Literature Review: Israeli Military Strategies

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Abstract: The study aims to review a range of academic and research dealing with Israeli military strategies. The study focuses on deterrence and Blitzkrieg strategies as the main two strategies Israel has relied mainly on confronting its enemies. The study also focused on Israel's use of such strategies with non-state organizations, like Hezbollah and Hamas. The literature reviewed indicates that the success of Israeli deterrence with the Arab states was not as it was with Hamas and Hezbollah. Where Hezbollah and Hamas managed to create a situation of breaking Israeli deterrence and creating a somewhat mutual deterrence in some cases. In addition, Israel no longer benefits from a Blitzkrieg strategy with organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, since both of them have tactics to deal with the long-term Israeli strategy. However, Israel is seeking to develop especial strategies for non-state organizations.

Key words: Israeli security strategy, military strategies, deterrence, attrition, Israel, military

INTRODUCTION

Touching a topic related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict provides a huge range of works. As a longest conflict in the modern history, the issue enjoys a big concern. The Middle East security issues are the crucial in the world politics for different reason. The Palestinian issue is among the main triggers there.

With the recent developments in the middle East since the Arab uprisings in early 2011, many phenomena emerged there. The main changes in Middle East are: the decline of the power and influence of the modern nation-state in the Arab Region and disintegration of some of these states as well as the growing role of non-state actors, the growing militarization of the region and the use of violence, the rise of the role of regional non-Arab powers in the region (Iran, Turkey and Israel) and finally, growing sectarian and religious conflicts. Despite of that, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict still stays at the core of the regional politics. Looking on the Israel-Hamas conflict as a model to state vis-vis non-state conflicts, this research aims to figure out the Israeli strategy towards Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The review includes two main themes; the Israel security strategy and the Hamas-Israel conflicts.

Existing in unreceptive region has made Israel lives in state of war from the first day of its establishment.

Therefore, the need of strategic military power is existential for Israel. Since, 1948, Israel has waged more than 10 wars. Within this very long term of hostile, Israel has been adapting different types of strategy which depends mainly on the type of the threat and the state's capabilities. The establishing circumstances of the "Jewish Entity" on an Arab land with unlimited support from the West and the history of the Jewish militias and gangs in Palestine have affected the Israeli strategic military culture.

This study is going to concentrate on the military implementations of the Israeli security strategy. As a literature review research, it depends on the Ben Gurion's three components of the Israeli security strategy to revise the military aspects of deterrence and decision. Most of the literatures here are belongs to Israeli experts, academics and retired officers, since, the study tries to study the Israeli military strategies as they look to.

Literature review: The Jewish gangs and militias which were active during the British mandate in Palestine had adapted a well-planned strategy to attack the Palestinian villages and evacuated from the population. The non-Zionist Jewish historian Pappe (2007) has provided a detailed narrative on the Zionist movement strategy to commit an ethnic cleansing in Palestine. In his book "Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine",

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Pappe provides an explanation on how the Zionist armed gangs committed intended mass massacres against Palestinian villages in aim to cleanse the land from its people to replace them with the immigrant Jews. Pappe's work shows that the Zionist gangs had worked based on well-planned offensive and defensive strategies. The principle of "defense" starts to emerge very early in the Israeli mind. One of the biggest and most influential Zionist gangs which formed later on the Israeli army was the "Hagenah" which means the "defense". Therefore, the offensive mentality of the Israeli military strategy is always existing. the role of well-organized Jewish militias such as the Haganah, the Irgun Zva'I Le'umi, often shortened to Etzel, the Lohamei Herut Yisrael, the 'Stern Gang in a wide strategy of spreading terror among Palestinians to push them out of Palestine as a part of ethnic cleansing process (Bar-Joseph, 1998; Levran, 2001).

During seven decades, since, Israel created, Israel has wide experience of conflicts with regular armies (states) and irregular armed groups (non-state). At the first level, the inter-state conflicts were the main challenge for Israel. Since, 1948 war (Nakbah for Palestinians), Israel's aspiration to expand and annexes more land on the expense of Arab's led Israel to involve in the 6 days war in 1967. Israel was able to defeat six regular Arab armies and sized Sinai, Golan Heights, West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1973 October war (Yom Kippur for Israelis), the Arab States, Syria and Egypt in particular, tried to retrieve their land and push Israel back to the 1948 truce line (known the Green Line). Israel was almost defeated in that war but the US direct interventions changed the situation into Israel's favorite and the war stopped with no achievements for Arabs (Bregman, 2010).

After 1979 Camp David Agreement with Egypt, Israel have not had a such war with regular army and the kind of threat transformed to another type. The non-state armed group has become the main direct challenge for Israel. In fact, this kind of threat was not new for Israel, the new was to become the main threat instead of Arab states. For instance, from the Fedayeen. (They are groups of Palestinians who exiled from their lands during 1948 war. Fedayeen had adapted the guerrilla style to attack the Jewish militias and settlers in retaliation of founding a Jewish entity on their own lands) in 1950's until Hamas and Hezbollah nowadays, Israel never stopped facing non-state armed groups.

In this regard, the Israeli security strategy has a kind of theoretical frame work or in other words a security doctrine. This doctrine works as an umbrella of the Israeli security strategy regardless of the types of the threat whether come from state or non-state groups. As Israel became a "reality", the Israeli founders and institutions had begun forming their own security doctrine and strategies to defend their unwelcomed and newborn entity.

As one of the earliest founder and the 1st Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben Gurion was considered as one of the top engineers of the Israel security doctrine and philosophy. Ben Gurion has defined the Israeli choices of strategy with three main components: deterrence, detection and decision. Hence, both offensive and defensive strategies are adapted in the Israeli security strategy. The military mind and element has the lion share in the Israeli security theory, since, the traditional and existential kind of threat was the dominant for the Israelis decision makers (Ben-Gurion, 1968; Ben-Gurion, 1954).

ISRAEL MILITARY STRATEGIES

Kober focuses in his article on the Israeli society during the attritions wars. He argued that the Israelis have shown a relatively high staying power in face of attrition wars. To proof his argument, Kober provided eight cases, since, Israel was established until the second Intifada in 2004. In his way to the main argument, Kober conducted a conceptual comparison between two kinds of war; attrition and Blitzkrieg. The core of difference between the two kinds depends on the relationship between the time and the military achievements. Linking that with the Western Democracie's experience, he believes that WD's are more resilient to wage wars.

Kober proved that Blitzkrieg is the best choice for Israel. Despite of that, he argues that Israel has a long experience with attrition wars since the 1950's. according to Kober, the important shift in Israel philosophy toward the attrition wars was during the first and second intifada in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1987-1993 and 2000- 2005, respectively. Kober concludes that the Israeli society was able to stay power in most cases of attrition wars for five reasons; Israel's wars have not received much debate on legitimacy, higher supports, limited loses, Israel was not the field of war, the national unity government during the risky cases.

The best example of Israel's losing the Blitzkrieg position is the 2014 war which continued more than 50 days. Although, Israel made a huge destruction in the strip, it was not able, even to conduct a serious ground operation. Shamir and Hecht (2014)argue that Israel failed to guess Hamas objective of the war which was related to Hama's weak strategic position after the coup in Egypt. Therefore, the high destruction could mean nothing while the political position does not change. The two scholars

suggest that Hamas main objective of the war was to cease the siege on Gaza based on its financial and political impasse there. On the other hand, Israel sought to "contain" and deter Hamas. The most significant in their article, that Israel used "attrition strategy" against Hamas "psychological exhaustion." It seems the first time that Israel laid on attrition strategy, according to what Shamir and Hecht thought. For them, Israel used attrition to have "ceasefire" with Hamas while as abovementioned, attrition aims to wearing down the enemy by using the duration of the war. The ceasefire was existed before the war, how can it be the goal of the war? And Hamas as they said "Hamas was able to maintain fire throughout the operation, reaching Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and beyond and temporarily halt international air traffic to Israel." Although, Hamas was also not able to cease the siege on Gaza, Israel failed to use its preemptive strategy, Blitzkrieg and attrition to deter Hamas.

In his study, Malka argues that the equation of deterrence in the middle East between Israel and its foes is two-ways deterrence and Israel has no more a unique situation. Malka explains the strategic environment of Israel in post 2006 war era which faces four main threats, the Palestinians, Hezbollah, Syria and Iranian nuclear project. The harder situation Malka sees Israel faces is the asymmetrical deterrence with the non-state armed groups, Hamas and Hezbollah. Although, his background is military, Malka highlight some non-military reasons behind what he said the "weakness of power" of Israel instead of "power of weakness" of the others. He sees, instead of some military tactical reasons, the decision-making process and the nature of Israeli society are the main reasons of the Israeli weakness of power.

Malka discusses the asymmetry of deterrence in Israel. Scanning the regional deterrence situation from Israel's point of view, Malka shows that Israel is more successful in creating deterrence with state than non-state armed groups and popular uprisings. He deters Israel current problems with Hezbollah and the Palestinians. Malka argues that the second Lebanon war in 2006 has affected the Israeli deterrence and remerges the question on the effectiveness of the Israeli deterrence with its enemies. He believes as well that at the Palestinian and Lebanese fronts in particular, deterrence does no longer exist as before.

Mackinney makes a historical view on the importance of deterrence on the Israeli strategic mind. He argues that deterrence is what Israel aims, since, its established. Mackinney mentioned four levels of deterrence that Israel used during its inter-state wars with neighboring Arab states; "current deterrence seeks to prevent the escalation of hostile Arab actsat the level of low-intensity conflict;

specific deterrence which aims at preventing Arab initiation of crises that endanger Israel's intrinsic and extrinsic interests; strategic deterrence, whose goal is to prevent a general war; cumulative deterrence which aims at convincing the Arab world that the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be solved militarily. Mackinney believes that Israel was able to achieve a cumulative deterrence with Arab state but that does not mean Israel become without threat. The new challenge that Israel faces now is the non-state groups which need a new approach of deterrence.

Mackinney argues that Israel deterrence differs from what the theorists Kahn and Schelling provide and it is more relative to "risk management" and "deterrence of crime in a civil legal system" which depends on balance of pain not balance of power of terror. The balance of pain is the equation that Mackinney believed it's created between Israel and its foes. According to Mackinney there are "Several factors make a balance of pain deterrence dynamic possible. First, the adversary is proximate; second, the adversary is highly motivated and persistent; third, there are no established rules by which everyone agrees to abide and fourth, the harm inflicted is mostly low grade but has potential to escalate to something significant, even catastrophic".

Sobelman (2004) explains the equation of deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah. It suggests that each side succeed to deter the other side to attack the civilians and keep the conflicts in the military fields. At the same time, Israel was unable to deter Hezbollah from developing its military capabilities over the years. After the unilateral Israeli withdraw in 2000 until, 2006. He argues that Hezbollah set an equation of "eye by eye" which means If Israel hit, Hezbollah will retaliate at the same level. As well as Malka argues that the July 2006 war was a "missed opportunity" for Israel to reestablish the deterrence with Hezbollah. As a former officer in the Israeli army, Malka believe that Israel went further the action to "go crazy" with Hezbollah in 33 days war.

Malka argued that "In the Palestinian theater, where the Palestinians have virtually nothing to lose, the question of whether deterrence exists is no longer asked". The Intifada itself and the rise of Islamic resistant movements like Hamas and Islamic Jihad were considered as a losing of the Israeli deterrence. Israel was very cautious to return its deterrence. Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) argued that Israel attempts to regain its deterrence through repression or hard choices was not effective as its police with rewarding with the people.

Frankel in his PhD thesis, examine under which conditions state can gain asymmetric deterrence with non-state armed groups. For that purpose, he took Israel's conflict with Hezbollah and Hamas as case studies. The study shows that, there are four main factors affected

implementing deterrence with groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. These factors are "elements of statehood (territorial control, political authority and responsibility for a dependent population), organizational structure, ideology and inter- factional rivalries". Frankel researches on developing what he called asymmetric deterrence matrix as an attempt to build a theory on how state should response to non-state armed groups threats.

Frankel examines the Dahya Doctrine's role in deterring Hezbollah and Hamas as well. He argues that the Dahya Doctrine cannot be adapted as a strategy to end the conflicts but to manage them. He sees that the Dahya Doctrine could work in case of non-state groups rational considerations based on their response to the four factors Frnakel adopted.

Seeking to assess the results of Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006, Gabrielsen (2013) argues that Israel government was unable to achieve its political aims, since, the military operation in the field failed to gain a strategic win despite of some tactical success. On the other hand, Hezbollah was more successful to translate its limited field achievements to a political victory. In addition to release the captured soldier from Hezbollah, forcing Hezbollah to withdraw from the southern Lebanon and damage Hezbollah's rockets, deterrence was the aim of the Israel "war of choice" against Hezbollah.

Gabrielsen (2013) believes that Hezbollah strategy during the war was more effective than the Israelis. He sees that Israel was unable to translate its tactic success to strategic one. Despite of that, Gabrielsen argues that reestablishing deterrence with Hezbollah was among a little success that Israel gain.

Gabrielsen sees that the air strike strategy Israel conducted to achieve the war goals was not effective to destroy Hezbollah thousands of rockets. He argues that the Israeli government has recognized that early but they decided to continue to the ground operations and they signed trap. Israel, according to Gabrielsen has conducted two ground strategy; limited ground invasion and large-scale ground invasion. Gabrielsen rises a suspicion whether Israel launch the large-scale ground operation to win or to stop its unsuccessful war. He concludes that there was disconnection between Israel political goals and its military achievements while Hezbollah was able to achieve its limited political goal of the war. In contrast, Gabrielsen (2013) argues that Israel did not attain its "strategic aims because the IDF struggled to translate tactical successes into strategic gains. instead, Hezbollah's strategy more effectively matched the war's conduct and enabled it to attain more, albeit limited, war aim author agreed with Catignani argument that the Israeli problem is with the political and strategic goals.

Focusing on Israel twenty-first century strategy against non-state armed enemies, Inbar and Shamir (2014) believe that Israel has an effective strategy of "Mowing the Grass" stems from Israel's realizing that the ideological armed groups are not easy deterrent. Therefore, he argues, that Israel adopted a patient attrition strategy to weaken the armed groups capabilities. The strategic dimension of the strategy depends on the assumption the strategic main threat of Israel has been shifted from statist conflict to state and non-state conflict.

At the military side, the study shows that, although, Israel has preferred short and decisive wars, Israel's strategy toward non-state armed groups does not aim to achieve a decisive victory. Inbar proved that Israel's confrontations with Hamas and Hezbollah in 2000's showed that Israel recognizes the difficulties of eliminate groups like Hezbollah or Hamas. So, Israel aimed during its wars in 2006, 2008/2009 and 2012 to affect the capabilities of that groups until they lose hope to achieve their goals of destroying Israel. For achieving this goal, Inbar listed two main components of Israel's mowing the grass strategy; retaliatory raids and preemptive strikes.

The study argues that there is a new change in the Israel's threat assessment and strategic thinking led to the new strategy "mowing the Grass". The Strategy reflects a new factor in the Israeli calculation which is the threat comes from the non-state entities. The main assumption, according to Inbar and Shamir is that Israel is unable to eliminate this kind of foes because of their ideological believes. A patient strategy aims to destroy the enemy capabilities is the strategic goal of the "Mowing the Grass". To examine their assumptions, the period 2002-2012 as large-scale rounds of violence against the enemies has been adopted as an implementation of the strategy. The study focuses on the military dimension of the strategy which considered as the core of the strategy. Aiming to destroy the enemie's capabilities to limit their political achievements and to affects their moral and thoughts, the strategy has adopted two main elements; targeted killings and preventive actions. The study comes to answer too many critics from the western academics and pundits who saw Israel's use of force is not successful in producing deterrence or military decision.The authors provide some of the works which criticized Israel strategy against the non-state entities, such as; 5Sergio Catignani, 'The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The gap between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada', Journal of Strategic Studies 28/1 (2005), 70; Dag Henriksen, 'Deterrence by Default? Israel's

Military Strategy in the 2006 War against Hizballah', Journal of Strategic Studies 35/1 (Feb. 2012), 95–120; Raphaelle L. Camilleri, 'Examining the Paradox of Israel's Unrealized Power: The Conceptual and Structural Sources of Israel's "Strategic Deficit"', Paper presented at the International Study Association 53rd Meeting, San Diego, CA, 2 April 2012. The study does not have a theoretical or conceptual frame work, although, it provides the four large-scale rounds of violence that Israel involved, since, 2002 until 2012. The main finding of Inbar Shamir's research is that is Israel does not have a strategy to end the circle of violence militarily as well as politically.

Samaan (2013) discusses the Dahya concept which reflects to the Israeli heavy strikes on Hezbollah area in Beirut during the 2006 war. The researcher links the new concept with rooted deterrence strategy in Israeli doctrine. Samaan has built his theory on Dahya strategy on believe that Hezbollah is a rational actor.

The study provided a debate on one the emerging concepts of the 2006 war, the Dahya "Dahya (Arabic for "suburbs") commonly designates the name of a densely populated group of Shia neighborhoods in Southern Beirut where Hezbollah's headquarters are located 2. During the 1st days of the 2006 war, it was the target of massive air strikes by the Israeli Air Force." For more, see: Samaan, J.-L. 2013. The Dahya Concept and Israeli Military Posture vis-a-vis Hezbollah, Since, 2006. Comparative Strategy 32(2): 146-159. Strategy. The concept, according to Samaan, used for the first time by Gadi Eisenkot, then Israeli Northern Commander who explained that what Israel did in the Dahya in 2006 will be done for every Lebanese village used to fire Israel. Samaan argues that the calm after 2006 war indicates kind of equation of deterrence between the two sides. Despite of that, he sees that "Indeed the Dahya concept is born of the very idea that it is impossible to guarantee Israel's absolute security from Hezbollah's missile arsenal and therefore, that a deterrence dialogue with this nonstate organization was critical for the regional stability Ibid. According to Samaan, the Israeli failure to achieve a military decision or even deter Hezbollah in the battlefield led the Israeli leadership to the Dahya choice. In an assessment to the result of this choice on Hezbollah response, Samaan sees that the Israeli bet on the Hezbollah rationality which led it to a deterrent equation when Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hezbollah, said "If you attack us, we will use our Katyushas; if you do not attack us, we will not use our Katyushas Quoted in Nicholas Noe, ed., Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Freilich claim that Israel has never adopted a national security strategy despite of different threats that faces. He returns to the basics

elements of Israel's national security strategy to the founder Prime Minister of Israel David Ben Goruin who set three components of Israel national security; deterrence, detection and decisive. Freilich argues that defense still needs time to be among them. Highlighting the change strategic environment of Israel, Freilich sees that deterrence detection and decisive could not be effective with non-state armed groups like Hezbollah and Hamas which requires a new national security strategy to deal with this new threat. He claims that Israel was not able to achieve a total victory or decisive military in its wars with Hezbollah and Hamas in the last decade. He concludes that will effect Israel's deterrence and the later should find a solution to live with a continuous pain from Hezbollah and Hamas.

Kirshofer explained how the alignment of Hamas and Israel interest could affect the stability of deterrence between them. He argues that the Israel- PLO experience indicates that the deterrence after 1982 Lebanon war led Arafat to recognize Israel and accept the Oslo Accord. Although, the PLO has been tried to maintain the Oslo Accord and seek to a Palestinian state in the 1967 land and worked with Israel for its security, the negotiation failed to reach to a final agreement. the inception of the second Intifada led to new situation between the PLO and Israel. The latter accused Arafat supporting the armed resistance and funding some military operation. Kirshofer sees that the end of the peace process between Arafat and Israel broke the alignment of the interest between the two sides which led Israel to reoccupying the West Bank.

As Hamas was not in power until 2006, depending on Kirshofer's argument, Israel was not able to achieve a successful deterrence against the movement which was hitting Israel any time without considerations. When Hamas won the 2006 election and then took over the Gaza Strip in 2007 after clashing with Fatah, the price of attacking Israel became higher, Kirshofer claims. Instead, Hamas, while it was n power, held an operation on Gaza border and captured an Israeli soldier. Despite of the heavy Israeli revenge, Hamas kept the solider for 6 years and released him after a swap deal with Israel. The wars of 2008/09, 2012 and 2014 on Gaza shows that the deterrence based on alignment interest is no longer workable while domestic and Foreign factors could affect the two side leading them to violence.

Byman (2013) provide an almost comprehensive assessment of Israel counterterrorism strategy, since, Israel's establishment until the last rounds of confrontations with Hamas in Gaza. Byman claims that Israel has unprecedented situation of terrorism in the world while it has enemies at all fronts all types and all kinds of threats. He suggests that Israel can be a model

for rest of countries on how can they counter terrorism. According to Byman, the main deficiencies of Israel counterterrorism strategy are first, that Israel was not able to transfer its tactical victory to strategic gain. Second, Israel failed to deal with what Byman called "hydra-headed movements" which aim to win hearts and minds of its populations through providing social and educational services. Targeted killings, the security fence, interrogation and intelligence dilemmas were among the tactics that Byman highlighted in his chronological work.

Byman believes that Israel counterterrorism strategy has two main problems; lack of strategic thinking or ultimate goal and the direct influence of internal circumstances or determinations on the decision-makers. Byman claims also that Israel will not able to gain deterrence against its foes, since, it adopted "the democratic value" of counterterrorism which pays consideration to the human rights issues. He sees that Israel should be more violent to achieve a serious deterrence. In this regard, Byman suggests that targeted killing policy is effective in deterring the enemies and he provided some evidences from the Palestinian front. Although of that, Byman does not believe that Israel is under existential threat any more.

In one of the rare work on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Byman (2013) comes up with his book "A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism". As a historical evaluation to the Israeli counterterrorism, according to Bayman, the dominant doctrine which did not leave the Israeli mind is to let the enemies pay a heavy price. Starting from the early years since 1948 until the last decade, the researcher went through the main rounds of violent between Israel and its foes. The author argues that Israel with its long experience with counterterrorism has almost adopted every kind of strategies and tactics to fight its enemies. Although, Israel still exists and become a regional power, the price which the Israelis and Arabs citizens paid was very high, Byman argues. The researcher pays his efforts to be objective in assessing the Israeli strategies which according to him, successes in some cases and fails in another. The big number of the interviews which Byman conducted for his book makes the work one of the most important recent reference in this regard. Byman agreed with the majority of experts and pundits that Israel which generally success in the battlefields fails in the political and strategic gain. In order to curb the terror, Israel adopt different tools such as sky marshals on airplanes and the role of controversial techniques such as targeted killings and the security barrier that separates Israel from Palestinian areas. The book offers a model on

the state response on the terrorist groups according to the researcher point of view.

Schueftan as most of the Israeli scholars sees that Israel has a unique environment of existent and potential enemies and threats. In his eyes, Israel also is island of democracy in mid of non-democratic and unstable region. For Schueftan, Israel's uniqueness affects its ability in facing its potential enemies who are use that to continue pressurizing Israel. So, he argues that Israel has challenges on regional and international levels while its main assets are domestic with full American support.

At the regional and international level, Israel faces Iran, as a potential nuclear power, non-state armed groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas and the regional chaos. Internationally, he sees that Israel is almost isolated in the UN and face a new challenge with European countries regarding Israel's hard actions. Schueftan suggests that Israel has two main assets the domestic one which means the resilience, constructive drive and ingenuity of Israeli Jewish society" and the international assets which is the American support.

Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) show that Israel used "repressive (or punishing) and conciliatory (or rewarding) actions on terrorist behavior" against the Palestinian armed factions. The study shows "that repressive action are either unrelated to terror or related to subsequent increases in terror and conciliatory actions are generally related to decreases in terror, depending on the tactical period. Findings also reveal the importance of understanding the role of terrorist's constituencies for reducing violence." According to Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) and (Schweitzer, 2010), the period between 2000-2004 witnessed the large number of the killings among the Israeli soldiers and settlers. To deal with this serious challenge, Israel adapted a "policy during the second intifada focused on activity that started on the ground level with frequent arrests, targeted assassinations against wanted terrorists and escalated to targeted killings of organization commanders and leaders".

Charles argues that "Israel has never adopted a formal national-security strategy", since, post David Ben Gurion era (Freilich, 2015). According to Charles, Ben Gurion's strategy has three components: deterrence, detection and decision. Recently, a fourth component was added, the defense. The main pillar among these is the decision which Israel faces a problem. Charles focuses on the absence of the military decision in the Israeli records, since, the 1967 war which was the last conflict Israel was able to use the military decision to achieve its goal. The implication of the military decision in the Israeli mentality is to end the fight on the enemy's land and destroy its forces. Israel was able to implement this strategy in its

first three wars 1948, 1956 and 1967. The strategic result of this situation was deterring the Arab countries partially. The 1973 war was considered the first Arab-Israel war which Israel lost the deterrence, detection and decision.

Charle's main argument reflects the changing in the Israeli strategic environment with emerging the non-state entities as well as the popular uprising in the occupied Palestinian territories. He sees that Israel failed again to adopt its decision strategy in the second Lebanon war 2006 with Hezbollah and the three violent rounds with Hamas in 2008/2009, 2012 and 2014. This challenge became more serious, since, Israel's failure in the military decision led to its failure to establish a deterrence equation with Hezbollah and Hamas. The reasons behind this conclusion, according to Charles, come from the solid ideological thoughts of Hamas and Hezbollah as well as the Israel's disability to launch a decisive war with cooperative targets.

Israel's failure to deter its foes in the current strategic situation is what in a comparison between the Israeli strategy and the ground tactics, Catignani (2005) believes that there is a gap between the strategy and the implication on the ground. In his study which is adopted Al-Aqsa intifada (2000-2005) as a case study, Catignani sees that "the IDF has not been able to achieve a battlefield decision or victory". He argues that although, the Israeli army was able to reduce the Palestinian insurgency, there was no decisive victory at the end. The main reason behind that, according to Catignani was the absence of the "political and strategic direction from the Israeli political echelon" (Catignani, 2005).

The author provided a historical argument that the strategic goal of Israel is to deter its foes nothing more than. Israel will be always under existential threat. In his case, Al-Aqsa intifada, Catignani, sees that Israel reached to a strategic impasse since the strategy needs a political end for any war whatever the kind of this war; comprehensive war, counterinsurgency or even small confrontation.

In an assessment of the 20088/2009 Gaza war (or Cast lead Operation according to the Israeli concept), Maddy-Weitzman (2009) argues that Israel "Israel became determined to reestablish its deterrence vis-a-vis Hamas". After 2006 Second Lebanon war with Hezbollah which end with no winners, no losers and mutual deterrence. At the other hand, Hamas which takeover Gaza from its rival Fatah in Summer 2007, aimed to renew a ceasefire with Israel with better conditions. The outcome of the war, according to Weitzman, may come in favors of Israel on the military level but Israel failed to achieve its goals to topple Hamas rule in Gaza, return the captured solider and

stop Hamas rockets. As well as the siege that Hamas hoped to be left continued with no changing. Focusing the political outcome, Weitzman argues that the negotiation between the PLO and Israel is the only solution to stop the cycle of violence.

Focusing on Hamas strategic calculus during the 50 days war in Summer 2014, Robinson (2014) argues that Hamas did not seek to the confrontation at that time. Despite of that Hamas sought to improve its weak position regarding to what happen in the region, since, 2011. The study shows that Hamas was able to reveres it earns since Israel failed to achieve its goal or even deter Hamas. The study highlights Hama's position before the 2014 war regarding the domestic, regional and international levels. Robinson believes that Hamas wanted to fill the strategic gap that felt after the coup in Egypt and its disagreement with Syria and Iran regarding the Syrian crisis. In same context, Hamas was enforced to sign a reconciliation agreement with Fatah to form a unity government in Gaza and West Bank. That meant Hamas no more rule Gaza solely. According to the study, because of Hamas good job in the battlefield Hamas was able to hit Tel Aviv and Jerusalem as well as the whole Israeli cites for the first time. Hamas continued launching its rockets for 50 days. Israel was unable to enter Gaza with ground troops because of Hamas resistance, it was able to reverse gain some political points. Robinson argues that will be for short time regarding the current regional situation which Hamas has no serious supporter.

Satria highlights in her thesis the main drivers of the Israel security strategy. In this regard, she studied three cases of Israeli strategic decision; peace agreement with Egypt, unilateral withdraw from Gaza in 2005 and two Lebanon wars in 1982 and 2006. Satria examine whether the internal or external factors are more influence on the Israeli leader. She concluded that Israeli leadership pay attention to the internal pressure more the external one.

In a comprehensive work on the 2014 Israel war on Gaza, Alzytounah center issued an informative report on the war edited by Saleh (2015). The book includes the operational confrontation between the two sides day by day. In addition, the work highlights the domestic and regional situation and the international position on what the book called the Israeli aggression on Gaza. The book also shows the humanitarian aspect of the war and the result of the Israeli heavily assaults on the civilians on Gaza. The work consider as a good informative reference for those who want to study the Gaza war. The research does not include any analytical studies or strategic assessment.

Heller (2015) goes direct to the point that Hamas should not gain any tolerance in the Israeli responses. Arguing that Israel has nothing to do to deter Hamas which has nothing to lose, Heller provide an explanation to the internal and external factors that make any deterrence strategy with Hamas irrelevant without a very heavy price in Hamas capabilities and stockholders. He proves that Hamas popularity after the protective edge operation in 2014 was unprecedented. The researcher sees that Israel has not effective tools to pressurize Hamas except the military tool which should let Hamas pay a high price to be deterrent and that is not sure.

Siboni (2015) conducted a comparative study on the three Israeli operations in Gaza, since, Hamas's seizure of power in 2007. Operation Cast Lead (December 2008-January 2009), Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012) and Operation Protective Edge (July-August 2014) were studied in term of their strategic background and the operational military aspects. Siboni sees that Hamas depends on "Victim Doctrine" to harm the Israeli image in the international community. While Hamas seems learn better than Israel from the previous rounds, Siboni argues that Hamas was able to improve its military capabilities and thoughts as it is shown in the last rounds in 2014. At the strategic level, Israel still aims to deter Hamas to get a long calm as soon as possible. According to Siboni, Israel's experience with Hezbollah in 2006 which caused a long calm at the northern border, encouraged it to keep its deterrence strategy with Hamas as well. In the three rounds, the regional politics was an important factor affected the both side. In 2008/2009 round, Hamas was among the resistance alliance in the region which included Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas at that time. The Iranian support for Hamas was very high. In 2012 round, Siboni, argue that Hamas was at its best strategic situation when it was back by Morsi government in Egypt. In 2014, Hama's motive to fight, according to Gabi was to survival since Hamas was among the big loser after the Syrian crisis and its rift with Iran and the coup in Egypt. Hamas was without defender. Gabi argues that Israel still not able to achieve deterrence against Hamas although, it is too early to judge the last round of 2014.

According to Schweitzer, who is a senior research associate and head of the Program on Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict at the Israeli Institute of National Security Studies, Israel strategy to counter the "suicide bombings" included; solid interceptive intelligence, the construction of the security barrier, systematic arrests and targeted killings of initiators and perpetrators of suicide attacks.

Although, the number of the martyrdom (or suicide bombings) declined, Schweitzer believes that Israel's success in the capacity not the motivation. He is also highlighted two possibilities on why Hamas "suspended" use of the suicide bombings tactics; the heavy price that Hamas paid from its top leaders, or that Hama's priority shifted at that time to the Palestinian political arena which actually won the Legislative Council Election in 2006. Goldings (2011) suggest that the targeted killings policy was effective to push Hamas to stop its martyrdom operations, but sometime gave an opposite result while killings the leaders became a trigger for retaliate.

CONCLUSION

The two strategies on which Israel has relied primarily on confronting its enemies are deterrence and Blitzkrieg. The literature reviewed indicates that the success of Israeli deterrence with the Arab states was not the same as with Hamas and the party. Where Hezbollah and Hamas managed to create a situation of breaking Israeli deterrence and creating a somewhat mutual deterrence. The 2006 war with Hezbollah constituted an important turning point for all parties to the conflict in the region. In this war, Hezbollah was able to break the Israeli deterrent effect and the effect of the Israeli offensive. Israel failed to achieve the stated goals of the war and the war generated a major reaction within Israel. This reaction led to form a commission of inquiry (Winograd Commission) into the causes of failure or what the party calls the defeat of Israel. Hamas has also benefited from this war in the three confrontations with Israel from 2008-2014. Hamas has stripped Israel of deterrence three times in 8 years. Israel also tried to use the blitzkrieg strategy with Gaza in 2008 but did not succeed in breaking the Hamas as predicted and the war continued for almost two weeks without results except mass destruction. Israel no longer benefits from a blitzkrieg strategy with organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Nevertheless, Israel seeks to develop strategies for non-state organizations aimed at the organization's ideology, supply and development system. These strategies, however, have not been tested. Hamas and Hezbollah continue to develop their military capabilities from time to time in preparation for any confrontation with Israel. The field of confrontation remains to judge the success of strategies from their failure.

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