-being and progress and does demand consideration and respect of differences and stimulates to the search for a path for creative coexistence.

Tolerance and political tolerance, in particular, can be defined as a willingness to put up with disagreeable ideas and groups (Gibson, 2007). So, tolerance first of all teaches us to respect fundamentally and to accept and then to enable and even to stimulate differences, especially to overcome stereotypes and prejudices (Borba, 2001). Society, especially multicultural and multiethnic one such as Iran is comprised of people with different cultural and ethnic backgrounds who practice different religions and represent different groups. Democratic societies strive to be politically tolerant and the rights of minorities and other groups are protected. But it is worth noting that the tolerance or intolerance depends largely on culture and cultural values and also on abilities and mental capabilities of individuals such as intelligence and especially moral intelligence.

Political participation is described as one of the basic conditions of functioning democracy (Verba *et al.*, 1995; Norris, 2002). And defined as an activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action-either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies (Verba *et al.*, 1995). Hence, citizen participation in public sphere builds a stronger democracy but it is worth noting also that political culture (which is under the influence of intelligence in general and moral intelligence in particular), has an important role in the tendency of individuals to political participation. As Rindermann (2008) has stated intelligence is a relevant phenomenon for politics and itself a relevant political phenomenon.

Supportive culture of democracy: Supportive culture of democracy has been emphasized by many social theorists (Almond 1956; Almond and Verba 1963; Pye, 1965; Dahl, 1971; Bobbio 1987; Eckstein 1988; Diamond *et al.*, 1990; Lipset 1994; Barry, 1997; Inglehart, 2000; Young, 2000). Inglehart and Welzel (2005) believe from the outset, scholars of political culture have claimed that the functioning and persistence of democratic institutions at the system-level is closely linked with prevailing mass tendencies in individual-level attitudes and value orientations. They concluded after pointing out to some cases, almost all studies in the political culture tradition claim in one or the other way that mass tendencies in individual-level attitudes and value orientations are important for the functioning of democracy at the system-level. One can reasonably conclude that this is the basic creed of the political culture school by which most of its advocates justify their research. As Almond and Verba (1963) believe, political culture is a subjective mass phenomenon that consists of orientations toward key objects of the political system and toward the individual's role in it. They state that the political culture of a nation is the particular distribution toward political objects among members of the nation (Almond and Verba, 1963).

Wucherpfennig and Deutsch (2009) believe at a time when democratic forms of government were the exception rather than the rule it was Lipset who in his seminal 1959 piece some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political development first established the theoretical link between the level of development of a given country and its probability of being democratic. They concluded, economic development-like urbanization, wealth and education-in Lipset's account works as a mediating variable that is part of a larger syndrome of conditions favorable to democratization. One may find content of this "larger syndrome of conditions favorable to democratization" in Almond and Verba (1963)'s conclusion that a healthy mixture of "subject orientations" and "participant orientations" was conducive to a "civic culture" that helps democracies to flourish (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) and mean according to Coppedge (2012) from subject orientations, citizen's respect to the law and the authority of the state and the government and from participant orientations, citizen's interest in politics and participate in elections and other activities that make democracy research or in Inglehart and Welzel (2005)'s statement where they see a logical connection between having a large proportion of citizens who "value self-expression-who feel economically secure independent from elite domination and claim "the ability to make decisions and actions based on autonomous choices." According to Tessler and Eleanor (2009) while

Almond and Verba focused on political cognition, feelings toward government and politics, levels of partisanship, sense of civic obligation and political efficacy, Inglehart, investigated the relationship between democratic achievement and adherence to self-expression values, including trust, tolerance and political activism and Rice, and Feldman (1997) examined support for freedom of expression, political tolerance, respect for competing ideas and preferences, political interest and a willingness to participate in the political process. They mention dimensions of political culture that have received attention in other studies and say these dimensions include political interest by Booth and Richard (1998), political tolerance by Dalton (2000), valuation of liberty by Rivero *et al.* (2002), rights consciousness by Gibson *et al.*, 1992, support for civil disobedience by Inglehart and Welzel (2003), support for media independence by Nathan and Shi (1993) and political participation by Rice and Feldman (1997).

These studies have examined the role of a broad array of attitudes, values and behavior patterns on democratization and democratic processes in societies and the study of the relationship between moral intelligence as a mental and behavioral ability and tendency to democratic values can be seen in this line of studies. In fact, many analyses have focused on the influence of these and other cultural and political cultural variables on democratic orientations and focus on the influence of moral intelligence on the tendency of individuals to democratic values can be done under these and other relevant studies inspirations.

Moral Intelligence (MI): Moral intelligence, according to Boss (1994) may be defined as "respect for oneself and others as beings with inherent value." He believes this definition is similar to Piaget's definition of "practical morality" as "mutual respect for others within relationships, the indissoluble unity of judgment and obligation and aspirations while it is newer and less studied than the more established cognitive, emotional and social intelligences but has great potential to improve our understanding of learning and behavior (Coles, 1997; Hass, 1998). Borba (2001) defines moral intelligence as the capacity to understand right from wrong, to have strong ethical convictions and to act on them to behave in the right and honorable way. She identifies seven competencies related to moral intelligence including empathy, conscience, self-control, respect, kindness, tolerance and fairness. The first three-empathy, conscience and self-control- represent the "moral core" of moral intelligence. Lennick and Kiel (2005) define it as our

mental capacity to determine how universal human principles-like those embodied by the “golden rule” should be applied to our personal values, goals and actions. And believe it helps an individual acknowledge what difference our existence makes in the great cosmic scheme of things.

According to Christen *et al.* (2014), Lennick *et al.* (2011) were the first to introduced the term. They referred to the business world and, based on case studies, concluded that mere strategic thinking is not sufficient for being a successful business leader. Lennick and Kiel (2005) of course, believe moral intelligence is not just important to effective leadership and in their inspiring book moral intelligence: enhancing business performance and leadership success have written:

Moral intelligence is not just important to effective leadership-it is the “central intelligence” for all humans. Why? It’s because moral intelligence directs our other forms of intelligence to do something worth while. Moral intelligence gives our life purpose. Without moral intelligence, we would be able to do things and experience events but they would lack meaning. Without moral intelligence we wouldn’t know why we do what we do-or even what difference our existence makes in the great cosmic

Christen and associates then present their own definition and believe moral Intelligence is the capability to process moral information and to manage self regulation in any way that desirable moral ends can be attained. Their picture of a morally intelligent person so is someone who is endowed with a desire to strive for moral goals and to use moral principles and self-regulatory skills to do what is good for society, other human or nonhuman beings. According to Lennick and Kiel (2005)’s Model, moral intelligence includes the following dimensions:

Integrity: Is the hallmark of the morally intelligent person. When we act with integrity, we harmonize our behavior to conform to universal human principles. We do what we know is right; we act in line with our principles and beliefs. If we lack integrity, by definition, we lack moral intelligence.

Responsibility: Is another key attribute of the morally intelligent person. Only a person willing to take responsibility for her actions and the consequences of those actions will be able to ensure that her actions conform to universal human principles.

Compassion: Is vital because caring about others not only communicates our respect for others but creates a climate in which others will be compassionate toward us when we need it most.

Forgiveness: is a crucial principle because, without a tolerance for mistakes and the knowledge of our own imperfection, we are likely to be rigid, inflexible and unable to engage with others in ways that promote our mutual good.

A moral genius according to Boss (1994) is a person who is able to successfully integrate the various components of moral intelligence and immerse himself or herself in this area of expertise, just as geniuses in other areas are able to express their genius in a wide array of ways. Considering these competencies of moral intelligence it can be said that moral intelligence reflects life through the glasses of the final meaning and so imagines emotional feeling and activity too (Coles, 1999) In fact, without a moral aspect to life we cannot arrive at social insight; just as we are capable of quality social communication at the operative step only on the basis of motivation which is launched by moral judgment (Gerjolj, 2008).

Theoretical framework: According to Wucherpfennig and Deutsch (2009), it was Lipset who drew the connections between micro-level modernization and macro-level democracy and conducted the empirical testing. Thus, the Lipset’s theory is in essence, a cultural one. Lipset (1959) writes “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” And believes (1994) the acceptance of principles underlying freedom of speech, media assembly, religion, the rights of opposition parties, of the rule of law, of human rights and the like by the citizenry and political elites creates a supportive culture or in Wucherpfennig and Deutsch’s term, micro-level modernization that prepares the ground for establishment of democracy in macro-level.

Almond and Verba’s research, The civic culture, according to Tessler and Eleanor (2009), was the first major attempt at understanding the relationship between citizen orientations and democracy and established the importance of studying the attitudes, values and behavior patterns of ordinary men and women, obligation to participate, sense of efficacy and level of inter-personal trust are among the particular orientations they explore. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) also believe Almond and Verba (1963) launched the first comparative empirical survey of the mass attitudes that are presumably linked to the stability and functioning of democracies. It was a landmark study, according to Silver and Dowely (2000)

because it showed how survey data could be used to characterize the subjective “political culture” of a nation and address questions about the congruence between patterns of subjective political orientations and political structures. Inglehart and Welzel themselves, According to Wucherpennig and Deutsch (2009), revitalizing Almond and Verba (1963)’s long-standing argument of cultural prerequisites for democracy and provide what is perhaps the most comprehensive framework, by linking socio-economic development and cultural prerequisites for democracy.

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) hypothesizing that the emancipative nature of self-expression values reflects a strong commitment to democratic norms such as liberty and tolerance. Self-expression values according to them, include a postmaterialist emphasis on personal and political liberty, civilian protest activities, tolerance of the liberty of others and a sense of subjective well-being reflected in life satisfaction. Interpersonal trust, too, belongs to this syndrome of self-expression values. For this reason, interpersonal trust tends to be linked with democracy as well. Tessler and Eleanor (2009), believe during the last decade and a half, there have been many empirical investigations of citizen orientations and their relationship to democratization. The general conclusion, according to them as summarized by Inglehart is that “culture plays a crucial role in democracy. . Its survival depends on the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens” (Inglehart, 2000). But it should not be neglected that more than values and beliefs, culture, also includes “any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” and under this extensive framework, intelligence, including moral intelligence as one of these “capabilities”, “plays a crucial role in democracy” and has important effects on tendency of ordinary citizens to democratic values. The Association of Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD) Panel on Moral Education defines a moral person as one who respects human dignity, cares about the welfare of others, integrates individual interests and social responsibilities, demonstrates integrity, reflects on moral choices and seeks peaceful resolution of conflict. According to Boss (1994) who view moral intelligence as a vital and important part of human nature, Martin Hoffman while recognizing the importance of reason and social factors on moral development, also regards empathy or sensitivity as the fundamental component of morality. And believes when empathy progresses from egocentric empathy to empathy for others “feelings, to empathy for others” life conditions, it is at this highest stage, that one finds the greatest congruency between empathy and a concern for principles of justice.

Empathy as “the ability to identify with and feel another person’s life concerns” (Borba, 2001), according to Hogan (1969) is an everyday manifestation of the disposition to adopt a broad moral perspective. By taking the moral point of view, a person is said to consider the consequences of his or her actions for the welfare of others. According to Hass (1998), certain essential features of the highly developed moral individual include a sense of fairness, empathy, responsibility to others, self-actualization and self-control. Borba (2001) offers several ideas that would help develop moral intelligence. She suggests fostering awareness and an emotional vocabulary, enhancing sensitivity to the feelings of others and developing empathy for another’s point of view.

A critical part of Christen and associates’ model is the idea that “moral commitment” is the central competence. It is governed by an appraisal of moral standards and values and affects all other stages. They define “morality” very broadly as a set of norms, principles, values and virtues that are governed by an orientation towards the good. As such, they reflect concerns for oneself and for other entities (persons, animals, environment) and are embedded in a justification structure (ibid: 122). In sum, it can be said that many believe moral intelligence is an essential element to individual and collective well-being and progress (Clarken, 2010: 4). Because morality and spirituality affect the ability to effectively attach to others, regulate emotion and moods, cognitively process and act responsibly. Since moral intelligence does demand consideration and respect of differences and stimulates to the search for a path for creative coexistence (Gerjolj, 2008), it is predictable that research on the relationship between moral intelligence and citizenship relationships, social and cultural adaptations, intergroup relations, multiethnic and multicultural relations, democracy and democratic values, will grow in the near future and existing theoretical and empirical works on moral intelligence have established a firm foundation for research on moral intelligence’s relation with cultural adaptation, social and political tolerance, tendency of individuals to socio-political participation freedoms and rights, democratic values and democracy. We integrate these two streams of research to inform our research. Going beyond existing research on supportive culture of democracy that has demonstrated the importance of knowledge, belief, morals, custom and so on for democracy and the tendency of individuals to democratic values and going beyond existing research on MI that has theorized and demonstrated the importance of MI for empathy, responsibility, collective well-being and creative coexistence, we focus here on MI as a capability that

affects the tendency of individuals to freedom, tolerance and participation and consider how having higher rates of MI among the citizens of Orumieh enhance the likelihood that they have higher rates in tendency to these democratic values. So, our major claim is that MI has a role in the tendency of individuals to democratic values. Accordingly, our hypothesizes in this study are as follows:

A: There is a relationship between the tendency to democratic values and moral intelligence or MI.

B: Religion and ethnicity affect the tendency of individuals to democratic values.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Procedure and measures: A survey was created and administered to 600 citizens of Orumieh (capital city of West Azarbaijan province) which is according to population and housing census results of Iranian Statistical Center in 2011, one of the most culturally and ethnically diverse cities of iran. The data were collected as part of a larger study on the relationship between cultural, social, emotional and moral intelligence and tendency to democratic values, conducted in Jun 2016. Studied population hence, includes 18 year old and older citizens of Orumieh city. Using multistage cluster sampling of 5 districts in Orumieh, 600 citizens were selected and the study was performed among them. Obtained data were analyzed using Pearson correlation and linear regression for hypothesis 1 and one-way ANOVA for hypothesis 2.

The survey instrument for measurement of MI of individuals in this study was MCI (Moral Competency Inventory) which is developed by Lennick and Kiel (2005) to measure ten competencies within a moral framework. The competencies are: acting consistently with principles, values and beliefs;) telling the truth; standing up for what is right; keeping promises; taking responsibility for personal choices; admitting mistakes and failures; embracing responsibility for serving others; actively caring about others; ability to let go of one's own mistakes; and 10) ability to let go of others' mistakes. The first four of the competencies in the MCI claim to measure integrity. Responsibility is measured in competencies five through seven. Compassion is measured in the eighth competency. The two end of the competencies in the MCI claim to measure forgiveness. Reliability of the scale using Cronbach's alpha coefficient and content validity that shows its internal components coordination were approved by them (Lennick *et al.*, 2011). Reliability and validity of the questionnaire have been confirmed by

Table 1: Reliability statistics of Moral intelligence (MI).

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's alpha based on standardized Items	No. of Items
0.922	0.922	40

Martin *et al.*, (2009) too. Martin and Austin (2010) also reported an acceptable reliability for MCI. Cronbach's alpha varied from 0.65-0.84 for 10 subscales in their assessment (Kruger, 2012). This questionnaire is localized and validated in iran by Arasteh *et al.* (2010). Reliability of the scale has obtained-0. 89 using Cronbach's alpha coefficient. In our study, this questionnaire is scored based on a five-point Likert scale and using Cronbach's alpha coefficient, obtained reliability for the entire questionnaire is 0.922 (Table 1).

Instrument for measurement of tendency of individuals to democratic values was a 80-item questionnaire which was a combinatorial scale obtained from Almond and Verba's (1963) research on The civic culture: political attitudes and democracy in five nations which is according to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) the first comparative empirical survey of the mass attitudes that are presumably linked to the stability and functioning of democracies, Inglehart and Welzel (2005)'s research on Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy and Tessler and Eleanor (2009)'s research on Democracy and the political culture orientations of ordinary citizens. In the following Table 2 different aspects of the questionnaire and their theoretical resources are mentioned:

The decision for making a scale for measurement of the tendency of individuals to democratic values has taken when we noticed during a work by one of the PhD. students on his doctorate thesis (PhD thesis of Mr Mehdi Rafiee titled "The Study of the relationship between cultural, social, emotional and moral intelligence and tendency to democratic values: case study of orumieh) that there is not a standard questionnaire for the measurement of democratic orientations and tendencies of individuals in iran. Our more emphasis on tolerance and its aspects in the scale was due to the cultural, social, religious and ethnic diversity of iranian society and our aim was to examine effects of these differences on the tendency of individuals to democratic values. This questionnaire is also scored based on a 5 point Likert scale. To ensure the validity, the tool has been subjected to experts (sociology professors of Tabriz University) and necessary modifications were made. To ensure reliability, the tool was implemented as a pilot in the Sample and the obtained Cronbach's alpha for the entire questionnaire was 0.744 that shows the acceptable reliability of the tool. Obtained Cronbach's alpha coefficient for different dimensions of this questionnaire (including freedom,

Table 2: Main democratic values, their aspects, the number of questions, and theoretical resources of the democratic values questionnaire.

Main democratic values	Aspects of values, the number of questions on each aspect and their theoretical resources.
Freedom	Individual freedoms with 5 questions obtained from Almond and Verba (1963) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) Group freedoms with 5 questions obtained from Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Tessler and Eleanor (2009) Press freedoms with 7 questions obtained from Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Tessler and Eleanor (2009)
Tolerance	Individual tolerance with 4 questions obtained from Almond and Verba (1963) Social tolerance with 4 questions obtained from Almond and Verba (1963) Political tolerance with 6 questions obtained from Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Tessler and Eleanor (2009) Gender tolerance with 12 questions obtained from Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Tessler and Eleanor (2009) Religious tolerance with 11 questions obtained from Almond and Verba (1963) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) Ethnic tolerance with 8 questions constructed by researchers inspired by religious tolerance of Inglehart and Welzel (2005)
Participation	Individual participation with 11 questions obtained from Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Tessler and Eleanor (2009). Collective participation with 7 questions obtained from Almond and Verba (1963)

Table 3: Reliability statistics of democratic values.

Cronbach's alpha	Cronbach's alpha based on standardized items	No. of items
0.886	0.890	80

tolerance and participation) in the main study are respectively 0.742, 0.831 and 0.771 and 0.886 for the entire questionnaire. Reliability statistics of democratic values are displayed in Table 3.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Hypothesis 1: In order to determine is there a meaningful relationship between the tendency to democratic values and moral intelligence of Orumieh citizens, we performed Pearson correlation and a simple linear regression among the two variables. Correlations have shown in Table 4-11, respectively for three dimensions of democratic values and the variable in its entirety. Results show, in agreement with the prediction in H₁, at a significance level of 0.01, the tendency to democratic values is associated with moral intelligence or MI.

Hypothesis 2: In order to determine is there a meaningful relationship between the tendency to democratic values and religion and ethnicity and to determine if religion and ethnicity affect the tendency of Orumieh citizens to democratic values, we performed one-way ANOVA among these variables. Relationships have displayed in Table 12-15 respectively for religion and ethnicity. Results show, in agreement with our prediction in H₂, these variables affect the tendency of individuals to democratic values.

As results of comparisons table show shia and sunni citizens of orumieh have not significant differences in the tendency to democratic values but christians of the city differ significantly from shia and sunni citizens in the tendency to democratic values. Christians have a significantly higher tendency to democratic values. As results of comparisons table show turk and kurd citizens

Table 4: Moral Intelligence (MI) and freedom correlations.

Correlations	MI	Freedom
MI		
Pearson correlation	1	0.397**
Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000
Sum of squares and cross-products	1.552E5	2.255E4
Covariance	259.105	37.647
N 600	600	
Freedom		
Pearson correlation	0.397**	1
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	
Sum of squares and cross-products	2.255E4	2.078E4
Covariance	37.647	34.698
N 600	600	

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 5: Moral intelligence (MI) and freedom regression

Model (coefficients*)	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		Sig.
	B	SE	β	t-values	
1(Constant)	42.031	2.011		20.904	0.000
MI	0.145	0.014	0.397	10.579	0.000

Dependent variable: freedom

Table 6: Moral Intelligence (MI) and tolerance correlations

Correlations	MI	Tolerance
MI		
Pearson correlation	1	0.358**
Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000
Sum of squares and cross-products	1.552E5	4.261E4
Covariance	259.105	71.136
N	600	600
Tolerance		
Pearson correlation	0.358**	1
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	
Sum of squares and cross-products	4.261E4	9.149E4
Covariance	71.136	152.744
N	600	600

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 7: Moral Intelligence (MI) and tolerance regression

Model (coefficients*)	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		Sig.
	B	SE	β	t-value	
1(Constant)	119.297	4.293		27.791	0.000
MI	0.275	0.029	0.358	9.363	0.000

Dependent Variable: Tolerance

of Orumieh have not significant differences in the tendency to democratic values but armenians of the city differ from turks to some extent in this regards. Assyrians of the city have main differences in the tendency to democratic values with other ethnic citizens of the city.

Table 8: Moral Intelligence (MI) and participation correlations

Correlations	MI	Tolerance
MI		
Participation		
Pearson correlation	1	0.382**
Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000
Sum of squares and cross-products	1.552E5	24092.853
Covariance	259.105	40.222
N	600	600
Participation		
Pearson Correlation	0.382**	1
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	
Sum of squares and cross-products	2.409E4	25693.573
Covariance	40.222	42.894
N	600	600

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 9: Moral Intelligence (MI) and participation regression

Model (coefficients ^a)	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		Sig.
	B	SE	β	t-value	
1(Constant)	39.718	2.252		17.640	0.000
MI	0.155	0.015	0.382	10.093	0.000

Dependent variable: participation

Table 13: Impact of religion on the tendency of individuals to democratic values (Multiple Comparisons)

(I) Religion (J) Religion (Democratic values tamhane)	Mean difference (I-J)	SE	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower bound	Upper bound
Shia sunni	-2.492	1.751	0.398	-6.69	1.70
Christian	-9.425*	2.555	0.001	-15.61	-3.25
Sunni shia	2.492	1.751	0.398	-1.70	6.69
Christian	-6.933*	2.553	0.022	-13.11	-0.76
Christian shia	9.425*	2.555	0.001	3.25	15.61
Sunni	6.933*	2.553	0.022	0.76	13.11

*The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level

Table 14: Impact of ethnicity on the tendency of individuals to democratic values (ANOVA)

Democratic values	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Between groups	6364.863	3	2121.621	5.333	0.001
Within groups	237090.311	596	397.803		
Total	243455.173	599			

Table 15: Impact of ethnicity on the tendency of individuals to democratic values (Multiple comparisons)

(I) Ethnicity (J) Ethnicity (Democratic values tamhane)	Mean difference (I-J)	SE	Sig.	95% Confidence interval	
				Lower bound	Upper bound
Turk					
Kurd	-2.438	1.748	0.503	-6.94	2.06
Armenian	-6.661	3.078	0.135	-14.59	1.27
Assyrian	-14.078*	3.903	0.002	-24.13	-4.02
Kurd					
Turk	2.438	1.748	0.503	-2.06	6.94
Armenian	-4.224	3.081	0.518	-12.16	3.71

Assyrians have a significantly higher tendency to democratic values comparing other ethnic groups, especially with turks.

Table 10: Moral Intelligence (MI) and democratic values correlations

Correlations	MI	Tolerance
MI		
Pearson correlation		
	1	0.459**
Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000
Sum of Squares and cross-products	1.552E5	89253.913
Covariance	259.105	149.005
N	600	600
Democratic values		
Pearson correlation		
	0.459**	1
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	
Sum of squares and cross-products	8.925E4	243455.173
Covariance	149.005	406.436
N	600	600

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 11: Moral intelligence (MI) and democratic values regression.

Model (coefficients ^a)	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		Sig.
	B	SE	Beta	t-value	
1(Constant)	201.047	6.661		30.183	0.000
MI	0.575	0.045	0.459	12.640	0.000

Dependent variable: democratic values

Table 12: Impact of religion on the tendency of individuals to democratic values (ANOVA)

Democratic values	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Between groups	5389.826	2	2694.913	6.758	0.001
Within groups	238065.348	597	398.769		
Total	243455.173	599			

Table 15: Continue

(I) Ethnicity (J) Ethnicity (Democratic values tamhane)	Mean difference (I-J)	SE	Sig.	95% Confidence interval	
				Lower bound	Upper bound
Assyrian Armenian	-11.641*	3.906	0.016	-21.70	-1.58
Turk	6.661	3.078	0.135	-1.27	14.59
Kurd	4.224	3.081	0.518	-3.71	12.16
Assyrian Assyrian	-7.417	4.655	0.383	-19.41	4.58
Turk	14.078*	3.903	0.002	4.02	24.13
Kurd	11.641*	3.906	0.016	1.58	21.70
Armenian	7.417	4.655	0.383	-4.58	19.41

*The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level

CONCLUSION

As mentioned earlier existing research on supportive culture of democracy has demonstrated the importance of knowledge, belief, morals, custom and so on for democracy and the tendency of individuals to democratic values. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) pointed out: Democracy is not simply the result of clever elite bargaining and constitutional engineering. It depends on deep-rooted orientations among the people themselves. These orientations motivate them to press for freedom, effective civil and political rights and genuinely responsive government-and to exert continual vigilance to ensure that the governing elites remain responsive to them.

Intelligence is also a relevant phenomenon for politics and itself a relevant political phenomenon (Rindermann, 2008). Longitudinal studies support the theory that intelligence has an impact on political orientations and behavior (Deary *et al.*, 2008a, b). According to Meisenberg (2004), The causal arrow (from intelligence to political orientations) is likely to point from the latent trait ‘intelligence’ to a rational, non-traditional system of beliefs and values. As people get brighter they develop a habit of critical thinking, questioning religious dogmas and other sources of traditional authority. Moral intelligence, of course, has special position amongst other types of intelligences in this regard because as Hass (1998) pointed out moral intelligence encompasses both the ability to behave morally and the capacity to reason in a moral manner.

Moral intelligence or MI also as has shown in this study has a positive effect on the tendency of individuals to democratic values. Thus, our main hypothesis about the existence of a relationship between moral intelligence or MI of individuals and their tendency to democratic values is confirmed and this indicates the positive role of a mental and behavioral ability of individuals on their attitudes and opinions towards politics and political preferences. As Coppedge (2012) pointed out those who study political culture believe that we

cannot discover useful theories without getting inside the heads of political actors.

This finding is also consistent with those researches on MI that have theorized and demonstrated the importance of moral intelligence for caring about the welfare of others and seeking peaceful resolution of conflict, respecting oneself and others (Boss, 1994), improving our understanding of behavior (Coles, 1997), empathy and responsibility to others (Hass, 1998), enhancing sensitivity to the feelings of others and developing empathy for another’s point of view (Borba, 2001), directing our other forms of intelligence to do something worth while (Lennick and Kiel, 2005), stimulating to the search for a path for creative coexistence (Gerjolj, 2008), collective well-being and progress, doing what is good for society, other human or nonhuman beings and demonstrates that MI is an ability and mental capability that affects the tendency of individuals to freedom, tolerance and participation and shows having higher rates of MI among the citizens of Orumieh city enhance their tendency to these democratic values. Of course, this relationship is mutual and as Clarken believes creating an appreciation for the oneness of humanity, unity in diversity, open-mindedness, understanding, tolerance, honesty, fairness, courage, wisdom, trustworthiness and caring sets the stage for morality and moral intelligence to emerge.

As Dyne *et al.* (2012) have stated initial research on new constructs typically focuses on more global conceptualizations. Then, over time, more narrow conceptualizations are advanced which elucidate sub dimensions that allow more refined theorizing and testing Our study on the relationship between MI and the tendency of individuals to democratic values regarding this viewpoint can be seen as an initial attempt in “advancing more narrow conceptualizations” on MI that allows “more refined theorizing and testing” of its relationship with concepts such as democracy and democratic values. Moreover, as statistical findings in statistics section show religion and ethnicity affect the tendency of individuals to democratic values. Hence, our

second hypothesis is also confirmed according to acquired data and this indicates the role of religion and ethnicity of orumieh citizens on their tendency to democratic values. There are many different studies about the role of each of these variables on democracy, democratization and democratic values, for example, religion, according to Norris and Inglehart (2004), remains an important driver of political behavior and particularly so in the developing world. Michael Hoffman (2012) states about the nature of the relationship between religion and democratic orientations "I wish to suggest that the incentives faced by religious groups in the political settings under which they operate, influences their approaches to democracy in significant ways".

About the role of ethnicity in political culture, Silver and Dowley (2000) believe in the world at large, people and ethnic groups differ markedly in their levels of political interest, interpersonal trust, subjective political competence, pride in the country and confidence in political institutions, even when adjusting for compositional differences. They thus differ markedly in their adoption of a political culture of democracy. The findings also consistently with these findings show the different effects of religion and ethnicity on the tendency of individuals to democratic values.

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