

The End of Political Party in Indonesia: The Case of Weakening Voter's Loyalty in the Local Level, Malang

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Abstract: Political transformations since 1998 have implications to party's ID. In the election, the parties are no longer elected cause of the weakening party affiliation. This study aims to analyze the factors caused the weakening of voters loyalty to the party. The method used is a qualitative research. Technique data collection through field observation, interview and focus group discussion. The results of the study addressed that the source of weakening voters loyalty are national, local, party's internal, pragmatic factors: the national factor consisting of the rules of the establishment parties, the electoral system, the threshold of votes/seats. Local factors are decline in the support of NU and Muhammadiyah, the movement of popular cadres and party candidates. Party's internal factors consist of the conflict parties, the performance of the party. Finally is rational economic behavior of the voters.

Key words: Parties, voter's loyalty, election, volatility, Malang

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's democracy growing along with the ongoing reforms from 1998 to the present has not shown the stability of voter's loyalty in both the national and local levels yet. Electoral conditions in the June 1999 elections for the mayor parties are the democratic party of Indonesia struggle (PDI-P) 33.76%, Golkar party 22.46%, PPP 12.62%. While other parties gained more than 3% such continuing of the political stream as in the 1955 elections, nation awakening party (PKB) which is identical to NU got 12.62%, the national mandate party (PAN) and the crescent star party (PBB) is considered Masyumi representation, for each 7.12 and 1.94%. In the 2004 and 2009 election most of that parties suffering the decline of the electoral performance. It has been infecting to the party system in stabilization.

In this study, I would like to analyze why political party in local level, Indonesia has declining of voter's loyalty. The declining of voter's loyalty (both in terms of national election and local election) is responsible to the instability of the party system, both nationally and locally. Although political decentralization affect party system and party organization at various levels of government but not many scholars do research in the local levels in particular the declining of voter's loyalty.

PARTY IDEOLOGICAL POSITION

Cleavage is the most important subject in the study of parties. It is therefore important to understand the

cleavage of both the national and local and how cleavage structuring the political parties. Cleavage that develops after the new order was a continuation of the 1955 elections based on the nationalist and Islamic streams, minus the communist ideology.

The findings show that political parties are no longer explicitly listed their ideology in the party's platform such as PKB and PAN, although we know that both parties are both historical and ideological ties with the Islamic parties, traditionalist and modernist (Nurjaman, 2012). The absence ideological commitments in the party platform have an impact on the models of solution which are relatively uniform and not correlated with their ideology. Furthermore, program based on national problems there was substantially no difference among the parties. Logically, when ideology becomes a party system of values, ways of thinking and parties acting in resolving the issue would be characteristic of the political that distinguishes it from other parties. This is due to political ideology consists of a set of ideas and principles that guide how society should work, offering order a specific community, including offering how to manage power and how it should be implemented (Downs, 1957). Further, result of the weakness of the party's ideology is unclear orientation of the party in solving all national problems, including inability to criticize ideas, party ideas and programs of different ideologies. Following the impact of the low understanding of the ideological commitment, the party recruitment tends to choose the figure. The characteristic of this phenomenon called deficit of democracy as more emphasis on the figure of the

candidate's ability to focus on political charges. If this continues, the identification of voters against the party will disintegrate. This condition is described by Harrop and Miller (1987) as a process of de-alignment, a weakening of the party identification of the voters to the party or as "the wakening of party loyalties."

THE DECLINING OF VOTER'S LOYALTY

In 2004 and 2009 elections the declining of voter's loyalty has an implication to eroding the major parties likes PDIP, Golkar, PKB, PPP, PAN which are responsible for the electoral volatility in the post-New Order Indonesia. Electoral volatility that occur both at the national and local malang though are equally but it may vary. In 2004 and 2009, the total amount of volatility that occurred are, 28.55 and 30.20 (national); 32.27 and 27.17 (Kota Malang), 19.82 and 27.99 (Kabupaten Malang). While the volatility of the block, 2.22, 10.83 (national); 2.89, 10.05 (Kota Malang), 0.51, 15.03 (Kabupaten Malang). This has prompted new party raises a threshold that is able to penetrate the PKS and the Democrat Party, Hanura and Gerindra.

The high electoral volatility in 2004, nationally, influenced by a decline in votes of major parties, especially PDIP and the party which does not pass the threshold in the 1999 elections. The phenomenon of electoral volatility significantly from the major parties that passed the electoral threshold nationwide can be traced as follows: Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) which in the 1999 elections gained about 33.67% in the 2004 elections has decreased quite dramatically the to 19.58%, followed by the United Development Party of 10, 72-8.32% and the National Mandate Party from 7.12-6.47%. The phenomenon of electoral volatility in the major parties was followed by the emergence of new political parties that pass the threshold as the Democratic Party, the Prosperous Justice Party. In the 2009, not as much in 2004, the mayor parties were still contributing to the electoral volatility. PDIP votes in the 2004 election decreased from 18.3-14.03% in the 2009 election, Golkar from 21.62-14.45%, PKB from 11.98-4.94%, PAN from 6.47-6.01%.

Correlate with the emergence of new parties, there are three factors which according to Mainwaring and Scully (1995) can influence the politicians to establish a new party. The first situation where conflict within the party that encourages politicians to establish or join a new party. Second, following the view of Gunther (2005), the development of the central role of the party that changed the direction of the central role of actors in the campaign organizers have changed the party's existence to

politicians. It also has something to do with the growing medium of television where the politicians who will compete for executive positions using television as a medium to lure voters and not have to do the development of the party. Third is related to the parties rule, the relatively easy to encourage the establishment of new parties.

Contesting parties that passed the threshold of 1999 showed a downward trend from election to election, indicating that the relationship between parties and voters is declining or de-alignment (Mair *et al.*, 2004), a weakening of the state of voter support for or loyalty to the party (Harrop and Miller, 1987). The six political parties that passed the threshold of 1999, PDIP is a party that has the highest an average eroding of votes in both national and local, 10.27 and 7.94%. Among all parties, the eroding of PDIP was the highest, 15.38% in 2004 in Kota Malang. In the 1999 elections, in Kota Malang PDIP won the highest votes, more than twice the votes Golkar and PKB which is 41.22% but must accept the fact his votes fell to 25.84% in 2004 while still remaining a party winning a majority.

The eroding of PDIP votes in the 2004 election was followed by the emergence of the democratic as the new arrivals party with the vote of 14.55%, the difference is only 0.83% lower than the reduction PDIP. The conditions are not conducive to post-reform economy, the society longing for the emergence new leader who can give a hope for the better future. This condition is tit for tat with the increasing popularity of Susilo Bambang Yuhdhoyono (SBY) a military background who also has an ambition to become president. Therefore, when SBY create democrat party, so that in 2004 many people both individually and collectively to be supputer and also became the supporter of the presidential award of SBY.

SBY policies was similar to the concept of Thai's Prime Minister Taksin Sinawatra policies. The performance of Democrats party both in Kota and Kabupaten levels were continuing to increase, in the 2004 election the democratic votes to reach 14.55 and 7.76%, in the 2009 election increased dramatically to 24.08 and 17, 42%. This condition indicates the realignment of new voters into the party and possibly at certain elections. This situation will return to stable conditions characterized by low volatility of the party vote. While the performance of Golkar in Kota and Kabupaten of Malang on the election of 1999, 2004 and 2009, respectively 16.04, 12.35, 7.23 and 18.32, 16.68, 13.55%. When we viewed from the downward trend in votes, Golkar vote in the district (Kabupaten) are relatively more stable compared with the region with an average of 11.87% votes, 19.38% and the average volatility of 2.37, 4.41%. This situation show that

Golkar have a strong base in rural areas than urban areas and the average low volatility also shows that Golkar is relatively stable compared with the PDIP.

THE FRAGMENTED PARTY SYSTEM

The high electoral volatility implies fragmented party system in Indonesia. Over the past three elections starting from 1999-2004 and 2009 indicate that the change of the party system continues to run, the number of parties that won seats continues to change (21, 17 and the last 9 party). As well, judging from the score or the Effective Number of Party (ENPV)-based votes and chairs, from election to election in which national ENP is changed from 5.06 and 4.17 (1999), 8.55 and 7.0 (2004) and 9.59 and 6.13 (2009). The height the amount of ENP means that the votes are more distributed to many parties. This condition is related to the high electoral of volatility, even the number of parties is still high, 48 (1999), 24 (2004) and 38 (2009). Furthermore the high electoral volatility is also caused by the enactment of the threshold, electoral threshold 2.5% and 3% (1999 and 2004) and parliamentary threshold 2.5% (2009) which caused some parties must be dropout. The problems following from the threshold rules are disproportional, where parties do not obtain the number of seats proportional to the number of votes obtained in elections. This issue is often raised discourse related representativeness

In the 1999 elections the total amounts of parties who passed the threshold were six political parties but in 2004 one of the parties must accept the fact that PBB eliminated from the next election due by votes 2.56 and 2.09% were not enough seats to meet the demands threshold of 3%. After PBB, entered two political parties, one is the PKS (in 1999 elections were named PK) and one new party is the Democratic Party. Both of these parties gained enough votes, PKS 7.20 and 7.46% with the percentage of Democratic seats 8.18 and 10.36%. In the 2009 election, the distribution of votes and seats is increasing. If in the year of election 1999 and 2004, 6 and 7 political parties passed the threshold, then in the 2009 with parliamentary threshold system was nine political parties. This means that in the 2009 elections there are two new political parties that qualify for the threshold, Gerindra and Hanura.

Change in the party system does not only occur at the national level but also in the local. In the 1999 election, 2004, 2009 at the national level the number of parties that gained seats, 21 parties, 17 parties, 9 party; Kota Malang 6, 8 and 9 parties and Kabupaten Malang 5, 6, to 9 parties. The party system model in Indonesia both local and antional include moderat pluralis as Sartori categorized

(1976), even the number of parties that gained seats in parliament >5. The moderate pluralism of the party system in Indonesia can be seen from the Effective Number of Party in the Kota and the Kabupaten Malang, in the election years 1999, 2004 and 2009 both ENP based vote and seat, ENP based vote are 4.06, 6.79 and 7.65 (Region), 3, 69, 5.3 and 7.75 (District), ENP based seat are 3.67, 6.0 and 6.23 (Region), 2.4, 4.14 and 6.19 (District).

In the 1999 elections there were six party passed the threshold such as PDI-P, PKB, Golkar, PAN, PPP, PK. All of the parties, in term of clustering ideologies, both nationalist nor Islamic party are almost not much different. Golkar and PDI-P, although, at the grassroots level frequent friction but in fact both parties in terms of platform has much in common. likewise PKB, PAN, PPP, PK, although there is always a gap between the parties primarily voters based on Santri voters (Modernist and Ttraditional). However, because both have the support of voters based on Santri, the parties were in fact relatively still can work together. In the 2004 election, seven parties passed the threshold like Golkar, PDI P, PKB and PAN plus two new parties, the Democrats and PKS. While the 2009 elections there are nine political parties passed the threshold to qualify partie's threshold 7, 2004 and two new parties, Hanuran and Gerindra.

New parties emerge and gain a significant votes both in 2004 and 2009, generally based nationalist party. In 2004, although the PKS is a new party but not at all because the new party in 1999 elections had competed with the name of the Justice Party (PK). While democrats is the really new party, formed to facilitate SBY running for president. PKS and the Democrat vote nationally in 2004 relatively similar, namely 7.2% and 7.46%, the difference is only 0.26% for the nationalist democratic victory. While at the local level and the city of Malang Regency, PKS and the Democrats gain votes for 7.16, 14.55 (difference 3.9) and 3.05, 7.76 (difference 4.71%). This situation also reflects the reality of shifting the balance of the block is relatively small in 2004 that only 2.22%. Thus, when it is said that the political stream in 1999 and 2004 elections is still showing its existence (King, 2003; Baswedan, 2004), then the claim block is in line with the low volatility that occurred.

In the 2009 election, there are two additional new parties have a significant vote of the nationalist bloc Gerindra and Hanura while none of the Islamic bloc. Bipartisan vote nationwide totaled 8.23, 4.46% and Hanura Gerindra 3.77%. While at the local level: 4.13, 2.93% (Kota Malang) and 4.17, 5.06% (Kabupaten Malang), respectively. In addition to the phenomenon of the new party in the 2009 election also surprised by the skyrocketing Democratic votes for 13.39% (National) from

7.46-20.85, 16.92 (Kota Malang) from 14.55-24.08, 9.96 (Kabupaten Malang) from 7.76-17.42%. Positive trend of the nationalist bloc is inversely proportional to the Islamic bloc. PKS is predicted to gain his votes would rise in the 2009 election, only increased by 0.68 from 7.20-7.88% (National) while in Kota Malang increased 0.27 from 7.16-7, 43% and in Kabupaten Malang increased 2.22% from 3.05-5.27%. On the other hand, there was a significant reduction of PKB due to internal party conflicts involving Gus Dur as the founder of the party and Muhaimin Iskandar as the Chairman of which is a nephew of Gus Dur himself. In the 2004 national election vote PKB decreased by 7.04 from 11.98-4.94%. While at the local level decreased by 7.06% PKB from 17.36-10.30% (Kota Malang), 12.64% from 25.72-13.08% (Kabupaten Malang).

The phenomenon of the block votes declining of the Nationalist and Islamic block vote has affected the balance between the blocks. In the 2009 election the Nationalist bloc vote rose by 8.61 from 2.22-10.83% (National), 7.16% from 1.89-10.05% (Kota Malang), 14.52% of 0.51-15.03% (Kabupaten Malang). By looking at the high decrease in the Islamic bloc vote in the 2009 it showed that the cleavage role in structuring the parties voters it is different from the findings of Liddle and Mujani. According to Liddle and Mujani (2007), the influence of religious orientation in 1999 and 2004 are very limited, whereas the authors found that the weaker influence of religious orientation was in the 2009 election.

SOURCES OF THE DECLINING VOTER'S LOYALTY

In this study, I also will analysis the sources of declining of voter's loyalty. The national factors consisting of the rules of the establishment parties, the electoral system, the threshold of votes/seats. Second, local factors are decline in the support of NU and Muhammadiyah, the popular movement of cadres and party candidates. Third, the part's internal factors consist of the conflict parties, the performance of the party. Fourth, the factor is rational economic behavior of the voters. Party rules from election to election continues to be revised and made it more difficult for new parties to be able to participate in elections. Therefore in 2004, the number of parties has decreased to 24 but increased in 2009-48, the increasing due to political compromises related to the determination of threshold. In the other side, electoral system also change towards a more enabling the de-legitimizing of the party. Proportional system with a closed list in the 1999 elections turned into a proportional open list with certain limited. In 2004, continue to change again into a fully open or proportional majority system. Moreover, threshold continues to change, 2.5% of the

1999 elections, turned into electoral threshold of 3% threshold parliamentary elections of 2004-2.5% of the 2009 election. Furthermore, due to the low performance of political parties in carrying out its functions as inter mediatory between the public and the government has reduced public trust to political parties.

In the 2009 election, Muhammadiyah members are no longer support PAN as well as Nahdhiliyin on PKB. In addition to shifting the role of elite cleavages which is a representation of the social base of the party. Nahdilyin groups is no longer determines the social basis of PKB in this case Gus Dur is more represent of the traditional Islamic group. Likewise with the PAN is more influenced by Amin Rais than Muhammadiyah as a social base. Furthermore, the PDI-P which is a representation of the voter's abangan, highly dependent on Megawati, who is also the democratic nationalist party is more a collection of supporting Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In other findings related to the dynamics behind the high declining of voter's loyalty is pragmatic development among political parties, especially parties that are not clear social base.

CONCLUSION

Weakening of the political cleavage has led to a change of political power among the parties. According to Mair *et al.* (2004) this process called as de-alignment which is related to the symptoms of the electoral market change or market change. Changes in the electoral market can be seen from such things as changes in social structures, structural de-alignment, decline in party identification, change in value orientation and competition of issues and ending by crisis of the party. Changes in social structures that are mentioned by Mair *et al.* (2004) is based on changes in socioeconomic structure but in the case of Indonesia, economy class, does not have a significant impact on political behavior as Gaffar (1988) founded. Social structure based on primordial (religious) was more prominent in influencing political behavior in Indonesia. But after political reformation, religious cleavage has no significant enough in structuring political behavior (Nurjaman, 2012). This is the crisis of the party which political party loses their constituency. In 2004 and 2009 in Indonesia occurred a significant political shift and has led to a fragmented party system due to voter disappointment and the emergent of new parties.

Emergence of new political parties was not caused by the emergence of new socioeconomic class. But there is something new: the figure of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in the party who could be a symbol of the party's ideology. As with the other parties gained significant votes: Gus Dur for PKB, Amin Rais for PAN,

Megawati for PDI-P that symbolized the ideology of each party. Therefore, it can be said that the pattern of “aliran” suggested by Geertz (1960) was a certain degree is actually still running but has suffered a setback as an explanatory tool of political realities of Indonesia or we can said as anomalous processes.

Furthermore, the declining of voter loyalty is mostly due to the high voter distrust to the party it triggered the pragmatic political behavior and also welcomed by the party by doing vote buying in the election. Vote buying is being the phenomena of Indonesian politic now and it create a political high-cost. Moreover, political parties tend to do pragmatist program in mobilizing voters outside from the traditional based (catch-all party). High political cost riggers the amount of corruption cases involving the members of the parliament.

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