

## The Rupture and Restoration of the Relations between the Communist Party of China and Japan

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**Abstract:** This study reviews the twists and turns of the relations between the two parties, from friendship to breakdown, from hard negotiations to normalization of relations. From a multi-angle perspective in-depth analysis of the Sino-Japanese relations between the two countries in 1966, the breakdown of relations and normalization in 1998 to achieve the reasons for how to deal with the relationship between the Communist Party carried out a profound reflection.

**Key words:** Chinese Communist Party, Japanese Communist Party, the relationship between the Communist Party, negotiations, perspective, relations

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### INTRODUCTION

The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Japanese Communist Party (JPC) Japan were established with the help of the Communist International on 1st July, 1921 and 15th July, 1922, respectively. Although, both are Communist Party of Asia but their experiences are very different. The CPC overthrew the reactionary rule of the Kuo-Ming Tang (KMT), a Chinese National Party to become a big country's ruling party. While the JPC has opposite experience in early 20th century they were 30-years-repressed by Japanese's fascist era. During US occupation authorities as end of World War II, they experienced a purge and then a split of the party before entering a normal development track in 1950's. The two parties have cooperated closely, supported each other and forged a profound friendship. In Sino-Soviet debate era, especially after the start of the cultural revolution in China, the relations between the two parties deteriorated rapidly and finally broke-down. With the development of the situation, both the Chinese and Japanese parties believed that it was necessary to restore friendly relations. After several rounds of negotiations, the normal inter-party relations were finally restored in 1998. At the moment, the JPC is one of the largest Communist Party in developed countries and the CPC is the largest ruling Communist Party. This study tries to study the long story of both parties' relations in order to learn the lessons and to promote the development of bilateral relations significantly.

### THE BEGINNING OF THE CPC AND THE JPC RELATIONSHIP

The Chinese and Japanese parties have established close working relationships as both of them are branch of the Communist International. In the early days of the founding of the party, the two parties had had contact at the First Congress of the Far East Revolutionary Organizations. In April 1928, the two parties issued a joint declaration on Japan's dispatch of troops to China's Shandong Peninsula and condemned Japan's robbery, calling on the Chinese and Japanese people to strengthen international solidarity and jointly oppose Japanese imperialism. After the 18th September incident, at the critical juncture of the Chinese nation, the Japanese Communist Party stood unequivocally to support the Chinese people's struggle against Japan. Because the JPC upheld the Japan's internationalist position, the brutal repression, they were forced to stop the party's unified action in 1935. In April 1940, the JPC leader Osamu Sansen arrived in Yan'an, established the "Anti-Japanese War in China Yan'an branch". This movement was responsible for the Japanese army in China's counter-work. In order to train cadres, he also established "Japan's industrial and agricultural schools" in Yan'an. The JPC in the Chinese battlefield engaged in the campaign has made outstanding achievements. In his military report to the Seventh CPC Congress, Zhu De praised the comrades of the JPC, Zhu (1983) said "Their work in the spirit of lofty internationalism has given us great and valuable help in

this respect” (Zhu, 1983). After World War II, the Japanese Communist Party in December 1945 held the Fourth National Congress, the official reconstruction. The Chinese and Japanese parties have supported each other and maintained friendly relations. On 21st January 1949, the people’s daily of China published a short commentary entitled “Japan’s Elections and China” before the general election in Japan. The short commentary points out was that “the people who are most qualified to lead Japan and establish a true and close friendship with New China People, the democratic elements of Japan, the Japanese Communists and other democrats who have not been infected with Chinese blood, must be made known to all the Japanese people in a simple way.

In April 1950, the United States occupation authorities announced a total of illegal, issued a purge. In the face of the behaviour of the US and Japanese authorities, the Communist Party immediately issued editorials and statements in the people’s daily, strongly condemning the atrocities committed by the US occupation authorities and the Japanese government, calling for the revocation of the reactionary order of the Japanese Communist Party and the end of MacArthur and the United States the Japanese occupation of the tyrannical rule “to encourage the Japanese Communist Party was convinced that” the last failure must be the heinous American imperialism and its lackeys, the Japanese people and the people of the revolutionary struggle is always to victory (Berton, 2001).

In 6th January 6, the European Communist Party intelligence agency publication’s “for a lasting peace, for people’s democracy” published “on the situation in Japan”, a text, criticized the Osaka Sansan’s occupation under the peaceful revolution, that Osaka Theory is “Whitewash Imperialism on the theory of Japanese occupation for the United States Imperialism boasted the theory and therefore, deceive the Japanese People’s Theory”. The Japanese Communist Party’s reaction on how to deal with the criticism of the Intelligence Bureau, there were serious differences which in the history of the Japanese Communist Party known as the “50 years”. The Communist Party of China gave help to the Tokuda School that sought support in Beijing, accompanied Wang Jiexiang to accompany him to Moscow, where Stalin directed them to draft the “51-years program” for violent revolution. Although, this program was not necessarily correct with the help of the CCP, the crisis within the Japanese Communist Party had been eased. This is an undeniable fact. In the 1960’s, the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union

deteriorated. The Japanese Communist Party’s view on the issue of bilateral relations between the two sides once again had serious differences. The CCP stood on the position of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party and praised the Japanese Communist Party for “standing in the forefront of opposing modern revisionism” and gave firm support to the expulsion of Shikao Yoshioka and Suzuki City from the Japanese Communist Party and other revisionist rebels who collaborated with foreign forces to improve the authority of the Japanese Communist Party Central Committee (Berton, 1694).

The Japanese Communist Party also gave full support to the new China’s foreign policy. The Japanese Communist Party had consistently opposed the anti-China policy pursued by the United States. During the Korean War, the Japanese Communist Party resolutely opposed the Japanese government to enter the war in any form and the Chinese People’s Volunteers gave a high evaluation that the volunteers “to the US imperialist aggression against the North Korea and its ambitions to expand the war a serious blow to the maintenance of the world Peace has provided a great contribution”. In August 1958, the Taiwan Strait crisis, the people’s Liberation Army bombardment of Kinmen, Matsu, Sino-US relations deteriorated sharply. The Japanese called on the Japanese people to unite to oppose US provocation in the Far East and carry out military provocations in the Taiwan Strait area, asking the United States to stop interference in China’s Internal Affairs and the withdrawal of troops from Taiwan. The Japanese government had long followed the policy of hostility toward China by the United States. It not only refused to recognize New China but also signed the Peace Treaty between Japan and the Republic of China on 28th April 1952 and established the so-called “diplomatic relations” with the Chiang Kai”. In the case of official relations between China and Japan it was difficult to make progress, China took the initiative to carry out the “civil diplomacy” in order to achieve the “people to promote their official” purposes. At the Seventh National Congress, held in late July 1958, the Japanese Communist Party adopted a resolution on the normalization of relations between Japan and China. It declared that it would “take the lead in promoting the restoration of Japan-China diplomatic relations and the Japan-China friendship and peace movement” and make it a national to abolish the treaty with Taiwan to thoroughly implement the Fourth Trade Agreement and to strive for the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and

Japan as soon as possible". On the issue of Sino-Soviet relations, the Japanese Communist Party first supported the "one-sided" policy of the Chinese Communist Party. After the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet debate, the Japanese Communist Party publicly or indirectly supported the CCP before 1965. At the Bucharest meeting in June 1960, Khrushchev took a surprise attack and accused the CCP. The Japanese Communist Party did not agree with the views of the Communist Party Soviet Union (CPSU) and did not participate in the siege of Khrushchev against the Chinese Communists. In the "Twenty two", the CPK refused to openly criticize the Communist Party of China with the Communist Party of China to support the Albanian Labour Party. With the deteriorating relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Japanese Communist Party's support for the attitude was clearer. In 1964, when the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of Japan (CPC) came to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of Japan, the Japanese Communist Party had publicly stood on the side of the Chinese Communist Party, condemning the "revisionism" of the North Korea and opposing the Soviet Communist Party's splits of the international communist movement and its interference in the internal affairs of the Japanese Communist Party. At this point, the unity of the two parties reached a peak.

#### **THE BREAKDOWN OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY**

The intimate and friendly relations between the Chinese and Japanese parties were largely maintained until 1965. Since, then the two party relations tended to be cold. The reason for the coldness was mainly due to the ideological differences between the two parties gradually emerged. The "51 years program" of the Japanese Communist Party (JPC) was defeated and the lesson of the "30/9" incident in Indonesia was even more bitter. The Japanese Communist Party began to advocate the completion of Japan's "bourgeois-democratic revolution" through the parliamentary democratic road. At this time, the CCP was violently criticizing the "three-and-two" theory of CPSU and the idea of the Japanese Communist Party would inevitably hit the CCP's muzzle. On the establishment of the international front against imperialism, there were also great differences between the two parties. Although, the two sides advocated the establishment of an anti-imperialist international front, the Japanese Communist Party advocated the establishment of an anti-imperialist international front including the

Soviet Union while the Chinese Communist Party advocated the establishment of an international front against the United States and the Soviet Union. Japan criticized the revisionist tendency of the Communist Party Soviet Union (CPSU) but unlike the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) it did not think that the CPSU has completely evolved and was not in favour of equating the Soviet Union with the United States. Japan opposed the Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of the Japanese Communist Party but did not agree with the international communist movement split in particular, did not want to see the opposition between the two parties. While opposing "modern revisionism", the Japanese Communist Party seems to have sensed what the CCP had in mind, proposing to oppose "ontemporary dogmatism" and "sectarianism" at the same time. In 1965, the United States began to upgrade the war in Vietnam. The Japanese Communist Party thought that it was necessary to support the anti-American war in Vietnam and establish an anti-imperialist international front including the Soviet Union as the urgent task of the current international communist movement. This was a serious disagreement with the Chinese party that advocates the establishment of an anti-US anti-Soviet international front. The Soviet Union's aid to Vietnam must transit China and the Chinese Communist Party refused to cooperate with the Soviet Union on the issue of aid to Vietnam, saying that the Khrushchev revisionists were accomplices of the imperialist bandits. "People's Daily" published in November 1965, "refuting the Soviet leadership of the new leadership of the so-called" joint action "article, reiterated this principled position. The CCP believed that the stubbornness of the CCP "poses great difficulties to the struggle of the Vietnamese people" and "was a very serious mistake" (Berton, 1986).

The Japanese Communist Party Central Committee in order to bridge the differences with the Chinese Communist Party, for the Asian Communist Party's sympathy for the Japanese Communists, sent a delegation headed by Miyamoto Shigetsu in 1966, 2-3 months in China, Vietnam and Korea between the shuttle visits. During several meetings with the CCP delegation composed by Deng *et al.* (1984), the Chinese and Japanese parties were divided on whether to include the Soviet Union in the anti-imperialist international front. After hard negotiations, the two sides reached an agreement, March 27, 1966 to determine the Sino-Japanese bipartisan joint statement of the text. The main contents included: the establishment of a broad international united front against the "US Imperialist Policy in Vietnam", the unresolved opposition to "modern revisionism" and the need to guard against dogmatism and sectarianism. The

text of the joint statement stated that Chairman Mao Zedong held talks with the Japanese delegation. This showed that only after the meeting with Mao Zedong, the Joint Declaration can be published. On the evening of March 27, the Chinese side held a banquet to welcome the Japanese Communist delegation to celebrate the bipartisan agreement on the joint statement. March 1928, Chairman Mao Zedong met with the main members of the Japanese Communist Party, Mao Zedong on the current text of the joint statement strongly opposed. Comrade Mao Zedong asked for some changes to the Joint Declaration which included direct calls to denounce the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in opposition to modern revisionism and the position of the United Front should be established a united front against the United States and the Soviet Union. "Mao Zedong also called for a clear explanation of" dogmatism in his statement. According to the data of the Japanese Communist Party, Mao Zedong also suggested that after the return of the Japanese Communist Party leaders to amend the party platform for the violent revolution and the people's war to prepare. The Japanese delegation rejected Mao's comments and suggestions. Mao Zedong had made a strong response. In his view, the case, the two parties did not need to publish any joint statement. As a result, the joint communique failed to be published and the talks ended without result (Kojima, 1980).

After the breakdown of the Sino-Japanese bipartisan talks, the Japanese Communist Party opposed to "contemporary dogmatism" action upgrade, take the initiative to take steps to worsen relations between the two parties. The Japanese Communist Party removed the Mao Zedong's works from the bibliography of the classics which must be read by the party members and removed the portrait of Mao Zedong from the wall of the office of the Party organizations at all levels. In the attack, Mao Zedong described Mao as "a stale old leader", accusing the CCP of dogmatism and adventurism. The "Cultural Revolution" was a manifestation of "feudalism". Japanese Communist Party (JCP) considered that the Communist Party attached dogmatism to the healthy body of Marxism-Leninism which was an illegal national congress held by Mao's followers and the CCP had become a Maoist follower group, Chauvinist line, unprincipled landscaping of Nixon and so on. The Chinese side had also taken counter-measures: dissemination of the Japanese anti-Japanese propaganda materials, advocating "the gun inside out of power", "Jinggangshan road to the world". The CCP's attacks on the Japanese Communist Party were more personal, directed against Miyamoto. The CCP's attack on Miyamoto's rule was a "gutter worm in the gutter", a

hospital service for capitalism and the flattery of modern revisionism in the Soviet Union, a shameful traitor of Marxism-Leninism. The revisionist renegade clique, a revisionist bourgeois parliamentary party, a parliamentarian or a parliamentarian, a traitor to the Japanese people, the US-Japanese reactionaries, anti-China forces, anti-communist forces, anti-people forces and tools of counterrevolutionary force or faithful stooges, accomplices and so on. And even, the Japanese Communist Party as a common enemy of the Chinese and Japanese people.

Comrade Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China's influence on the Asian Communist Party was an objective reality, the Sino-Japanese bipolar debate on the unity of the Japanese Communist Party caused great pressure. From September, 1966, some local organizations of the Japanese Communist Party formed "Revolutionary Left" in Yamaguchi, Saga, Aichi, Fukuoka and Hyogo and announced their departure from the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party. Anzhai Kuchi, who established the "Japanese Communist Party (Marxism-Leninism) National Committee", Fukuda justice, who established the "Japanese Communist Party (left) Revolutionary Committee and so on. These factions claimed to hold the high great banner of Mao Zedong Thought and take the road of Chinese revolution. The important leaders of the Japanese Communist Party Xizelong II, Anzhai Kuji, etc. had also announced that the CPC Central Committee. Japan had accused the Chinese Communist Party of dividing the Japanese Communist Party, the future entangled these memories.

The Chinese Communists also demanded that the Japan-China Friendship Association, the Japan Press Conference, the Asian-African Solidarity Committee of Japan, the Asian-African Writers Conference, the Japan Council and other Japanese political groups and the Japan-China Business Association, stood against the Japanese Communist Party. Japan-China Friendship Association did not accept these requirements, the Communist Party of China to support the Socialist Party of Kuroda Shouan exit in October, 1966 separately formed the "Japan-China Friendship Association Orthodox Headquarters". "It is determined to make unremitting struggles with all the conspiracies of US imperialism, Soviet revisionism, the Japanese reactionaries and a handful of Japanese revisionists trying to undermine Sino-Japanese trade and completely eliminate a handful of Japanese revisionists in Japan in a trade that can give bad influence". In 10th April 1968, Sino-Japanese Friendship Association and the Japan-China Friendship Association (orthodox) talked summary were the "US imperialism", "Japanese reactionaries", "modern revisionism" and "the

revisionist group” known as the “two enemies” of the Chinese and Japanese people. In 28th February 1967, the Japan-China Friendship Association orthodox headquarters and a number of overseas Chinese youth and Japan-China Friendship Association of the Japanese Communist Party sent violent clashes. This conflict continued until 2nd March afternoon was the Japanese police crackdown which is “Tokyo Good Neighbourhood Student Hall Incident”. Afterwards, the Chinese side accused the incident of “being organized in a planned and organized way, a major exposure of the counter-revolutionary character of the Japanese revisionists”. This incident had further aggravated of the relations between the two parties. The Japanese were ordered to withdraw their representatives in Beijing sand between a good and “red flag” reporter Konno pure one. When the two in 3rd August 1967 were in Beijing airport ready to fly to Pyongyang, were heard by the Red Guards “criticism”. The Japanese government naturally took the initiative to protest but mistakenly thought that the CCP organized the incident. In fact, people were familiar with the Chinese knowledge that this was only the prevailing “Red Guards” event with an “ordinary” event only. This event had brought the serious confrontation between the two parties to an apex and the relations between the two parties had been completely cut off. Since, then, the Japanese Communist Party of China and Vietnam were in a conflict, standing on position of the Soviet Union and Vietnam side in the Chinese Communist Party’s perspective, the Japanese Communist Party was naturally considered as pro-Soviet forces. In this situation, the contradiction between the Chinese and Japanese parties, in the 20th century, from 1970 to early 1980, was not only did not ease but more profound. The Japanese Communist Party prohibited the official status of party members involved in the exchanges between the CCP and the Japanese government, China did not allow the Japanese Communist Party leaders to visit China in an official capacity.

### **THIRD, THE RESUMPTION OF THE CCP AND THE JCP RELATIONS**

The Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee began to systematically correct the “Left” mistakes. The Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Some Historical Issues concerning the party since the Founding of the people’s Republic of China in June 1981 was pointed out: “We uphold independence and respect for the power of other people to become independent and self-reliant” (Deng *et al.*, 1984)”. The revolutionary road

and road of construction, the people themselves to find, create and decide, no one has the right to impose their views on people. “This principle in the past relations between the Chinese Communist Party summed up the merits for the restoration of bilateral relations, the ideological conditions”.

The Chinese Communists first took the first steps to improve relations between the two parties. At the beginning of 1985, the Chinese Communist Party invited representatives of the “Prohibition of Atomic Bomb Hydrogen Bomb Convention” which was led by the Japanese Communist Party to attend the symposium on peace held in Beijing in June of the same year and expressed the hope of “contact and exchange” with the Japanese Communist Party. Soon, Miyamoto was in the CPP Central Committee ten plenum also said to actively repair the relationship between the two parties. First, the Chinese Communists must acknowledge past mistakes and apologize to them; secondly, the Chinese Communists must sever their ties with the pro-Communist separatist groups and pro-communist groups the relationship between individuals. The CCP believes that the guiding ideology for the resumption of relations between the CCP and the EC is “without ending the past and opening up the future”. This principle is of course applicable to relations with the Japanese Communist Party. In 1985, the CPC also proposed to the Japanese Communists to hold secret talks between the two parties responsible for international affairs officials. The CCP proposed that the talks be held in Beijing. North Korea did not agree to hold such talks in China and the two sides agreed to hold a meeting in Bucharest, Romania.

On September 27, 1985, Chinese Minister of Foreign Liaison Department Qian Liren and Japanese International Minister Yoshihiro Mori held talks. The Communist Party of China pointed out that the Communist Party of China “has corrected the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution period and is trying to use Marxism-Leninism to rectify the correct line. “He said: “We are dealing with the same party including the Japanese Communist Party relations on the shortcomings and errors, the hearts cannot but feel the pain”. Yukihiro’s remarks focused on the details of the CCP’s “interfering in the internal affairs of the Japanese Communist Party” and reaffirmed the two prerequisites for the resumption of relations between the two parties. The CCP representative only emphasized that the CCP had completely rejected the “Cultural Revolution” and that the “gang of four” had been abandoned. There was no substantive progress in the Bucharest meeting (Berton, 2004). As the Japanese Communist Party in the 1989 Beijing political turmoil in the stand against the Chinese Communist Party, the two parties of reconciliation still

seem difficult. In the 1990's, especially after 1997, Miyamoto and other old leaders of the Japanese Communist Party gradually introduced the leadership and formed a new leadership group which was unbroken and determined to be the core. In September 1997, the Japanese Communist Party held a total of twenty-one, the Japanese were proposed to lead in the 21st century, the goal of a democratic coalition government. The leaders of the new generation of the Japanese Communist Party knew that diplomacy with China was an important part of Japanese diplomacy. Japanese nationals will not accept a party that did not maintain normal relations with the CPC to lead the country. Only by improving relations with the CPC can consolidate their position in Japan's political arena. An study in the People's Daily on July 6, 1997, reported the results of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly elections in Japan, praising the Japanese Communist Party as "a new political party in Japan". The Japanese newspaper "red flag" in the same month 31 full text reproduced in the article. After the next mutual test, both parties agreed that the time had come for reconciliation. In January, 1998, Zhu (1983) secretary general of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, visited Japan and opened the curtain on the normalization of bilateral relations. In April the, same year Hu Jintao's visit to Japan, April 22 was not broken Zhe, three attended the Japanese Foreign Ministry held a welcoming banquet, at the exchange of Hu Jintao, bilateral relations toward the normalization direction had taken an important step. On July 20, 1998, the Japanese delegation led by the Japanese Communist Party visited China and held friendly and cordial talks with General Secretary Jiang Zemin on bilateral exchanges, development and friendly relations. The two parties achieved the highest level leadership meeting. At this point, the Sino-Japanese Communist Party between the existences of 32 years of cracks finally bridged.

In January 2006, Japan held a total of twenty-four. At the invitation of the Japanese Communist Party, the CCP representative attended the congress which shows that the relations between the two parties had developed smoothly. It was also very important for the CCP to establish a new type of inter-party relationship facing the 21st century. Since, the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, the two countries have carried out fruitful cooperation in the political, economic and cultural fields and achieved a series of positive results. But there are still "bottlenecks" in relations between the two countries. Especially in recent years, the rise of Japan's political right-wing to promote Sino-Japanese friendship greatly weakened. The Japanese Communist Party is the only revolutionary party outside

the conservative system. The Japanese Communists have consistently advocated the need to address historical issues and oppose the strengthening of military cooperation between Japan and the United States, believing that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory and that the Taiwan question is China's internal affair. These views are very similar to those of the Chinese Communist Party. Strengthening cooperation with the CPC should be the first choice for the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

## CONCLUSION

The history of the relations between the two parties tells us that the great party doctrine is an important factor leading to deepen the differences between the two parties and the breakdown of the relationship. The manifestations of great party doctrine are varied. Some of them are small and medium-sized parties in the foreign exchange by the big party of the gas, the party's affairs by the big party control and interference but the party does not consciously let the smaller party, the interference of other party affairs and decide other countries. The act of the revolutionary road. In the 10 years Sino-Soviet debate, the Communist Party of China and the Soviet Communist Party had a resolute struggle, against the anti-well. While the CCP opposed the CPSU it did not consciously interfere in the internal affairs of the Japanese Communist Party. On the question of the revolutionary road in the 1950's the Chinese Communist Party followed the Soviet Union's imposition of the "violent revolution" on the Japanese Communist Party. After the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations, the Chinese Communists demanded that the Japanese Communist Party be in line with its own views, establish an international front against the United States and oppose the Soviet Union and demand a common "three and two" clear line and a violent revolutionary road. After the Japanese Communist Party rejected the CCP's proposal, the CCP supported the anti-Japanese opposition in some way, even though it was usually the spontaneous act of the "Revolutionary Rebels" and "Red Guards". While criticizing and resisting the great party doctrine of the CPSU, the CCP has committed a "self-sacrifice" to isolate itself and injure others. Deng *et al.* (1984) has admitted frankly: "We are opposed to the 'I party' which we are against is right. We do not agree with what the 'centre' but we also made a point of random gesticulation mistakes (Deng *et al.*, 1984).

The history of the relationship between the two parties also tells us to the unfortunate events between the Communist Party to take "the end of the past, open up the

future” attitude, a strategist’s vision and courage. The relationship between the two parties is a barometer of China’s domestic politics. The relationship between the two parties is also a victim of China’s “Cultural Revolution”. Some Foreign scholars pointed out that Deng *et al.* (1984) who joined the two-party talks in March, 1966, belonged to the leaders of the “Liu-Deng Group”. Mao Zedong put the differences between Liu and Deng Dissatisfaction with the Japanese delegation in the body (Chiou and Han, 1978). This view is worthy of further study. In that era of non-inversion, the CCP’s own organization was severely damaged. Most of the CCP leaders who participated in the Sino-Japanese bipartisan talks were subjected to brutal persecution which the Japanese Communists should fully understand. On the other hand, the behaviours of the Japanese Communist Party, there are many inappropriate. Mao Zedong researcher was removed from the must-read bibliography of party members, banning party members from listening to Japanese broadcasts in China, reading the Chinese language and reading the Chinese language. Publications, offenders were severely punished and so on. These behaviours hurt the feelings of the Chinese Communist Party and are not conducive to the unity of the two parties. After the end of the cultural revolution, the CCP gradually got rid of the influence of the “leftist” ideology, set forth the four principles of inter-party relations, resumed relations with foreign communists and began to seek relationship with them. At present time, the Japanese Communist Party still does not get rid of the rigid mode of thinking, insisted that the Chinese Communist Party accept the preconditions of “admitting mistakes” and “breaking off diplomatic relations” and making diplomatic relations with China and the United States and other

countries. This policy makes situation worst and delays the process of normalization of relations between the two parties.

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