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## Review Article

# Psychological Mechanism of Corruption: A Comprehensive Review

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## Abstract

Corruption prevention can be more effective if it does not rely merely on legal enforcement. This theoretical review aimed to propose a hypothetical psychological model capable of explaining the behavior of corruption. Moral disengagement is a variable that is considered ontologically closest in "distance" to the variable of corruption behavior. Counterfeit self, implicit self-theory, ethical mindset and moral emotion are taken into account as the pivotal factors of the corruption behavior and its mechanism of moral disengagement. Counterfeit self along with some moderating variables are regarded to "set" one's future corrupt behavior based on his/her past/prior ethical or unethical behavior and moral emotions. This review discovered a conjectural-theoretical model of the corruption psychology. It can be used to design a social intervention and training for individuals to manage the mindset and emotion that can buffer counterfeit self effect. In addition, the users of these research findings are recommended to be aware of the surroundings that consist of groups of people with particular ethical mindset, moral emotion proneness and self-theory.

**Key words:** Corruption, moral disengagement, counterfeit self, ethical mindset, self-theory, moral emotion

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## **INTRODUCTION**

One of the roots of social problems in Indonesia and many other developing countries is corruption<sup>1</sup>. Corruption is an abuse of public authority for personal or private interest that disadvantages public by doing things that are against the prevailing law<sup>2</sup>. In a perspective, corruption is categorized as an unethical behavior. Unethical behavior is described as an act that has harmful effects on others and is "either illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community"<sup>3</sup>.

An example of corruption behavior is as follow<sup>4,5</sup>: "A President Director of State-Owned Enterprise sells state land, which has been a state-owned enterprise's asset, to an entrepreneur who wants to build a hospital with free care for poor people. The sale is conducted according to formal procedures in the auction process. However, the entrepreneur and President Director manipulate some provisions to a lower price than required. The company manages to sell for the lower price and the President Director earns 5 billion IDR, as a reward for helping the entrepreneur realize the goodwill. The entrepreneur has good intentions in building a hospital with free service for poor people. Besides that, the President Director conducted the land sale mostly according to applicable procedures, but he also did some manipulations of applicable provisions".

Corruption is unethical, unfair and unjust<sup>6-12</sup> as well as urgent to investigate<sup>13-16</sup> because, (1) It weakens the actualization of human potentials, (2) Contrary to virtue ethics, corrupt behavior decreases the capacity of the perpetrator as a moral agent capable of considering the moral meaning in every fact of life, (3) It has inter-generational detrimental impacts from past to present, from present to future, creating erosion of trustworthiness norms, (4) It decreases confidence in political representation, (5) It lowers the dignity, pride and competitiveness of a nation and (6) It is institutionalized in the legislative, executive and judicial structures. Unfortunately, the development of corruption is more rapid than research on corruption.

The psychological factors influencing corrupt behavior are attempted to explain. They are categorized into various major perspectives in psychology such as psychoanalysis, behaviorism, cognitive and multi-level socio-cultural approach<sup>17</sup> in individual, group and community settings. As reviewed by Abraham and Pane<sup>17</sup>, psychodynamic approach emphasizes on oedipal conflict related to authority, envy and defensive mechanism. Behavioristic approach explains corruption as the function of reinforcement existing in the environment. The rational-analytical approach emphasizes that corruption is a result of calculative-rational decision making based on loss and benefit. The sociocognitive

approach emphasizes on the cognitive bias (knowledge, belief, perception) working on interpersonal and intergroup setting. The cultural approach emphasizes the roles of cultural orientation (collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and power distance) and social norms (injunctive norms and descriptive norms) in explaining corruption. Numerous studies have found linkages between cultures (national, organizational, local)-distributed in social norms (injunctive, descriptive) and level of corruption<sup>18-23</sup> because of rationalizations by the culture that sharpen the good-bad feeling. An examples of narratives about the role of "culture" of corruption is tribute culture (in Indonesian: "Budaya upeti") in Java, Indonesia. The word "culture" is in quotation marks because it has the potential to reinterpret and to counter as well as to negotiate the dominant discourse on culture's contribution to corruption<sup>24</sup>.

In essence, corruption is culturally unacceptable based on a number of arguments. The very first argument comes from public agreement side. Corruption does not include justifiable action in most societies' cultural repertoires<sup>23</sup>. Cultures of Indonesia, where the authors live, are anti-corruption, for instance, cultural values of *siri'na pacce* (shame for human's existential survival, which is based on integrity, personal and family dignity as well as empathy to community) in South Sulawesi<sup>25</sup> and Java's culture of *alus*, which considers the happiness of others<sup>26</sup>. Zhang<sup>23</sup> stated that "cultural sense" that lives in contrast with major assumptions on culture's supportive nature toward corruption is capable of overcoming legal sense so that an individual would not commit immoral acts even without a legal obstacle. People are "often restrained from self-interested behavior not by the fear of legal sanctions, but rather by our sense of right and wrong"<sup>23</sup>.

Another argument that culture at its heart does not support corruption comes from an example: Respect for trust can be manifested in the practice of writing a detailed (for Americans) or brief (for Chinese) contract/agreement. Contract letters are not important to the Chinese but are to Americans<sup>27</sup> and both these contrary practices are all based on, indeed, just the same values or priorities, i.e., the importance of trust. Hierarchy and inclusiveness of application of a moral virtue might also differ across cultures<sup>28</sup>. This claim illustrates the complexity and dynamics of morality's development within a cultural context. The moral foundation argument<sup>29</sup>, for example, contains five universal moral foundations: Care, fairness, loyalty, respect for authority and purity. However, different psychological foundations can exist as a result of "adaptive social challenges throughout evolutionary history"<sup>29</sup>. In other words, cultural shifts in viewing an action's morality can also occur. In the middle of this controversy, Magnis-Suseno<sup>30</sup> suggested the following:




Fig. 1: Visual hypothetical model explaining corruption behavior

"There is absolutely no reason to deny that in different socio-cultural situations, concrete moral norms are also different. What should be asked is: How far is the difference? Is it different only for the concrete norms that cannot be separated from the situation and certain socio-cultural conditions (whereas, the basic moral principles of mankind remain the same) or differences until the roots in the moral view among human beings?... Apparently the profound differences between the moral systems of various societies and cultures which are known from the research of anthropologists, ethnologists and historians do not force us to reject the moral unity of mankind"<sup>30</sup>.

In addition, when religion is regarded as a form of or integral to, culture<sup>31</sup>, "unfortunately", study results suggest the total lack of difference in religious groups' perception of corruption<sup>32</sup>. The opportunity for corrupt practices cannot be viewed as a cultural opportunity. When opportunities for different types of corruption are ubiquitous, corruption is not appropriately attributed to culture<sup>7</sup>. A practical implication is that law enforcement agencies need to deepen their fundamental philosophy of society's plurality of norms. If this study's main assumption is believed i.e., the existence of humankind's moral unity, whatever the culture, then high moral efficacy belongs to the people. Rationalization of corrupt behavior misusing "local wisdom premise" could be strongly argued against. Furthermore, the use of the term "cultural corruption" will not be justified because corruption is unacceptable in any culture.

Among the psychological approaches, which one has the highest efficacy in explaining corruption? Narvaez<sup>33</sup>, a proponent of social intuitionist model, stated that human cognition is an impure individualistic phenomenon but is embodied in a social situation. Narvaez<sup>33</sup> concluded that one's decision to behave ethically or unethically is determined by interacting factors such as gut feelings, mood, energy, purpose, preference, situational pressure, contextual guidance quality, social influence, logical coherence with self-image and the history of previous behaviors. In short, corruption is an interactive coordinate between the situational factor and personal factor. In this present review, moral disengagement (MD) is placed as a sociocognitive variable representing the interaction of cognitive, affective as well as self and situational variables, as hypothesized and shown in Fig. 1.

### MORAL DISENGAGEMENT

From a psychological perspective, one of the ways to explain why people corrupt is by using process perspective. The most plausible psychological theory in relation to the perspective is moral disengagement<sup>34-36</sup>. Moore<sup>35</sup> and Moore *et al.*<sup>36</sup> are the first persons who explicated knowledge application about MD to explain corruption.

The MD theory is based on the basic question, why there are some people who can be involved in inhumane action without being stressed<sup>37</sup>. Private interest is one of the goals of those detached from moral awareness. According to this

theory, there is a cognitive mechanism that reinterprets the moral in the person so that moral self-regulation is blocked or even does not work. In politics, the phenomenon is easily identified. Further, Moore<sup>35</sup> stated that MD application generalization can be very strong in the act of corruption. There are some dimensions in MD construct that are very relevant to corruption<sup>38</sup>. The MD is related to the use of "psychological maneuver". As an example, moral justification involves cognitive reconstruction over the affected behavior. Barsky<sup>38</sup> argued that people, in general, are not willing to behave unethically, like corruption, except if they find justification for the behavior. The psychological process taking place is that this behavior is viewed by the actors as still bearing moral values, e.g., beneficial to the organization; or when a member of parliament views corruption as "lubricating oil for development"<sup>39</sup>. In that condition, moral judgment is compromised for the sake of the actor's interest.

Another dimension is euphemistic labeling. For example, Indonesian Golkar party's statement saying that a sting operation (in Indonesian: Operasi Tangkap Tangan/OTT) launched by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) team to arrest its cadre, Bengkulu governor, Ridwan Mukti, is a "sign that the party is developing"<sup>40</sup>. Actor of corruption is said as a part of a "team player" who maintains the sustainability of a system<sup>41</sup>.

In everyday life, advantageous comparison-another dimension of MD-spreads through some memes among younger generations. As an example, there are memes with texts as in the following examples: "Students who like to cheat are called trash. However, a student who cheats for his/her own benefit and leaves his/her friend in a difficulty is lower than trash" (<https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CIB26gZUYAEGeJH.jpg>). Advantageous comparison is also reflected in the saying, "George felt he had to choose between being a failure or being a fake"<sup>42</sup>. It is as if there are things worse than corruption, e.g., doing corruption alone without involving peers, or failing in general life, so corruption can be more justified.

Another dimension of MD is displacement of responsibility. The corruptive actors deny their responsibility and make external attribution (for example, because of the pressure from the superintendent or because other people in the community conduct the similar act of corruption). This is done to minimize individual's contribution to an act that disadvantages others. This occurs in an expression like, "It is none of my business what the corporation does in overseas bribery"<sup>43</sup> and "I played such a small part that I'm not really responsible"<sup>35</sup>. Some expressions like, "no one

was really harmed"<sup>43</sup> and "this little bit of money doesn't affect anything in a huge company like X"<sup>44</sup> describe this mechanism.

Other dimensions of MD with a significant role in corruption are distortion of consequence and dehumanization. They are relieving or liberating people from depression or uncomfortable feeling/dissonance evolving as the expected consequences of conducting such behavior. The distortion can be in a form of expression or belief that corruption sacrifices no one (victimless).

The MD assessment can be used by various government or private institutions to identify the at-risk parties or those who are prone to conduct corruption. Business institutions using this present review can minimize corrupt behavior based on MD assessment. The benefit is that the "cleaner" institutions will receive ethical perception from their stakeholders that will increase trust in and loyalty to the institutions<sup>45</sup>.

## **COUNTERFEIT SELF**

Self is a continuously developed identity through identification process in a companionship world, playing a role as a relatively autonomous subject ("I") and can take various positions as an object ("me") at the same time that serves as a dialogue partner for the subject and its various positions<sup>46</sup>. This definition of self does not want to be trapped in essentialism because self consists of some properties that continuously experience reactualization. Self can undergo fragmentation if there is no coherence between the knower ("I") and the known ("me") self properties<sup>47</sup>. Self can also endure inflation when it exaggerates positive belief in him/her.

Counterfeit self is different from hypocrisy. To understand the difference, types of self need to be elaborated. Two relevant types of self to discuss in the context of counterfeit self are the institutional self (i.e., self as anchored in institutions) and the impulsive self (i.e., self as anchored in impulse). The two types of self are dynamically changing together with one's true/real self. True self, in the approach of role theory, is "the self we are striving to live up"<sup>48</sup>. True/real self is in tension with the impulsive self and the institutional self. True/real self can transform into the counterfeit/deceptive self when the self is occupied or dominated with institutionalized motivations/goals that are artificial, not coming from one self (or: alien) but are controlling the self. If one "plays" institutional game, there will be an erosion of his/her true/real self.

In front of institutional self, the real self is the self with a "standard" that will appear reliable if it does not fall into/is not trapped in the institutional game. Turner<sup>48</sup> discussed it as follow, "the real self is revealed when a person does something solely because he wants to-not because it is good or bad or noble or courageous or self-sacrificing, but because he spontaneously wishes to do so". In front of impulsive self, the real self is something that is "discovered". On the other hand, institutional self views self-discovery as illogical. Self is a "created" (achieved, chosen, worked on) entity not "discovered". Discovering self, according to institutional self, is like "opening the door" for true/real self, but the "changes" is not simple. According to institutional self, self-discovery is risky because the impulsive self can use any means such as alcohol or drugs as long as they are functional for the discovery. Meanwhile, for institutional self, "the new self" that goes beyond impulsive self limitation must be created. "The new self" is the true self for institutional self. Institutional self is active and volitional as well as negotiates with inner needs (satisfy oneself) and outer needs (ingratiation, presented to satisfy others).

Based on the propositions, it can be concluded that, according to Turner<sup>48</sup>, the counterfeit self is the institutionalized self that is losing its control because of pressure or being overwhelmed by the surroundings. The difference of counterfeit self from hypocrisy can be seen from the two perspectives. In front of institutional self, hypocrisy is one's failure to live his/her standard. This self is not counterfeit self as long as it does not have any "misrepresentation" motive, exaggerating self-appearance that is not congruent with the real internal situation. In front of impulsive self, hypocrisy means determining self-standard that is not harmonized with individual's capacity and preference. Even though the standard can be lived up (in a way that it is: Done, run, fulfilled), he/she remains a hypocrite if at the same time he must minimize the desire/passion to "get out from/stop" the expectations of the standard.

Vannini and Franzese<sup>49</sup> theoretical study showed that the characteristics of authenticity of the self (the antonym of counterfeit self) consist of two combined components, i.e., "I" (subjective, oriented towards self) and "me" (objective, oriented towards others) borrowing the symbolic interactionist paradigm, "authenticity influences not only self-views but how we negotiate interactions in which self-views are at stake". Based on Vannini and Franzese's<sup>49</sup> theoretical study, authenticity is the function of one's view on his/her moral status. The following sums up their expression:

"(A)uthenticity-as virtuous it may seem-cannot be exempt from the need to strike a balance between ideal and necessity. In fact, it would even seem that being authentic at all times,

under all circumstances, would represent a serious practical problem for the self and society-again, especially, if we view authenticity as a way of acting in accordance to laws of one's own making. Individuals have been found to submerge authenticity for different reasons at times to maintain congeniality, at times for self-protection and at times for self-gain..."<sup>49</sup>.

Authentic/inauthentic self is the result of one's reflection on his/her moral self-image, which can change along with moral behavior quest. The individual is involved in substantial negotiations between his/her personal needs and social influence.

In Gino *et al.*<sup>50</sup> experiments, users of counterfeit products (producing counterfeit self) were given the opportunity to exaggerate their performance to gain bigger financial reward and there is a chance to be appreciated by others. There is an experience of "reducing experienced ethical dissonance" than "reducing anticipated ethical dissonance"<sup>51</sup> constituting a moral justification. The dissonance condition triggers a reaction to conduct several things for self-concept maintenance<sup>52-53</sup>. Some of them are (1) Distancing, i.e., "pointing to other people's moral failings"<sup>51</sup>, (2) Moral hypocrisy, embracing two different cognitive elements at the same time. An example of moral hypocrisy is evaluating our own moral transgressions in a more moderate way that is in line with MD moral justification element; evoking a sense of integrity or decency the feeling as good people based on the willingness to improve self-image. Meanwhile, they know that they are not that good. In other words, they tolerate self-deception, but harshly judge others' moral transgressions<sup>51</sup>. Indeed, one method of dissonance reduction is becoming very critical towards others' moral behaviors as a defensive effort to restore the "polluted/contaminated" moral self-concept. Other dissonance reduction methods can be done by the following series of psychological events<sup>54</sup>: Counterfeit behavior actor experiences self-signaling. This signal shows that there is a discrepancy between the things appeared (such as accessories, behavior) and the "real self" who is wearing the fashion or doing the behavior. The signal is then processed and the person will rethink about him/herself, whether he/she has no integrity, or is not respectable. If he/she accepts, even implicitly, that he/she is immoral, there is a possibility that this person continues his/her moral career on dishonesty track. Thus, it is obvious that regardless whatever ethical dissonance reduction one takes, the counterfeit behavior will lead to mental corruption (counterfeit self). Therefore, the effect of counterfeit behavior does not only refer to oneself (to be more unethical, to be more corrupt) but also refers socially in a form of accusing or even sacrificing others (victimization).

One's behavior history is mostly dominated by ordinary but dishonest/unethical behavior, at least according to Ayal and Gino<sup>55</sup> claim. It is demonstrated by people who, (1) Echo moral values, fight to maintain public and private moral self-image, but who, (2) Behave immorally whenever there is a chance, that they think they can get away with and (3) Feel that they have no problems when they commit "little" dishonesty. Ayal and Gino<sup>55</sup> named the gap between the number (1), number (2) and number (3) as ethical dissonance. "Everyday's life" unethical behavior (which ethic is "ambiguous" and which its unethical behavior seems to be not serious) is, in fact, has a high potential to produce future unethical behavior. This behavior is also known as no harm no foul behavior<sup>56,57</sup>, such as using counterfeit product bringing forth counterfeit self that seems to cause no disadvantage for others. Dissonance reduction, such as trivialization or other cognitive consonance restoration efforts, will lead to higher degree of unethical psychological mechanism<sup>58</sup>. For example, people often underestimate or overlook the true moral cost of the use of the counterfeit product because of motivated forgetting or willful ignorance element. The use of counterfeit product leads to the next unethical behavior (even in a behavior domain that is different from consumptive behavior, such as academic cheating), as found out by Gino *et al.*<sup>50</sup>, because moral leniency and moral disengagement are at work.

Counterfeit self could be measured by self-alienation dimension<sup>59</sup> although the measurement scale excludes misinterpretation motive boosting self-image in the social environment. There are three academic arguments.

The first argument, the self-alienation measurement follows Gino's measurement tradition<sup>50,53</sup> that use the feeling of being alienated to measure counterfeit self. Besides, Rae<sup>60</sup> also stressed that, "If we understand what it is to be alienated, we also, at least implicitly, understand what it is to be authentic. Similarly, if we understand what it is to be authentic, we, at least, implicitly understand that if we lack those aspects of being that constitute an authentic way of being, we are alienated.... By implicitly disclosing what it is to be authentic, a description of alienation also provides us with an understanding of what the actual self should be, what it should strive for and ultimately, the way it should comport itself"<sup>60</sup>.

In simpler words, alienation and authenticity are two sides of the same coin. Alienation refers to a condition where the actual self is not in unity with self history (past perspective) or his/her ideal self (future perspective). Meanwhile, historical and teleological aspects develop the authentic self. Alienation

is an ontological component of authentic self<sup>60</sup>, whereas, the other two components of authentic self (i.e., authentic living and accepting external influence<sup>61</sup>) are just derivations of from socio-behavioral aspects of alienation situation.

The second argument, it was often difficult to manipulate counterfeit behavior. This pragmatic approach recommends measuring the current global self status, i.e., whether or not it was alienated, to know the degree of counterfeit self.

The third argument, the measurement relies on scientific evidence of Wood *et al.*<sup>61</sup> that counterfeit self/self-alienation has a negative correlation with self-acceptance ( $r = -0.39$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). In fact, impression management and self-presentation are commonly used when one has acceptance intention<sup>62-63</sup>. In short, even though counterfeit self is measured only using self-alienation scale without quantifying the ingratiation motive, the scale could indicate the existence of the motive.

Complementing the measure, qualitatively, manipulation check of counterfeit self could be acquired by asking whether those who exhibited counterfeit behavior narrate that they were not being themselves. It should be that they who experience alienation from their true self (e.g., "keeping up with the Jones" to get a high position, pretend to like a job, wearing disliked clothes to appreciate the person who gave, to bear with a conversation because of the worry about being excluded, exhibit the quality of being "easy-going/boisterous" to make many friends when they are actually quiet) will bring to certain negative emotional experience like sad, afraid, angry, less comfortable, annoyed, confused and ashamed. This proposition is based on Gino *et al.*<sup>53</sup> study stated that inauthenticity leads people to experience negative moral emotion like shyness. On the other hand, those who did not exhibit counterfeit behavior might narrate that they became themselves, e.g., stated the truth about themselves to others, narrated something without fear of having to bear consequences, said anything without feeling uncomfortable, had the freedom to defend their opinion without feeling bad. The exhibited emotions might be positive emotions such as pleased, calm, good, happy and confident. Note that negative emotions could also present, mixed with positive emotions. The mixed emotions are common because becoming the true-self often results in depressing social rewards. However, authentic individuals manage to deal with the negative emotions.

Parents can use the findings of this review to be aware of the importance of unconditional positive regard for children so that they do not grow up with inauthentic/counterfeit tendency<sup>64</sup>.



## IMPLICIT SELF-THEORY

Classical discussion on social perception shows that every person holds the implicit theory of self and others that influence one's attitude and behavior<sup>65</sup>. This belief is invisibly at work in understanding and processing social information, influencing social attribution process and providing conclusion and prediction about a social event. The word "implicit" in the implicit theory of self shows that the belief one holds is related to a complex meaning system that is not always be realized<sup>66</sup>.

There are two kinds of self-theory (how one views his/her personality), i.e., entity and incremental theories. According to Dweck<sup>67</sup>, both theories will determine the types of information one seeks, the attention direction and the way to conclude something (attribution) based on the limited data. In non-moral aspect of life like intelligence, it is known that people with entity theory tend to pay more attention to performance. Therefore, an experience of academic failure will bring the people to self-handicapping behavior making them prone to behave negatively towards feedback, defensive, disengage from academic activities, experience helplessness, skip classes and have low aspiration and achievement. Meanwhile, incremental theory one holds predicts the pursuit of mastery and the choosing of challenging tasks that are predicted to increase their skill and ability even though they may experience short confusion or failure, they tend to be persistent, resilient and involved more in various tasks focusing on learning<sup>66</sup>.

Entity theorists use stable, dispositional or characterological individual trait information to judge others and tend to ignore situational information. It is also known as "correspondence bias"<sup>68,69</sup>. Those people believe that the "status" of one's trait and his/her demonstrated behavior have a strong correlation<sup>68,69</sup>. On the other hand, incremental theorists form attribution by using less dispositional information and do not rely on stereotypes. The people appreciate situational process and condition as factors that shape the behavior one exhibits<sup>67-69</sup>.

In the field of morality, Chiu *et al.*<sup>70</sup> investigated the influence of implicit theories (self theories/lay theories). The first claim of their article stated that every moral belief bears in it an implicit theory of moral behavior resources about the individuals and their social world. Chiu *et al.*<sup>70</sup>, through five studies, found out that people who embrace entity theory (fixed mindset) will focus on obligations, i.e., duty-based moral belief, such as the obligation to fulfill the role. The followers of this theory are always "haunted" by a question of "is my behavior already in line with the permanent moral order in the

world?" People with entity self-theory view fixedness of moral order, whereas people with an incremental self-theory view the malleability.

The study of self-theory assumes humans as "dynamic creatures who are highly sensitive to cues in their environment and who are capable of change and growth"<sup>71</sup>. Carol Dweck's self-theory is a motivational model that includes "distinct goals, learning opportunities, degree of effort, reaction to failure and performance" that are proven to influence one's behavior intention<sup>72</sup>. It is very appropriate to set self-theory as a corruption predictor because it describes that every person melts intention and opportunity elements (two elements often generally conceptualized as two main factors of corruption<sup>73</sup>) in a "theory" of viewing the world. The answer to the questions, "will people use or create a chance to do corruption?" and "is corruption intended?" are rooted in the self-theory.

People who embrace entity theory will manage their behavior to maintain status quo or moral prescription that is assumed as static, determined, such as laws, norms, ethical codes and stable moral obligations in society. The behavior that is not in line with the norms will be punished. If the actor is him/herself, he/she will do self-punishment or self-sanction. The steps to deal with negative emotion resulted from the punishment are quickly secured. The problem is, the failure is not further thought and interpreted, but only be repressed. The entity theorists do not object to sacrifice their freedom and rights as long as moral rules are enforced. Good behavior, which is in accordance with the rules, is seen as a "normal" thing that it would not invite appreciation or praise, especially in an exaggerating way<sup>70</sup>.

In the context of intelligence, entity theorists focus more on the effort to document and demonstrate the ability they possess through performance in self-validation framework; e.g., they study not merely to gain and master new knowledge<sup>74</sup>. Dweck and Grant<sup>74</sup> stated clearly the differences of the two theories in dealing with difficult tasks, "for entity theorists, the continued difficulty of the task was a source of distress, whereas, for incremental theorists, the progress was a source of growing confidence and of enjoyment". This is related to morality because in dealing with a moral dilemma, people experience the dilemma as an "easy" or "difficult" matter to solve, people invest effort in reasoning, judging and achieving a moral decision<sup>75,76</sup>.

Incremental theorists will put forward behavior plasticity, historical behavioral changes and learning experience in social life. They believe that every person has the right to develop his/her self-potential toward self-fulfillment. Those with higher incremental theory (lower entity theory) believe that they can



change and grow, that they will not avoid morally worrying situations. They even approach it and persistently face the challenge of morality but at the same time are more willing to fix the mistakes<sup>77</sup>. It is not surprising that their morality is individually developed, not only following the intention of the social. Incremental theorists (with growth mindset) will focus on rights (right-based moral belief; such as the right to have an equal chance), in a way that the rights are contextualized in moral principles<sup>70</sup>. Incremental theorists believe that the world can be shaped so that they are always looking for-not depending themselves on the stabilities of-principles to manage the world to be a better place to live in. Moral orders prevailing in the society are not absolute or static, but dynamic. Because they make moral orders relative, moral obligation is not the "commander". The "commander" is respect for human rights that must always be fought for.

If incremental theorists face or do unethical behavior (such as counterfeit behavior), they will implement negotiation (including self-negotiation) so that their moral self-concept does not immediately drop<sup>70</sup>. This is supported by Miller *et al.*<sup>65</sup> study showed that incremental theorists tend to conduct external attribution, which is viewing a situation as a chance to learn. If one feels that he/she fails in demonstrating moral behavior, for example, because he/she conducts counterfeit behavior, the failure is regarded as challenge and motivation. In other words, they apply moral balancing to increase their moral self-concept and not to give up in conducting internal attribution "I am miserable, my moral quality is bad". They treat the failure of demonstrating ethical behavior as a measurement of to what extend their moral is developed, not to lament but to plan focus and effort to further develop<sup>78</sup>. On the other hand, if they are successful in demonstrating moral behavior, they may be more relaxed and let him/herself experiments with ambiguous moral restriction and see if there is a challenge of a chance to learn from the experience. The point is they focus on the process that considers various psychological processes (such as need, goal, emotional condition and etc.; not one's personality character) and situation, not result.

People with entity theory only focus on the positive quality of moral role models but pay less attention to the fact that moral failure or violation may contribute to their moral development<sup>79</sup>. These people believe that few people possess moral perfection and bear stable, unchangeable moral traits. Meanwhile, people with incremental theory believe that the failure experienced by moral role models inspires moral development because the failure can be seen as a means of learning and growth. They also believe that "moral exemplar" does not belong only to the perfect moral model but also an

imperfect moral model. People with entity theory tend to place themselves as the assessor and judge of the law (act more negatively towards moral transgression), whereas, people with incremental theory tend to emphasize the significance of education, training and social intervention (act more positively toward moral violation situation).

Learning about different affective and cognitive reactions toward moral violations among entity and incremental theorists, it can be assumed that negative emotion is significantly found among entity theorists. Will having a negative affect on a moral violation encourages betterment in behavior? Miller *et al.*<sup>65</sup> previously mentioned about the activated anger in entity theorists when they do moral violation. Entity theorists possess higher negative moral emotion (disgust, anger, negative criticism, insult) after they do moral violation. Miller *et al.*<sup>65</sup> argued that negative affect reaction occurs because entity theorists (compared to incremental theorists) assume that moral violation is always deeply intentional when it was done by the actor. It means that immoral behavior is rooted in the actor's personality, in line with correspondence bias. For entity theorists, the cue of the situation is not sought<sup>80</sup>. The negative affect occurs intuitively and becomes heuristics that is quickly applied into a situation based on social intuitionist model of Haidt<sup>81</sup> in a way that the negative affect "acts" as an affect<sup>82-83</sup> that reflects "retributive" intention towards moral transgression.

Entity and incremental theories are identified as "theories" because they are different from what is known as self "concept". Thomas and Sarnecka<sup>84</sup> explained, "they are rich, structured modes of reasoning deserving of the word 'theory'"<sup>84</sup>. This self-theory determines relationship network between self-concept and antecedents along with the consequences<sup>78</sup>. As an example, the failure someone experiences, academic or moral failure, influences how one views the fact about him/herself (self-concept) and attitude/judgment on the view (self-esteem). Both entity and incremental theories can experience negative self-concept and low self-esteem because of failure. Nevertheless, the thing that sharply differentiates the two theories is how to conceptualize antecedent (attribution; explaining why failure takes place) and restore the self-concept and self-esteem (whether one uses upward or downward social comparison, for example) to maintain positive self-concept. "Theory" in this case is a coherent ideational networks used by lay people (lay theories) defining one's life attributes such as intelligence, personality, as relatively static or dynamic. People who view that the attributes are static (entity theory) will engage in downward social comparison (to create comfort by comparing

him/herself to those whose test scores are lower or those with more moral violations); whereas the ones who view that the attributes are dynamic (incremental theory) will engage in upward social comparison (challenge oneself to learn from those with higher test scores or those with less moral violation). It is obvious that entity vs. incremental “theoretical system” can predict one’s behavioral pattern, including corruption.

This review recommends focusing on entity self-theory (ES) for predicting corruption behavior among Indonesians. There are three reasons. The first reason, the theories exist in a unidimensional construct<sup>70,85</sup>. It means that entity and incremental self-theory is on a continuum, if one’s self-theory (e.g., entity) is low, the other theory (i.e., incremental) is high. Therefore, the measurement needs to be focused on one of the self theories. This position is supported by the empirical findings of Thomas and Sarnecka<sup>84</sup> stated that entity and incremental self-theory are not categorical variables. Psychometrically, they found out that the response to the self-theory psychological scales forms a normal distribution that they concluded, “We found a continuum of beliefs... Our data do not suggest that they are distinct”<sup>84</sup>. More or less people are in particular position between entity and incremental self theories.

The second reason, ES should be prioritized because Indonesian is known as a religious society and at the same time religious prejudice and discrimination are widespread. Meanwhile, it is known that religious prejudice is closely related to fixed mindset or entity self-theory<sup>86</sup>. Therefore, it is interesting to see how entity theory level (high vs. low) predicts corruption behavior.

The third reason, Chiu *et al.*<sup>70</sup> found that compared to American society, Asian society (including Indonesia) embrace entity self-theory because Asian society is oriented to responsibility (duty-based morality) and behave punitively towards transgressions. American society is oriented more to rights (in correlation with incremental self-theory) and behave negotiatively towards moral violations. However, Wong-On-Wing and Lui<sup>87</sup> found the contrary facts that (1) Moral belief of the followers of entity theory tends to be among Americans (as the representative of Westerners) and (2) Moral belief of the followers of incremental theory tend to be among Chinese (as the representative of Easterners). It indicates a complexity that the difference of self-theories reflects also the difference within a culture, not only the difference between cultures.

In measuring self-theory, it is possible to include altogether measurement of individual’s implicit theory of

others, places, things and the world in general. It is known as “generalization of the model beyond the self”<sup>88</sup>. The basic assumption is that the belief in oneself is closely related to belief in the world. For example, if one believes that changeability and controllability of oneself are high, it also applies to what one’s belief in changeability and controllability of the world. A “theoretical system” is also at work in this matter. As an example, those who embrace entity theory will tend to monitor, measure and judge various things, whereas, those who embrace incremental theory will tend to work on and develop the things.

It should also be noticed that entity theorists could be beset by overconfidence bias. They do not need accurate information input to learn effectively. They judge information that was not in line with the belief in positive moral characteristics as interfering and troublesome that they tended to avoid negative and corrective feedback on their morality. Entity theorists are less tolerant of moral behavior deviation based on the existing social system<sup>70</sup>. Therefore, it can be assumed that (1) The interaction between high entity theory and high counterfeit behavior should result in corruption behavior (helplessness phenomenon) and (2) The interaction between low entity theory and high counterfeit behavior should result in less corruption behavior because the self does not provide punishment but a chance to change.

Nevertheless, there might also be another dynamic of entity theorist. Dweck<sup>89</sup> opened a possibility by stating, “fixed mindset (entity theory) gives self-esteem formula and a way to love and respect from others. The mindset presents to offer a simple and direct way to an appreciation and live.... (but) you may say that your effort to be better has failed. And you can still take growth mindset (incremental theory) step. You will feel miserable and keep looking for information that will help you to self betterment.” This perspective might present a challenge for assumption that an entity theory renders the individuals vulnerable to maladaptive reactions in the face of failure, that there is still the “third possibility” besides “entity theory” and “incremental theory”, that is the believe that the self holds entity theory, but taking incremental behavioral steps. Related to this fruitful possibility, Church<sup>90</sup> and Church *et al.*<sup>91</sup> found that implicit theories prevail stronger in individualistic than collectivistic culture provided that “trait and contextual beliefs are not bipolar opposites. Rather, people can be implicit interaction theorists, believing in varying degrees in both the traitedness and contextuality of behavior”<sup>91</sup>.

## ETHICAL MINDSET

One's ways to deal with moral dilemma depends on his/her ethical mindset<sup>92</sup>, whether it is rule-based mindset (deontological thinking)-which measures the goodness of moral behavior based on moral principles/rules or outcome-based mindset (consequentialist thinking) which measures the goodness of moral behavior based on the benefits for as many people as possible (rules can be made relative). Ethical/moral mindset is defined as "the filter of personal beliefs and values deriving from the individual's inner self through which appreciation of, reflection about and actions on situations that develop"<sup>93</sup>. The definition is in accordance with ethical mindset definition used by Cornelissen *et al.*<sup>94</sup>, "past work has demonstrated that this distinction (consequentialism/outcome-based mindset vs. deontology/rule-based mindset) is not exclusively philosophical but that individuals consider it meaningful when reflecting on their behavior, are flexible in the use of either type of moral arguments"<sup>94</sup> Ethical mindset is one of the mindsets besides other mindsets such as analytic mindset, collaborative mindset and action mindset<sup>93</sup>. The strength of outcome-based ethical mindset is its support for cognitive efficiency and society's welfare, the strength of rule-based ethical mindset is its encouragement for perspective taking and religiosity<sup>95</sup>.

Ethical mindset bridges reflection and action. Reflection without action is passivity and action without reflection is thoughtlessness<sup>93</sup>. Ethical mindset is a relevant predictor of moral disengagement or corruption behavior because it fully describes the tendency of action and reflection unity (i.e. readiness to look and act) that influences one's ethical behavior. Ethical mindset is derived from personal moral philosophy<sup>94</sup> and is not rooted in particular religious belief, therefore, it can apply to people with any religions or beliefs. The synonym of mindset is mental set<sup>96</sup>. Operationally, ethical mindset or moral thinking is defined as one's way to deal with a moral dilemma he/she faces<sup>92</sup>.

Using construal level theory (CLT) explanation framework, Mullen and Monin<sup>97</sup> showed that rule-based mindset (deontology) is related to high CLT (abstract moral behavior representation), whereas, outcome-based mindset (consequentialism or utilitarianism) is closely related to low CLT (concrete moral behavior representation). Mental construal characteristics with high CLT are (1) A-contextual, it means that it does not consider a specific situation one faces, (2) Focusing on permanent and cross-situational moral behavior and (3) Answering the question on "why?" (principle). Construal mental characteristics with low CLT are

(1) Contextual, specific, time-bound, (2) Focusing on temporary moral behavior attribute and (3) Answering the question on "how?" (strategy).

People may ask whether the rule considered by rule-based mindset (deontology) followers is the same or similar with duty considered by the followers of entity theory of self. It seems that there are differences. When Cornelissen *et al.*<sup>94</sup> stated that, "Of special interest is the case in which individuals are consistently unethical. In the current studies, we showed that a rule-based mind-set can lead to a consistent pattern of unethical behavior, in which violating a rule becomes the norm," what is referred to as the rule in rule-based mindset is a matter that is personally perceived by individuals as rules or norms and it can change according to the preceding events (in the case stated by Cornelissen *et al.*<sup>94</sup> the past unethical act could become the rule). It means that when past experience is an ethical act, what serves as the rule is the prevailing norm or law in the society. Meanwhile, the duty referred by Chiu *et al.*<sup>70</sup> is always "existing moral order" that is formed by social institutional and social world in general. However, deontology that serves as the base of rule-based mindset has several weaknesses. They are (1) It has no clear values guaranteed by each rule, this perspective cannot explain why a rule must be obeyed, what is the goodness or the badness, as well as what important is that the principle/rule is blindly obeyed and (2) It does not care about the consequence of an action as a result of obeying the rule/principle and this eliminates one's obligation to be responsible for his/her action<sup>30</sup>.

This review recommends outcome-based ethical mindset (OM) as a predictor of corruption behavior because Indonesian society is known as a collectivist society, whereas, utilitarianism (which is the philosophical root of OM) is the foundation of collectivism<sup>98</sup>. Based on CLT characteristics (high vs. low), people with the rule-based mindset (associated with high CLT) view their moral behavior from time to time as the reflection or derivation of their global, coherent personality or identity and overarching behavior in various long-term situations<sup>97</sup>. Therefore, it is logical to assume that rule-based mindset can predict moral consistency, i.e., doing corruption after doing a counterfeit behavior. In this case, psychological consonance is maintained<sup>94</sup>. Abstraction leads to moral consistency because it focuses on superordinate goals making a person monitors whether his/her behavior closer to his/her moral values or principles. If one embraces rule-based ethical mindset, they will think that counterfeit behavior and counterfeit self are parts of their moral principles that they will always hold the principles by manifesting immoral behavior (corruption).

In contrast, people with the outcome-based mindset (associated with low CLT) view their moral behavior from time to time as ways or means to achieve moral self-image. In this case, moral self-image is preserved. The ways or means can change (such as turned, deviated and etc.) from time to time. Therefore, it is logical to assume that outcome-based mindset can predict moral balancing, i.e., less doing corruption after doing a counterfeit behavior. Concretization leads to moral balancing because, in practice, people can see the constraints of their moral behavior clearer. If a person experiences moral deprivation due to a counterfeit behavior and he/she exercises consequentialism thinking, he/she will use the strategic means to return to be a morally acceptable person by not being corrupt.

In the medical field, Sade<sup>99</sup> discussed the reason why focusing on outcome-based mindset (consequentialism) by prioritizing beneficence ethical principles, "always act to the greatest benefit of your patient's health"<sup>100</sup> without considering autonomy ethical principle has its own problem. Sade responded to Tavaglione and Hurst<sup>100</sup>, who justified the act of "lying for the goodness of patients". Tavaglione and Hurst<sup>100</sup> gave an example of an ethical dilemma situation. A patient, X, is diagnosed by a doctor that he/she needs treatment Y. No experienced doctor will be able to deny the fact. Patient X also completely agrees to be given Y treatment. However, based on the insurance system X has, it is impossible to fund Y treatment based on the current diagnosis. Patient X can receive Y treatment if the doctor does what is known as gaming the healthcare system by giving a false diagnosis or change the diagnosis or in short: Lie to an institution.

Tavaglione and Hurst<sup>100</sup> argued that gaming the system can be justified by a number of arguments. The first argument, the medical world bears internal morality, which is a hippocratic argument, stating that patient's interest to be cured or to fight against his/her illness must be prioritized. Therefore, based on this argument, this system can be "corrupted", "breached" in order to reinforce the inherent internal morality in the medical world.

The second argument, people live in the world with a not so ideal social structure that it is not appropriate to exercise ideal theory. The possible implication is, "we are thus interested in agents eager to act as well as possible in circumstances that are not as good as possible"<sup>100</sup>. In this context, lying to save the patient and/or other similar actions on behalf of "making a better world", can be justified. If the doctor does not tell a lie, the doctor can be accused of conducting self-defeating because he/she desires an ideal world but he/she hinders the realization of idealization's outcome (which can only be achieved by lying). In addition, in the context of the world's situation where "a just rule" is not

guaranteed, distributive principle and contractual justice justified by rule-based mindset (deontological thinking) cannot be taken care of.

The third argument, moral intuitionist reasoning will defend the stance that there is no absolute rule that prevails in any situation forever, including the rule to tell the truth or not to tell a lie. Based on this argument, the rationality of humanity (for example, "must be honest") is not the goal, but a means to achieve the goal of humanity. In the context of doctor-patient-insurance above, the act of lying may promote humanity. It is obvious that the arguments proposed by Tavaglione and Hurst<sup>100</sup> are based on relativization of moral rules by exercising outcome-based mindset to advocate perceived positive consequence/outcome.

Nevertheless, Sade<sup>99</sup> criticized Tavaglione and Hurst<sup>100</sup> by stating that doctors who accept Tavaglione and Hurst<sup>100</sup> suggestion are indeed practicing self-deception. Even though he/she relies on "internal morality", the doctor must realize that they get the personal financial benefit when they give treatment Y to his/her patient. Self-deception brings about a consequence, the doctors experience moral erosion, a moral disengagement phenomenon, especially when habituation takes place; the doctors could repeatedly tell lies to the insurance company on behalf of humanity or medical morality. It should be remembered that this self-deception also takes place in one's experience with counterfeit self.

Another explanation why outcome-based ethical mindset would predict corruption behavior in a positive direction is because antecedent event and psychological mechanism (both physiologically and interpersonally) underlying risky acts (e.g., mocking, insulting, violating the law, act aggressively and etc.) in uncertain situations are similar to consequentialist/utilitarianist position in moral dilemma, both produce negative affect<sup>101</sup>. The antecedents referred to are (1) Neurocognitive antecedent in the form of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) brain lesion and psychopathology, (2) Neurochemical antecedent in the form of serotonin activity, (3) Hormonal antecedent in the form of testosterone increase, (4) Intrapsychic antecedent in the form of positive effect and (5) Interpersonal antecedent in the form of power and social connection. These all antecedents have been proven to increase both risk taking and outcome-based mindset as well as regulate negative affect after both take place. Meanwhile, corruption is an example of risky acts. The similarity of the two (risky and outcome-based acts) is that there is a cognitive process saying that the person is able to deal with and manage negative affective process resulted from a decision making in uncertainty or utilitarian/consequentialist moral choice.

When people reject deontological/rule-based principle (the opposite of consequentialism/utilitarianism/outcome-based ethical mindset), the individual has actually been in a "moral uncertainty" situation because he/she experiences disconnection from moral principles, values and intuition. The premise proposed by Lucas and Galinsky<sup>101</sup> was that, in everyday reality, utilitarian act requirements are not easily fulfilled. They further stated, "limited time, money and resources mean that maximizing utility for some involves trading off the utility of others. People often deviate from utility maximization in favor of alternatives that align with their moral intuitions and values"<sup>101</sup>. This explanation emphasizes that people may have difficulties in separating outcome-based ethical mindset (utilitarianism) from rule-based ethical mindset (deontology) in psychological, moral intuition level. In this way, consequentialist/utilitarian acts are actually in psychological tensions, "grey" area. Benefits maximization cannot be guaranteed in the midst of the limitations. In this situation, if negative affect regulation is ongoing, consequentialists are ready to take risks that lead them to moral disengagement and corruption behavior.

Applying developmental psychology perspective, it needs to be noticed that the ethical position of university students with outcome-based ethical mindset is predicted to be more stable than high school students' with the same mindset. High school students were more prone to make one option as a replacement of other options (i.e., choosing outcome-based ethical mindset because they do not like rules) and regarded consequentialism as a challenging choice (in a favorable way) because teenagers tend to favor risky behavior and rule violation as well as high self-orientation. It is in accordance with socioemotional system development in the brain during puberty period that seeks for "reward" especially in front of their peers and it will decrease when they are entering early adolescent period due to cognitive control system development<sup>102</sup>. This reality shows more unstable ethical attitudes in high school students<sup>103</sup>. This becomes truer in the educational system of high schools in Indonesia that does not emphasize the use of debate or disputation methods. Meanwhile, higher education, with its particular philosophy classes, helps students explore and confirm their ethical positions. Therefore, it should be expected that the choosing of outcome-based ethical mindset by university students would reflect more their actual positions, not a displacement phenomenon as might be found among high school students.

It should also be noted that consequentialism (outcome-based ethical mindset) and egoism's features intersect in terms of using calculation logic. Kahane *et al.*<sup>104</sup> reminded that there is the possibility of a gap between utilitarianists/consequentialists in philosophical and

lay-psychological level. For example, outcome-based ethical mindset philosophical characteristics of "no-nonsense, tough-headed and unsentimental approach to morality"<sup>104</sup> in psychological level are not in line with moral intuition and even develops skepticism towards morality. On the contrary, lay people who impartially concern with public interests will not easily let go deontological principles. In other words, they also experience internal tension.

Furthermore, Garofalo *et al.*<sup>7</sup> argued that variance in moral practices and ethical theories can actually be reduced to a particular underlying aspect. For example, deontology (rule-based ethical mindset) and consequentialism (outcome-based ethical mindset) overlap somewhat in ethical principles. However, in consequentialism, principle upholds the greatest happiness for the greatest number. In contrast, deontology-although it is not based on the good or bad judgment of an action's consequences-implicitly recognizes the ultimate goal's existence<sup>7</sup>. Furthermore, according to Garofalo *et al.*<sup>7</sup>, convergence between consequentialism and deontology lies not in intuitionism because intuitions "like tastes, provide little basis for argumentation," but rather in character theory or virtue ethics that "guarantee" ethics' universalism. It is worth providing a concrete example of convergence that has implications for ethical judgments on corruption. However, virtue ethics, deontology and consequentialism/utilitarianism can be reduced again to an aspect of the "hypothetical imperatives" system<sup>105</sup>, which produces social contract theory, capable of covering all of these. The coverage is evident in the conceptual relationship: "If you want the outcome, then you ought to do what will produce it. Which in this case means the virtues of character that will more reliably cause in you the behaviors that will generate that most desired outcome"<sup>105</sup>.

## PAST BEHAVIOR

Rusch<sup>106</sup> study of corruption cases in some countries showed that an individual's devoirs to past behavior are in line with "foot-in-the-door" phenomenon that is explained in social psychology. That is, one's commitment to small scale behavior will encourage consistency until the person is able to do the similar behavior in a bigger scale. In this case, a mental heuristic is served as one's benchmark to continue similar ethical or unethical behavior in the future. It will be dangerous if past unethical behavior is automatically "rationalized" (e.g., being a counterfeit self) as one of cognitive dissonance reduction ways, making it appears in line with positive moral self-concept, especially when the unethical behavior is ambiguous<sup>55</sup>, an example is bringing home office's stationery. In this case, the absence of feedback<sup>107</sup> leads to future

unethical behaviors, but, it is unique that self-concept of the actor is still the ethical one (he/she thinks that he is morally acceptable).

In everyday life, people meet two general phenomena of the consistency of one's moral behavior. Those who never cease to do good deeds or continuously do bad things have demonstrated moral consistency. However, there are people who, in daily life, are known as virtuous people, transform into actors of corruption, murderers, representing moral licensing phenomenon, i.e., doing unethical after doing ethical things. The other way around, a cheater or plagiarist who demonstrates repentance ("to turn, return to the right path") and other prosocial behaviors (such as donating to orphans), representing moral balancing phenomenon, i.e., doing ethical after doing unethical things. In relation to this, Zimbardo (as cited in Dittmann<sup>108</sup>) stated, "That line between good and evil is permeable," Zimbardo said, "Any of us can move across it... all have the capacity for love and evil-to be Mother Theresa, to be Hitler or Saddam Hussein. It's the situation that brings that out"<sup>108</sup>.

There are some "individual's situations" that are going to be identified and determined as the variables moderating past/prior behavior in predicting future moral behavior. Blanken *et al.*<sup>109</sup> identified five moderators: "(1) The type of moral licensing induction (traits vs. actions), (2) The behavior measured in the dependent variable (actual vs. hypothetical) and (3) The domain in which the behaviors take place (same vs. different) as well as (4) Article status (published vs. unpublished) and (5) Control condition (neutral vs. negative)"<sup>109</sup>. Variables number (1), (2) and (3) are categorized as theoretical moderators, whereas, the other two are methodological moderators. As an example, the hypothesis proposed by Blanken *et al.*<sup>109</sup> stated that (1) the act of remembering our own moral behaviors leads to moral licensing; on the contrary, remembering our own moral principles/characteristics leads to moral consistency, (2) demonstrating unethical behaviors leads to higher moral licensing on the same or similar field behavior. The reason is that remembering behavior/action make one feels that he/she has made some progress on his/her morality (closer to moral goal) that it will be easier for him/her to relax or even release his/her moral ambition (because it is "a little bit more"). On the contrary, remembering a moral characteristics/principles makes one activates his/her general moral identity that facilitates him/her to behave according to moral norms.

"Mental accounting" argument can be used to see the above phenomena clearer. The analogy is if one unexpectedly receives some amount of money from a particular field (such as, plane passengers receive financial compensation from the airline due to delayed flight), then it will be easier for the

individual to spend the money for the same field (for example, use the money to buy more luxurious dinner in the flight). It is not surprising because it is easier for behaviors to build "network" in a near or similar field. Nevertheless, 91 researches involving 7397 participants did not find the significance of moderation effect of variables number (1), (2), (3) and (5)<sup>110</sup>. Their findings only confirmed moderation effect of publication bias in moral licensing researches. It means that moral licensing effect is bigger in published articles.

Mullen and Monin<sup>97</sup> did not conduct empirical research like Blanken *et al.*<sup>109</sup>, but they conducted a systematic review. Based on the review, they offer five perspectives that moderate sequential moral behavior, i.e., (1) Construal level (abstract vs. concrete), (2) Progress versus commitment, (3) Identification, (4) Value reflection indicated by the initial behavior and (5) Ambiguity of initial and target behavior. Mullen and Monin<sup>97</sup> claimed that moderator variables based on the five overarching variables could be produced and the mechanism of moral behavior consistency can be discovered.

## MORAL EMOTION

Pizarro<sup>110</sup> suggested that the court system is mistaken when it assumes that the jury (or judge, in the Indonesian context) believes that emotions have no role in decision-making. This bias was inspired by a Kantian philosophical view that emotions should be avoided or ignored because (1) They can contaminate a person's moral thinking or moral reasoning, (2) Emotions prevent a person from impartiality, an attribute required by the justice system because emotions include features of distortive favoritism, (3) Emotions are vulnerable to be influenced by any situation (e.g., light, smell, physical appearance, event) and (4) Emotions are anti-intellectual, irrational and involuntary, they result in a person deciding not on the basis of free will or authentic choice<sup>110</sup>.

However, moral theorists often forget that existence of moral principles and reasoning (*vis-à-vis* moral emotion) does not automatically imply the application or actualization of the principles when a concrete situation needs or requires them<sup>110</sup>. On the contrary, moral emotion-interacting with moral reasoning-recognizes and tells how and when a concrete moral situation must be handled by a moral agent. In this case, moral emotion produces higher-order moral judgment. Moral emotion and moral reasons can be mutually inclusive or complementary in giving feedback. This fact overcomes objections about the significance of the "bad" role of moral emotion in moral judgment. Apparently, the real significance-at least based on current emotional theories-is good/positive.

According to Blair and Fowler<sup>111</sup>, moral emotion is related to the interests and welfare of whole society including an individual. Moral emotion emerges as a response to a moral violation or as a motivation for someone to conduct moral behaviors<sup>112</sup>. This emotion is a response to all forms of social change, threat or opportunity that can affect a person's selfhood<sup>112</sup>. When moral standards are violated, moral emotions or self-conscious emotions respond with the emergence of feelings that serve as moral barometers, such as guilt and shame<sup>76</sup>.

The emergence of guilt and shame can occur in two conditions that arise as reactions to anticipation and to consequences<sup>76</sup>. When a person intends to act in a way that deviates from a moral standard, he/she can preliminarily evaluate the act's consequences leading to the raise of anticipatory guilt or shame<sup>76</sup>. In contrast, if a person simply acts without any preliminary judgment, then the appearance of guilt or shame functions as a consequence. In the case of anticipatory guilt or shame, what matters is the person's proneness to guilt or shame. In the consequential case, if the person does not anticipate at all, or does anticipate but neglects the feeling and does not perceive any impact, the person is said less prone to guilt or shame and so does not restrain norm-violating behavior. The "proneness" construct describes (1) The degree of a person's moral internalization, which affects, (2) Anticipation of moral emotion for future moral transgression, which in turn affects (3) The predictability of unethical behavior. The significant contribution of this moral emotion approach is that the burden on structural approaches to corruption prevention can be reduced since this approach believes that "public surveillance is not required to prevent moral transgressions; instead, (people's) conscience guides them"<sup>113</sup>.

Louie<sup>114</sup> explained further differences in functional roles between shame and guilt in society's everyday reality:

"In shame-based cultures, public humiliation, scorn or censure are relied upon more heavily to keep individuals in obedience whereas, the Western notion of guilt and corrective behaviors comes from an individual's development of an internal conscience.... A traditional Westerner may experience shame as a result of something they did, whereas, Asians entrenched in a shame-bound system or culture will experience shame not only individually but also collectively when someone has done something dishonorable"<sup>114</sup>.

Proneness to guilt and shame<sup>115</sup> cannot stand alone in initiating or preventing corrupt behavior, but such proneness does affect judgment (1) About the harm and benefits of corruption (which affect judgment about corruption's

effects on justice), (2) About corruption's acceptability from a cultural point of view and (3) About the tolerableness of moral transgression as a retributive instrument against "psychological contract" violations.

Integrating the moral emotion and moral reasoning (compare also: Abraham and Pradipto<sup>116</sup> for Indonesian representation on "corruption") perspectives, from the perspective knowledge management, people can even learn from the prisoners<sup>117</sup> about the proposed variables in this review and, accordingly, build anti-corruption e-learning sites<sup>16</sup> that supports corruption prevention.

## **CONCLUSION**

This review found a hypothetical model of the corruption psychology of which the novelties are (1) Its coverage of the ethical psychology, social context, time perspective and the dynamics of moral behavioral change and (2) its antecedent attempt to have dialogues with cultural arguments.

## **SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT**

This present review discovered a conjectural-theoretical model that is useful for explaining and predicting corruption behavior. This model is beneficial in supporting corruption prevention programs held by Corruption Eradication Commission and its stakeholders. For example, the model could be applied in designing instructional courses (in the school context), training curriculums (in the office context) and social intervention strategies (in the community context) to raise awareness about personal and social dynamics that influence the tendency of corruption. Another benefit is that judicial decision makers on corruption cases could optimize this model by integrating psychological viewpoints concerning counterfeit self, moral emotion, ethical mindset, self-theory, past behavior and moral disengagement in achieving law enforcement approaching the sense of community justice. This study will help future researchers to uncover the very soft sides of corruption behavior by testing the model, wholly or partially, using correlational and/or (quasi-)experimental as well as cross-sectional and/or longitudinal methodologies. Further studies could also integrate literacy perspectives on corruption at the local, provincial and national levels. The innovated theory should be a socio-psycho-ethical psychology of corruption synthesizing the relevant social psychological mini-theories and ethical perspectives.



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